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INTRODUCTION 
In September of  1998 the Judicial Conference abandoned its 
most recent attempt  to regulate  the timing  of interviews  and offers  in 
the process  for hiring  federal  judicial  law clerks.  In September  of 1999 
most prominent  law schools abandoned  or cut back their attempts  to 
regulate the time at which faculty recommendation  letters could be 
sent.  Thus,  the law clerk hiring  process  now gets underway  at the be- 
ginning  of the second  year of law school,  roughly  two years  before  the 
clerkship  positions  themselves  would  begin. 
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What is going on here, and what, if anything,  should be done 
about it? To answer  the first question,  we present a wide range  of new 
and systematic empirical data from judges and students about their 
experiences  in the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks,  and we show 
how the problems  of this market  resemble problems  in a broad set of 
other markets  in the economy.  To answer  the second question, about 
possible reform of the law clerk market, we describe some of the 
unique  features  of this market  that make reform  particularly  challeng- 
ing and consider whether there are ways to adapt the reforms that 
have succeeded  in other markets  to these unique  features. 
Federal  judicial clerkships  represent  an important  point of entry 
to many of the most sought-after  positions in the legal profession. 
Every year top students from elite law schools compete for positions 
with judges who can help them to land Supreme Court clerkships, 
plum teaching  jobs, and competitive law firm positions.1  At the same 
time, federal judges depend heavily on their law clerks to aid them 
with their workload.2 
The essential problem  with how this important  market  presently 
functions  is that it is difficult  to establish  the time at which  the market 
will operate.  Any time that is set will tend to "unravel"  because  judges 
have an incentive to "jump  the gun,"  hiring  slightly earlier than their 
competitors,  to get the pick of the candidates.3  Students have strong 
reasons  to accept  early offers from  judges,  among  other things  because 
they will not know what their other options may be, and also because 
it is, quite simply,  difficult and uncomfortable  to hold off a federal 
judge.  Judge  Kozinski  explains  the incentive on the judge side:  "From 
the judge's perspective, making an early offer allows him to ...  attract 
candidates who might not otherwise seriously consider him for a 
clerkship."4  "[T]he ability to make offers early"  is "a very important 
bargaining  tool."5  As described by one respondent to our survey of 
federal appellate  judges: 
I live in, and my office is located in, a country  town ....  [I]t is not 
every young man or woman who will come here to live; indeed, 
most won't.... 
[Initially]  I did not employ law clerks until they had finished the 
first term of their senior year of law school....  I soon found out 
1  See generally  Alex Kozinski,  Confessions  of a Bad  Apple,  100  Yale L J 1707,1709  (1991) 
(describing  judges'  influence  over clerks'  future  career  trajectories). 
2  See Patricia  M.  Wald,  Selecting  Law Clerks,  89 Mich  L Rev 152,153  (1990)  (describing  the 
effects  of clerk  quality  on judges'  productivity). 
3  See Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Re- 
lated to the Timing of Market Transactions,  84 Am Econ Rev 992,992  (1994). 
4  Kozinski,  100  Yale L J at 1720  (cited  in note 1). 
5  Id at 1719. 
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that it was more and more difficult  to get law clerks  from  the top 
of the class....  But I have found that there are a few people in 
the top of the class at most law schools who had rather  be as- 
sured  of a job early,  even in a town this size, than  to wait and en- 
ter the contest in becoming  clerks for judges in the larger  cities 
with the larger  and  better-advertised  reputations.6 
The result of this incentive  for jumping  the gun is a situation  in 
which  judges  scheme  to outmaneuver  one another  in the effort  to hire 
desirable  clerks.  Judges  accuse  their  colleagues  of "frequenting  mater- 
nity wards  to make sure they get the 'best' clerks."7  The frenzy  of hir- 
ing has cast the judiciary  into disrepute  in some eyes-a  concern  that 
judges  have often voiced over the years,  and a concern  that  is dramati- 
cally confirmed  by some of the striking  stories told by students  in re- 
sponse to our empirical  investigation.  The process  by which  clerks  are 
hired  has other  negative  consequences  as well, as we describe  below. 
Part I of our analysis provides a normative  framework  within 
which  to analyze  the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks.  There  is a 
complicated  economics  literature  on the efficiency  of hiring  in mar- 
kets with timing  problems;  we attempt  to distill the essential  compo- 
nents of this literature,  which  have not been well understood  in the ex- 
isting legal literature  on the law clerk market,  and we highlight  some 
special  features  of the economics  literature  that bear on law clerk  hir- 
ing specifically.  Our normative  framework  provides  a context within 
which  to view our empirical  results. 
A fundamental  goal of our project  has been to gain an improved 
understanding  of how the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks  actu- 
ally operates.  There  are many  rumors  and opinions  about  this market, 
and few hard facts.  To remedy the lack of systematic  knowledge,  we 
have surveyed both judges (including  Supreme Court Justices) and 
students  about the law clerk hiring  process.  The little empirical  work 
that presently  exists is quite dated (particularly  in this rapidly  chang- 
ing market)  and also is much  less comprehensive  than our effort.8  We 
use our results to present a broad empirical  picture of the market 
from  both  judges'  and students'  perspectives. 
6  1999 Judge Survey #26d. For details on our citation practices for survey responses, see 
Part II.B.2. 
7  Abner J. Mikva, Judicial Clerkships:A Judge's View,  36 J Legal Educ 150,152 (1986). 
8  A survey of judges was conducted in the early 1990s, as was a survey of law students. See 
Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer, and Guido Calabresi, The Federal  Judicial Law Clerk Hir- 
ing Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 Yale L J 207, 212 & n 16 (1994) (describing 
survey of federal appellate judges to determine whether they would agree to a benchmark start- 
ing date for interviews); Lynn K. Rhinehart, Note, Is There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk 
Selection Process?, 83 Georgetown L J 575, 577-78  (1994) (describiag survey of third-year law 
students). 
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Part II describes our empirical findings.  On the judge side, we 
surveyed all federal appellate judges in both 1999 and 2000 and re- 
ceived responses from 65 percent of the judges in 1999 and from 54 
percent in 2000.  This gives us a reasonably  comprehensive  picture of 
the law clerk market as viewed from the judge side. We also sought 
the input of the nine Justices  of the United States Supreme  Court  and 
received responses from eight of them. On the student side, we con- 
ducted  surveys  in 1999 and again  in 2000 about the hiring  process.  Our 
results  provide a window on how the hiring  process  is regarded  by ap- 
plicants,  how well students are being matched to judges,  and how the 
process  is affecting  students'  decisions  to apply  for clerkships. 
Part III looks at other markets  that have had difficulty  in estab- 
lishing the timing of transactions.  Markets  with such timing problems 
can be found in a wide range of settings;  they include  markets  for ath- 
letic tournaments,  markets  for medical residents,  and markets  for so- 
cial club memberships.  Part III attempts to educe from the existing 
economics literature  what has been learned from the extensive study 
of this other set of markets. 
Part IV tackles the question of what,  if anything,  should be done 
in the market  for federal judicial  law clerks.  The main possibilities,  in 
their rough  contours,  are familiar  from the existing  legal literature:  (1) 
Leave the hiring process unregulated (as at present); (2) Establish 
start dates for offers and perhaps  also interviews  (a strategy  that has 
been tried in the law clerk market on numerous  past occasions);  and 
(3) Institute some form of centralized  matching  of judges and clerks. 
The last approach  is the one presently  used in the market  for medical 
residency  positions (as well as in a variety of other markets).  One of 
the present authors  (Roth) was responsible  for the design of the cen- 
tralized  matching  process  presently  used for medical  residencies.9 
Because of the diversity  of opinion expressed in the existing lit- 
erature  and in our surveys  on the matter of reform,  we will not try to 
focus on any one of these three approaches.  Rather we shall attempt 
to describe,  in light of the evidence and insights presented in Parts I 
through  III, how each of these approaches  could best be implemented. 
We will then assess each solution's likelihood of success in light of 
what we know from our evidence and the experience of other mar- 
kets. Of the possibilities  we consider,  the most promising  appears  to 
be the use of a centralized  matching  process  for those  judges who wish 
their clerks to be eligible for  United States Supreme Court clerkships, 
with enforcement  of the centralized  matching  requirement  by the Su- 
9  See  Alvin  E.  Roth  and  Elliott  Peranson,  The Redesign  of  the Matching Market for 
American  Physicians: Some  Engineering Aspects  of  Economic  Design,  89 Am  Econ  Rev  748 
(1999). 
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preme Court.  We describe  this proposal  in more detail in Part IV.D 
below.  It is meant to pick up on a fundamental  finding  of our judge 
survey responses;  the finding is that judges are not and do not per- 
ceive themselves  to be a homogenous  group  when it comes to the hir- 
ing of law clerks. 
I.  A NORMATIVE  FRAMEWORK 
A natural  prerequisite  for assessing  whether  what  is happening  in 
the market for federal judicial law clerks is good or bad is a set of 
normative  criteria  against  which to make that assessment.  We begin 
with the concern  most often voiced by judges-that  the current  proc- 
ess casts the bench  into disrepute.  We then turn  to the question  of the 
efficiency  and perceived  fairness  of the current  process of law clerk 
hiring. 
Throughout  the discussion  it is important  to distinguish  between 
two separate,  although  related,  features  of the market  for federal  judi- 
cial law clerks.  The first is that hiring  tends to occur in a rough-and- 
tumble  manner,  with  judges  making  short-fuse  offers,  trying  to outma- 
neuver  each other,  and  so forth.  The second,  distinct  feature  is that  hir- 
ing tends to occur  very early  in the student's  law school career.  These 
two things  are related  in important  ways,  of course,  but for our norma- 
tive analysis  it is important  to distinguish  between  them.'? 
Throughout  our discussion  we focus on the market for federal, 
and especially  federal appellate,  judicial  clerkships.  We adopt this fo- 
cus because  the market  for federal,  and particularly  federal  appellate, 
clerkships  is the market  in which  most of the problems  with which  we 
are concerned  have arisen. 
A.  Disillusionment  with the Federal  Bench 
From judges' perspective,  the biggest concern with the current 
state of the law clerk market  seems to be the disrepute  cast upon the 
bench by the way in which hiring  is done. (Judges  are also likely to 
care about some of the other problems  we describe  below.) Indeed, 
the impetus  for one of the prior  reform  efforts was an article  in The 
New York  Times  that painted a colorful  picture  of the judicial  "free- 
for-all"  that occurred  as judges "behav[ed]  like 6-year-olds"  in the 
rush to hire law clerks."  One judge likened the process to a "calf 
10  See Hao Li and Sherwin Rosen, Unraveling  in Matching Markets,  88 Am Econ Rev 371, 
371-72 (1998) (discussing the distinction between strategic behavior in transactions  and how early 
the transactions  occur). 
11  See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 209-10 (cited in note 8), quoting David 
Margolick,  At the Bar:  Annual Race for Clerks  Becomes a Mad Dash, with  Judicial Decorum Left in 
the Dust, NY Times B4 (Mar 17,1989). 
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scramble,"  which is "the low point of many western rodeos.  A small 
number of calves are turned loose in the arena, along with a larger 
number  of adolescent  cow persons.  The latter attempt  to seize, subdue 
and carry out the former.  The SPCA [Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals] writes letters to the editor during  the following 
week."1'  (Presumably the  "adolescent cow persons" here  are the 
judges.) 
The "judicial  disrepute"  normative  perspective on the law clerk 
market is relatively simple.  A system in which hiring occurred  in an 
orderly  and respectable  manner  would be preferable  to a system that 
can be likened to a "calf  scramble."  The fact that hiring  occurs  early  in 
the students'  law school careers  might  not be an independent  problem 
on this view; rather it may be merely a symptom of the other prob- 
lem-that  judges are jockeying for position and trying to outmaneu- 
ver one another  in the competition  for the best law clerks. 
Other normative  criteria  turn  out to be more complex,  as we shall 
see. 
B.  Efficiency 
From an economist's perspective, the natural question to  ask 
about the market for federal judicial law clerks is whether it is effi- 
cient.  A foundation  for an efficient  market  is the ability  of market  par- 
ticipants to consider and compare the alternatives available in the 
marketplace.13  Thus one potential source of inefficiency in the law 
clerk market  is that the "calf  scramble"  forces judges and students  to 
make choices before they can make real comparisons.  A second (re- 
lated but distinct) potential cause of inefficiency  is the early date at 
which hiring takes place. If the quality of the match between judge 
and clerk depends on attributes  that are not adequately  predicted  by 
information  available  after the first year of law school (and would be 
better predicted  by a fuller law school record),  then hiring  may be oc- 
curring  at an inefficiently  early  time.14 
12  Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 210 n 8 (cited in note 8) (quoting Judge Al- 
fred T. Goodwin). 
13  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 992 (cited in note 3). 
14  Note  that salaries are highly regulated in the law clerk market. For recent analyses of 
matching in contexts in which salaries are flexible, see Hao Li and Wing Suen, Risk Sharing, Sort- 
ing, and Early Contracting, 108 J Pol Econ  1058 (2000); Wing Suen, A  Competitive Theory of 
Equilibrium and Disequilibrium  Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching, 31 Rand J Econ 101 (2000). 
For a discussion of relaxing salary restrictions in the market for federal judicial law clerks, see 
Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial Clerkship Selection Process, 59 Md L 
Rev  129, 167-72  (2000). However, many of the inefficiency  results apply both to matching with 
fixed  salaries  and to matching with flexible  salaries. See, for example, Roth  and Xing, 84 Am 
Econ Rev at 1034-35  (cited in note 3). 
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We elaborate  on these issues below,  considering  them in the light 
of several  different  possible  standards  of efficiency. 
1.  Pareto  efficiency. 
One standard  is Pareto efficiency,  which  says that an outcome is 
efficient  as long as there is no way to make  one or more parties  better 
off without  making  at least one person  worse off.  Under this standard, 
the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks  is likely to be efficient.  The 
Pareto standard  is notoriously  limited in its usefulness,  for rarely  can 
one make some people better  off without  making  even a single  person 
worse  off.1 
To be sure,  it is possible that the law clerk market  is suboptimal 
for all participants.  Everyone  might  be better off if hiring  occurred  in 
an orderly  manner,  at a later time,  or both.16  But it seems more likely 
that some gun-jumping  judges  would  be made worse off by such a re- 
form,  since they would no longer have the bargaining  advantage  that 
they seek to get from acting  early.  (Certainly  Judge  Kozinski's  view in 
his well-known article Confessions of a Bad Apple seems to be that 
such  reform  would  make  him worse  off.'7) 
Thus,  the remainder  of our analysis  will consider  two other,  more 
useful  conceptions  of "efficiency." 
2.  Maximizing  the "sum  total of satisfaction"  of judges  and 
clerks. 
If the standard  of efficiency  is not Pareto efficiency  but instead 
some broader  notion of maximizing  something  like "the sum total of 
the satisfaction"  (however measured) of judges and students with 
their matches,  where some parties' gains can be traded off against 
others'  losses,  then several  arguments  suggest  that the current  market 
is likely to be inefficient.  We first consider  the nature  of the process 
and then the distinct  issue of the early  time at which  hiring  is done.  In 
both cases,  however,  the inefficiency  we identify  may be muted  by the 
fact that the positions  in question  last for only a short time, and also 
by the fact that each judge has multiple  law clerks,  who are plausible 
substitutes  for one another. 
a)  The nature of the process.  One benefit of a market is that it 
brings  together  many  buyers  and sellers  at the same time,  so that they 
can consider  a wide range  of transactions.18  But the present  market  for 
judicial  clerks  is quite narrow:  the buyers  (of clerks'  services)  and  sell- 
15  See, for example, Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth  a Value?,  9 J Legal Stud 191,193 (1980). 
16  See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1034-35,1039-40  (cited in note 3). 
17  Kozinski. 100 Yale L J at 1708-08,1719-21  (cited in note 1). 
18  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 992 (cited in note 3). 
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ers (of those services)  typically  can consider  very few possible transac- 
tions.  Indeed,  as we document  below,  in many instances  the sellers can 
consider only one possible transaction-the  one with the judge who 
first makes them an offer.'9 
Why are many of the gains of a market  lost when participants  are 
not able to consider a range of options? In a market with limited 
numbers  of buyers and sellers,  parties are not able to gather  informa- 
tion about multiple options and then act on that information  to seek 
out their most preferred  alternatives.  Choices must be made from a 
very small set of alternatives  and in a very compressed  period. Deci- 
sions must be reached on the basis of extremely  limited information. 
And if participants  try to refine their information,  they may not be 
able to do so in a timely enough fashion,  since time spent in ultimately 
fruitless courtship (for instance, in making an offer that is subse- 
quently refused) means that other candidates  will have matched and 
left the market.  All of these features have the potential to introduce 
substantial  inefficiency.20  In addition,  this process  may be so unappeal- 
ing to some clerkship  candidates  that they drop out of the process al- 
together. 
b) Early hiring. The costs of a rough-and-tumble  process exist 
whatever the timing of hiring;  even if such a process occurred  at the 
middle or the end of students'  third  year of law school, the inability  of 
participants  to consider  a range of options would reduce the ordinary 
gains from a well-functioning  market.  The fact that hiring also occurs 
very early in students'  law school career poses a distinct  set of prob- 
lems. These are mostly related to the limited amount of information 
available when hiring is done early (wholly apart from the informa- 
tional limitations  that result  from a chaotic  process). 
As will be described more fully in Part II, almost two-thirds  of 
the federal appellate  judges responding  to our survey  about the 1999- 
2000 law clerk hiring season were entirely done with their hiring by 
January  31 of the applicants'  second year of law school. A few stu- 
dents apply for clerkships  in their third year, but this is a relatively 
small number.21  Thus decisions for the typical  judge were based solely 
on first-year  grades and recommendations  (since first-semester  sec- 
ond-year grades were not yet available),  together with the student's 
record  prior  to law school. 
The problem with such early hiring is that two-thirds  of the in- 
formation  about the student's  academic  record  in law school, plus vir- 
19  See Part II.C.l.a. 
20  Such inefficiency  is examined  in simulations  motivated  by the market  for clinical  psy- 
chologists in Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing, Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clear- 
ing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists, 105 J Pol Econ 284 (1997). 
21  See Part II.B.3.c. 
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tually all of the information  about the student's  legal writing,  which 
typically  is done in the second and third  years,  is missing.  Realistically, 
hiring  would  probably  not occur  at the very end of the third  year  even 
under a reformed  system for hiring  law clerks,  but it could certainly 
happen sometime during  the third  year, so that at least the full sec- 
ond-year  record  would  be available.  Obviously,  assessing  the impact  of 
this missing information  on the satisfaction  of judges and students 
with  their  matches  is difficult.  Is the quality  of a student's  legal writing 
well-predicted  by the student's  first-year  grades?  How well do stu- 
dents' GPAs at the end of the second year correlate  with their first- 
year GPAs? 
It is (for obvious  reasons)  not very easy to get data  on grades,  but 
we do have data from a relatively  recent Harvard  Law School class, 
comparing  first-year  GPA to the GPA for the first and second years 
together.2  At most this limited amount of data can offer anecdotal 
support  for any claim,  but we think the results  are interesting  and so 
mention them briefly.  The overlap between the two measures  in the 
top of the class is not small,  but neither are the discrepancies.  Of the 
students  who were in the top 5 percent  of the class (the top twenty- 
seven students)  at the end of the first  year,  two-thirds  of them were in 
the top 5 percent at the end of the second year.  The other students 
who were in the top 5 percent  of their  first-year  class  were (in order  of 
decreasing  class rank) twenty-eighth,  twenty-ninth,  thirty-sixth,  forty- 
second,  forty-seventh,  forty-eighth,  fiftieth,  fifty-ninth,  and sixty-ninth 
at the end of the second year.  The students  who were ranked  forty- 
second,  forty-seventh,  forty-eighth,  fiftieth,  fifty-ninth,  and sixty-ninth 
would almost certainly  not have been competitive  for the very top 
clerkships  had they held those positions in class rank after the first 
year.  The students  who took these nine students'  place in the top 5 
percent  by the end of the second year were ranked  (again  in order  of 
decreasing  rank) twenty-ninth,  thirty-third,  forty-second,  forty-sixth, 
forty-ninth,  fiftieth,  sixty-ninth,  seventy-fifth,  and eighty-fourth  at the 
end of the first year.  Probably  the last seven of these did not have a 
shot at the very best clerkships  based on their first-year  grades,  even 
though  just one year later they were within  the top 5 percent  of their 
class at Harvard  Law School.  A brief look at the top 2 percent  of the 
class--the  pool for the most highly elite clerkships of all--at  the end 
of the first versus the second year shows even greater movement: 
fewer than half of the students  in the top 2 percent  at the end of the 
first  year  remain  there at the end of the second  year. 
In short,  early hiring  seems to create a real risk  of mismatches  in 
both directions:  some students  hired for the most competitive  clerk- 
22  The data discussed in this paragraph are on file with the authors. 
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ships on the basis of first-year  standing  may prove to be less strong 
than judges had hoped, and some of the most competitive students 
may not be identifiable  on the basis of first-year  grades.  It is true that 
large law firms likewise hire for second-year summer positions- 
which may turn into permanent  positions-on  the basis of first-year 
grades.  However, since law firms have a large range of types of work 
(ranging  from the relatively mundane to the complex), hire a large 
number  of associates  each year (versus  a small  number  of clerks  in the 
judicial  setting), and decide to offer permanent  jobs in significant  part 
based on summer  performance,  errors are likely to be less serious in 
this market  than in the law clerk market. 
In assessing  the power of first-year  grades  to predict  second-year 
grades,  it should be noted that one cannot be sure what second-year 
grades would look like if clerkships  were not decided before these 
grades come out. One possibility  is that students  who do not receive 
clerkships  (or who, having received mediocre first-year  grades,  know 
that they will not receive clerkships)  may throw  in the towel and stop 
trying.  Another possibility  is that students  who get clerkships  may de- 
cide that their future is set and thus that they need not try any more. 
Either phenomenon  would distort  second-year  grades  relative  to first- 
year grades;  second-year  grades  would be a less clear measure  of "le- 
gal ability"  (and of course they may be noisy already).  They may also 
be a less clear  measure  because of strategic  selection of easier courses; 
such strategic  course selection cannot generally  occur during  the first 
year because schedules are set without student choice. A  thought- 
provoking implication of these suggestions is that judges who wait 
longer to hire their clerks may be "fooled"  by the high second-year 
grades  of those not hired earlier,  as their grades  may be artificially  in- 
flated by less exertion of effort by students who receive clerkships 
early and by strategic course selection. But in fact slacking off and 
strategic  course selection by students  who do not get clerkships  seem 
more likely;  students who get clerkships,  or at least students  who get 
the most prestigious clerkships,  are likely to care about grades for 
other reasons  (graduation  honors,  Supreme  Court  clerkships,  positions 
in legal academia),  which  give them reason  not to slack off. 
Early hiring does not impose unambiguous  costs on the parties. 
While less information is available, risk-averse parties enjoy some 
benefit from resolving uncertainty earlier and, in  effect, insuring 
themselves against  the possibility  that things could turn out badly for 
them.2  This story seems most applicable  on the student side; for stu- 
dents, things could turn out badly if their law school careers do not 
progress in the way they might hope. The economic literature on 
23  See Li and Rosen, 88 Am Econ Rev at 372 (cited in note 10). 
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matching  shows that with risk-averse  parties,  early hiring  may some- 
times create  benefits.24  But in other  similar  contexts  we do not seem to 
think that early transactions  for insurance  purposes  produce  a better 
outcome;  for instance,  no one argues  that students  should  be admitted 
to college based on sixth-grade  test scores in order to "insure"  stu- 
dents against  not turning  out as well as they might  hope. (And we do 
not think this is only because of the large degree of information  loss 
that would result.)  It is equally  unclear  why such insurance  would on 
balance  be desirable  in the clerkship  setting. 
3.  Maximizing  the "production  of justice." 
Until now the efficiency  discussion  has focused  on the well-being 
of the parties to the clerkship  match-judges and students.  The em- 
phasis  has been on achieving  "good,"  or desirable,  matches  from both 
sides' perspective.  Another conception of efficiency focuses on the 
overall  quality  of the legal system  and thus on those who are not nec- 
essarily  market  participants.  Does the law clerk market  maximize  the 
"production  of justice"  (however defined)?  This question can be re- 
phrased:  Is failing to match the most desired  clerkship  candidates  to 
the most desired  judges-that  is, failing  to match  in accordance  with 
the parties'  preferences-a  bad thing or a good thing from the per- 
spective  of maximizing  the "production  of justice"? 
If the quality  of judicial  output  is an additive  function  of judges' 
and clerks' ability,  then the matching  does not matter,  holding con- 
stant the aggregate  pool of clerks  hired.  If, instead,  the output  quality 
of relatively  less desired  judges benefits from the input of top clerks 
more than the output quality  of relatively  more desired  judges does, 
then "mismatches"  are actually  good for societal  welfare.  Finally,  if the 
benefit  of having  a top clerk  is greatest  for the most desired  judges  (in 
other words,  the judicial  output function  is multiplicative),  then "mis- 
matches"  are likely to reduce  societal  welfare.  There  are other factors 
as well;  for instance,  a top law clerk  may benefit  more  from  the coach- 
ing of a more desirable  judge,  and this may produce  broader  benefits 
for society as the clerk pursues  his or her own career  after the clerk- 
ship.  All in all, it turns  out to be quite difficult  to say how mismatches 
affect the overall quality  of the legal system.  For this reason,  we give 
primary  emphasis  below to the criterion  of maximizing  the satisfaction 
of judges  and clerks  with the match. 
24  See  id. 
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C.  Perceived  Fairness 
Judges and students may care not only about the match that re- 
sults from the law clerk hiring  process  but also about the nature  of the 
matching  experience itself. Even if Judge A and student B are quite 
happy to be paired with one another at the end of the road, if the 
process of getting to that point was unpleasant,  the market may still 
cause disutility  and,  thus,  may be suboptimal. 
We have already  discussed  judges' distaste for the law clerk hir- 
ing process.2  Our survey  results  suggest  that students  may have similar 
or even stronger  feelings.  We focus below on a particular  form of dis- 
utility on students'  part.  Since it is hard  for participants  in this market 
to get good information  about one another,  various  forms of personal 
well-connectedness  may come to play a large role, and students (as 
well as judges) may perceive this to be unfair.  We discuss evidence 
along these lines in Part  II.C.3. 
II.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
A.  A Brief History  of the Law Clerk  Market 
To understand  the story told by our empirical  evidence,  it is help- 
ful first to understand  what has gone before.  The history  of the market 
for federal  judicial  law clerks and the attempts  to reform  it have been 
described  well and fully by others,  so we offer only the barest essen- 
26 
tials here.: 
Over the past several decades,  the time of hiring  of law clerks  has 
moved from the end of the third year of law school to the beginning 
or middle of the second year.  Judge  Wald  writes of her experience,  "I 
was hired in 1951 as a clerk to Second Circuit  Judge  Jerome  Frank  in 
May of my third year."27  During the 1999-2000  hiring  season, by con- 
trast,  the process  was well underway  by mid-fall  of the second year,  as 
documented  below.28 
Each stage in the backward  progression  in the time of hiring of 
federal  judicial  law clerks  has been marked  by a belief that the market 
will never move earlier than the present moment-that  the process 
has reached a "natural  stopping  point"  beyond which  it will not move. 
Judge  Kozinski,  writing  in 1991,  provides  an example: 
[T]he breakpoint  for many judges in making  clerkship  decisions 
comes  around February or March of a student's second year of 
25  See Part I.A. 
26  For  a full account  through  1994,  see Becker,  Breyer,  and Calabresi,  104  Yale L J at 208- 
21 (cited in note 8). 
27  See  Wald,  89 Mich  L Rev at 155  (cited  in note 2). 
28  See Part II.C.l.b. 
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law school. At that time several things come to pass. Perhaps 
most important,  the student's third semester grades become 
available.  Also, many students  will have developed relationships 
with members  of the faculty by working  as research  assistants, 
participating  in individual  research projects,  writing papers or 
participating  in seminars.  By that time as well, students  will have 
had a fair opportunity  to show commitment  to their law reviews 
by participating  in the editing  process  or doing substantial  work 
toward  publication  of their comments.  For those of us who care 
about such things-and  there are many-law  review board elec- 
tions are conducted  around  that  time.9 
Of course,  hiring  has now moved to a point well before Judge  Kozin- 
ski's  "breakpoint." 
The past two decades have witnessed  a parade  of attempted  re- 
forms  of the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks.  These  reforms  have 
had in common  their  inability  to solve the problem.  The average  life of 
a reform  has been about three years.'  The latest reform  effort,  begun 
in 1993,  involved the imposition  of a March  1 start date and initially 
appeared  promising  to its sponsors,  who stated  hopefully  after  its first 
year of operation  that although  "[w]e entertain  no illusions  that the 
March 1 Solution is perfect, [ ] we respectfully  submit that, like de- 
mocracy  with all its flaws,  it is the best system that anyone has con- 
ceived thus far."3'  However,  it was this very reform  that the Judicial 
Conference  abandoned  in 1998  after an acknowledgement  that it was 
"not  universally  followed and,  therefore  [ ] not an accurate  reflection 
of the practice  in the courts."32 
Thus,  since 1998,  there has been no official Judicial  Conference 
policy governing  the hiring  of federal  judicial  law clerks.  In the first 
year after the abandonment  of the March 1 start date, some law 
schools attempted  to enforce a February  1 start  date for sending  ap- 
plication  materials,  including  faculty  recommendations,  to judges,  but 
these efforts were largely abandoned  the following year (as well as 
somewhat  ignored  in the year in which  they were nominally  in effect). 
To learn more about what is presently  happening  in the market  for 
federal judicial law clerks, we surveyed both judges and students 
about  the process. 
29  Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1710 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added). 
30  See Becker, Breyer,  and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 209-15 (cited in note 8) (describing five 
failed reform efforts over the period from 1978 to 1990); text accompanying note 135 (describing 
the abandonment of the sixth, most recent reform attempt, begun in 1993, in September of 1998). 
31  Becker. Breyer. and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 222 (cited in note 8). 
32  Report  of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference  of the United  States  38 (Sept 15,1998). 
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B.  Survey  Design and Response 
1.  Survey  of Supreme  Court  Justices. 
In October of 1999 we sent a letter to the nine active Supreme 
Court Justices  asking about their law clerk hiring practices  and how 
these might relate to the hiring  practices  of other federal  judges.  The 
letter came from the judge-author  of the present work (Posner) and 
promised  confidentiality  to the Justices.  Eight of the nine members  of 
the Court  responded.  We discuss  their  responses  in connection  with our 
analysis  in Part IV of possible  reforms  of the law clerk  market  and the 
potential  role of the Supreme  Court  in enforcing  these reforms. 
2.  Surveys  of court  of appeals  judges. 
In September  of 1999 and again  in June of 2000 we distributed  a 
survey  about law clerk hiring  to all federal  appellate  judges.  The judge- 
author  of this  Article (Posner)  mailed  the surveys  to all active  and sen- 
ior court of appeals  judges.33  For confidentiality  reasons we requested 
that the judges return their responses to another of us (Jolls) rather 
than  to him.  Also, we did not ask  for respondents'  names,  but we did ask 
for the judge's  court (First  Circuit,  Second Circuit,  etc.) and the general 
timeframe  in which  the judge  was appointed,  and  from  this information 
it would be possible to identify some judges.  We therefore assured 
judges that identifying  information  would be shielded  from the judge- 
author  of this work as well as kept confidential  from  the public  at large. 
The 1999  and  2000  surveys  were quite  similar,  although  the 2000  version 
included  a few new questions. 
The 1999 survey yielded 155 responses  from judges,  a 65 percent 
response rate. Of the responses,  103 were from active  judges,  while 51 
were from senior judges. (One respondent did not specify seniority.) 
This response pattern reflects almost an exact match to the overall 
proportion  of active  judges versus  senior  judges on the bench (161 ac- 
tive, 77 senior), as shown in Table  Al  in the attached  Data Appendix. 
The 2000 survey yielded a similar,  although slightly lower, response 
rate of 54 percent, perhaps because some judges were disinclined  to 
bother responding  a second time.  Again the pattern  of responses  from 
active and senior  judges (84 and 45 responses  respectively)  was almost 
an exact match  to the overall  proportion  of active  judges  versus  senior 
judges on the bench (again see Table Al).  Across individual  circuits 
there was somewhat greater,  although  not enormous,  variation  in the 
response rates, as summarized  in Table  Al. All surveys  that were re- 
33  A  small number of senior court of appeals judges  from the Seventh  Circuit were  not 
surveyed because the sender of the survey (Posner), a judge on that Circuit, knew that they were 
no longer hiring law clerks. 
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turned to us were assigned numbers,  and these are what we use to 
identify  particular  responses  that  we quote or rely upon. 
As is obvious  from the description  just given,  our  judge data em- 
brace only federal appellate  judges;  they do not include information 
on federal district  court  judges or state court  judges.  While it is true 
that some of the most elite federal  district  court  and  state court  judges 
probably  compete with federal court of appeals  judges for clerks,  the 
number  of such  plausible  competitors  is sufficiently  limited,  relative  to 
the overall size of the pool of federal district  court and state court 
judges,  to justify  the limitation  of the distribution  of our survey  to fed- 
eral appellate  judges. 
3.  Surveys  of students. 
In surveying  students  about  the law  clerk  market,  we faced  a scope 
problem  similar  to, although  vastly  greater  in magnitude  than,  the prob- 
lem faced for judges.  Having decided to focus on federal appellate 
judges  to avoid an enormous  survey  pool, our interest  on the student 
side was in students  who were potential  candidates  for clerkships  with 
such  judges.  At some level, though,  that group  includes  every law stu- 
dent in the country,  since students  serving  in federal appellate  clerk- 
ships hail from an extraordinary  number  of schools  ranging  from De- 
troit Mercy  to St. John's  University  to Louisiana  State (LSU) to Har- 
vard.' Because it was obviously  impracticable  to survey  every student 
at every law school in the country,  we were forced to make choices 
about  how to narrow  the group.  One approach,  which  was  the approach 
taken in the only existing  survey  of clerkship  candidates  of which  we 
are aware,  is to limit  the sample  to students  serving  on the main  law  re- 
view at one of some suitably  defined set of "very  good"  schools (say, 
schools  in the top ten or twenty).35  The second approach,  which  is the 
one we adopted,  involves  surveying  all students,  not  just  members  of the 
main  law  review,  at an even smaller  number  of schools. 
Two empirical  factors  support  our focus on all students,  not just 
members  of the main  law review,  at a smaller  number  of schools.  First, 
membership  in a school's main law review does not appear  to be of 
overriding  or even particularly  great  importance  in the selection  proc- 
ess of court of appeals  judges.  Our 2000  judge survey  asked  judges to 
rank the following eight factors in order of their importance  to the 
judges'  law clerk  hiring  decisions:  law school  grades,  recommendations 
from familiar professors,  recommendations  from other professors, 
recommendations  from past legal employers,  recommendations  from 
34  See Judicial Yellow Book 52, 58, 81, 83 (Spring 2000) (listing these schools as the alma 
maters of federal appellate clerks). 
35  See Rhinehart, Note, 83 Georgetown L J at 577 n 12 (cited in note 8). 
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current  clerks and other "peers,"  membership  in the school's main law 
review, board position at the school's main law review, and writing 
sample.  (We did not ask  judges to rank  the importance  of the personal 
interview  because it seemed likely to be of substantial  importance  to 
almost all of them.) Table  A2 in the Data Appendix summarizes  the 
rankings  given to membership  in the school's main law review.  Over 
half of the judges who provided  rankings  (55 of 109) said that mem- 
bership  in the main law review  was either in the bottom half of factors 
in terms of importance  or was not a factor in their decisions at all. 
Only six judges said that such membership  was the most important  of 
the eight factors  to their decisions. 
The second empirical  factor that supports  looking at all law stu- 
dents at a smaller number  of schools as opposed to only members  of 
the main law review at a larger number of schools is that students 
from the four law schools generally considered  to be the most com- 
petitive (Chicago,  Harvard,  Stanford,  and Yale in alphabetical  order) 
strongly  dominate  students  from the remaining  top ten and top twenty 
schools in their success in landing federal appellate clerkships.  (For 
the top ten and the top twenty lists,  we use the (admittedly  controver- 
sial) U.S.  News and World  Report  rankings  from 2000. Harvard,  Stan- 
ford,  and  Yale are the top three schools according  to this ranking;  Chi- 
cago is sixth.36) 
Table  A3 in the Data Appendix presents  the number  of students 
from each group of schools serving  in federal appellate  clerkships  ac- 
cording to data from the Spring 2000 edition of the Judicial Yellow 
Book. It is important to emphasize at the outset the limitations of 
these data:  they cover only those judges who choose to report their 
clerks' schools (approximately  one-third do not report), and, much 
more importantly,  the variations  in reporting  rates across circuits  are 
substantial.  As a result  of the latter  point,  the numbers  in Table  A3 are 
probably  understated  (relatively  speaking)  for the California  schools, 
including Stanford,  as well as the Universities of Pennsylvania  and 
Texas,  and probably  overstated  for Chicago,  New York  University,  and 
Columbia;  the reason is that the Third,  Fifth,  and Ninth Circuits  (cov- 
ering Pennsylvania,  Texas, and California  respectively) have (along 
with the Eighth Circuit) the lowest rates of coverage in the Judicial 
Yellow  Book (with percentages  ranging  from 42 to 63 percent),  while 
the Second and Seventh Circuits  (covering  New York and Chicago  re- 
spectively) have much higher coverage rates (81 percent for the Sec- 
ond Circuit,  87 percent  for the Seventh Circuit). 
Despite the limitations of the Judicial Yellow  Book data, Table 
A3, coupled with the information  in Table A2, provides support for 
36  US News & World Rep 73 (Apr 10, 2000). 
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the approach of looking comprehensively  at the very top tier of 
schools instead  of looking only at members  of the main  law review  at 
a somewhat  broader  set of institutions.  Students  from Chicago,  Har- 
vard,  Stanford,  and Yale held 143 clerkships  (an average  of thirty-six 
per school), compared  to ninety-three  for students  from the next six 
schools (an average  of sixteen per school) and sixty-eight  for students 
from the remaining  ten of the top twenty institutions  (an average  of 
seven per school). Note that what is relevant  for our purposes  is the 
absolute representation  of the schools,  not how they fare relative to 
their student  body sizes,  since our goal is to get information  from the 
largest  absolute  number  of potential  federal  appellate  clerks. 
The remainder  of this section provides  further  detail on how we 
conducted  our student  surveys. 
a) 2000 survey of second-year students.  In February of 2000 we 
distributed  a survey  about the 1999-2000  law clerk hiring  process to 
all second-year  students  at Chicago,  Harvard,  Stanford,  and  Yale.  Sur- 
veys were placed in student mailboxes,  and students  were provided 
with a stamped,  pre-addressed  envelope in which to return  their re- 
sponses to one of us (Jolls).  Students  were assured  that no potentially 
identifying  information  in their responses  would be revealed  publicly 
or even to the judge-author  of this work.  Students  were not asked to 
put their  names  on their  responses. 
We received a total of 294 responses,  a 26 percent  response  rate. 
Presumably  the lower response  rate for students  than for federal ap- 
pellate  judges  reflected  the fact that while almost  all federal  appellate 
judges  hire law clerks,  many  law students  do not apply  for federal  ap- 
pellate clerkships.  We received 129 responses  from students  who ap- 
plied for federal  appellate  clerkships  (and 165 from students  who did 
not;  students  were asked  to return  the survey  either  way),  but since  we 
do not know the actual  number  of students  who applied  for these po- 
sitions,  we cannot calculate  a response  rate for the 129 responses.  As 
with the judge surveys,  all 2000 second-year  student  surveys  returned 
to us were assigned  numbers,  which  are used to identify  the responses 
below. 
b) 1999 survey of second-year students. In March of 1999 we dis- 
tributed  a survey  to all second-year  students  at the four law schools 
surveyed  in 2000 and also to all second-year  students  at three addi- 
tional schools,  Columbia,  Michigan,  and  Vanderbilt.  In contrast  to the 
2000 student survey,  which sought mostly quantitative  or categorical 
information  (for instance,  "in  what  month  did you apply?,"  "how  many 
interviews  did you do?"),  the 1999  survey  was largely  anecdotal,  with 
mostly open-ended essay or long-answer  questions.  This survey,  ad- 
ministered  just as our project  was getting  underway,  provided  a natu- 
ral starting  point for our research. 
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The survey was distributed  by multiple means.  At schools other 
than Harvard,  it was left in students'  mailboxes  with instructions  to re- 
turn responses to a drop box at a specified location;  at some of these 
schools the survey  was also distributed  via electronic  mail.  At Harvard 
the survey was left in students' mailboxes,  again with instructions  to 
return responses to a drop box; in addition some students received 
copies of the survey  in their large "bundled"  classes.  As with the 2000 
survey,  students were not asked for their names and were assured  of 
the confidentiality  of any possibly  identifying  information.37 
We received a total of 337 responses  to the 1999 survey.  Table  A4 
in  the  Data  Appendix provides a  breakdown by  school  and by 
whether the respondent applied for federal judicial clerkships.  (In 
1999 we asked whether the student had applied for federal judicial 
clerkships,  appellate or district  court level; in 2000 we asked whether 
the student had applied for federal appellate clerkships  specifically. 
Also, for 2000 we do not have data by school because one school ob- 
jected to having  school identification  on the survey  in 2000.) In the in- 
terest of consistency  with the 2000 results,  we focus our analysis  of the 
1999 data on the four schools surveyed  in 2000;  thus information  from 
the 1999 surveys reported below is from the surveys distributed  at 
Chicago,  Harvard,  Stanford,  and  Yale.  These schools accounted  for 267 
of the 337 responses (79 percent) (see Table A4). As above, we as- 
signed an identifying  number  to each response. 
As just noted, our 2000 survey of second-year students asked 
whether the student had applied for federal appellate clerkships,  and 
only students who had done so were directed to fill out the body of 
the survey;  the 1999 survey  asked whether  the student  had applied  for 
federal appellate or district  court level clerkships,  and only those who 
had done so were directed to fill out the body of the survey.  In both 
cases, however,  some of the responses by students  in the body of the 
survey may relate to state court applications  or (for the 2000 survey) 
federal district court level applications,  even though those were not 
embraced  in the opening question,  because the students  may have ap- 
plied for those positions in addition  to the ones embraced  in the open- 
ing question. Obviously we could have chosen to limit subsequent 
questions (such as "When  was your first interview?,"  "When  was your 
first offer of a clerkship?,"  and  "Did you receive other clerkship  offers 
before you rejected your first offer?") to the category of clerkships 
embraced  in the opening question,  but this could have produced  mis- 
leading or incomplete answers, since other opportunities certainly 
37  At the time of the 1999 student survey, one of us (Posner) had not yet become  involved 
in the project. We interpreted the confidentiality  promise to students as requiring that no one 
other than the original three authors (Avery, Jolls, and Roth)  see any potentially  identifying in- 
formation. 
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might  have affected  the student's  situation  in the market  for the clerk- 
ships covered in the opening question.  Nonetheless,  the cost of our 
approach  is that  the data  presented  below,  while  only for students  who 
applied  for some sort of federal  clerkship--and  for 2000 only for stu- 
dents  who applied  for federal  appellate  clerkships  -may  reflect  events 
in other  markets  as well. 
c)  The role of third-year  students. There is a widespread percep- 
tion (which  we shared  prior  to receiving  the contrary  results  from  our 
2000  judge survey)  that the early time at which  clerkship  hiring  is oc- 
curring  has significantly  increased  the frequency  of hiring of third- 
year students,  making  our focus on second-year  students  potentially 
problematic.  Dean Anthony Kronman  of Yale Law School wrote to 
the Yale student body about the subject  of third-year  applications  in 
the fall of 1999,  saying  that  he "suspect[ed]  that  third  year  applications 
will become increasingly  routine"  and that he "regard[ed]  this devel- 
opment  as a healthy  one."8  Students  would  work  at a law firm  or pur- 
sue some other opportunity  for a year after finishing  law school and 
then begin  a clerkship. 
The responses to our 2000 judge survey suggest,  however,  that 
judges have not intensified  their hiring of third-year  students  in re- 
sponse to the developments  in the clerkship  market since the 1998 
abandonment  of the March  1 start  date. In our 2000 survey  we asked 
judges how many third-year students, and also how many post- 
graduates (candidates  who had finished law school), they hired in 
1999-2000  and whether  these numbers  were greater  than,  less than,  or 
the same as the numbers  in previous  years.  Answers  are presented  in 
Table A5 in the Data Appendix. No  discernible  trend toward in- 
creased hiring of third-year  students (or post-graduates)  appears  in 
this data. 
C.  Is the Law Clerk  Market  Functioning  Well? 
Our  survey  results  allow  us to assess  the functioning  of the market 
for federal  judicial  law clerks  within  the normative  framework  devel- 
oped in Part  I above.  We  first  discuss  findings  related  to the efficiency  of 
the clerk hiring  process  and then turn  to findings  that bear on disillu- 
sionment  with  the federal  bench  and  the perceived  fairness  of the clerk 
hiring  process. 
38  Memorandum from Tony Kronman to the students of Yale Law School (Dec  8, 1999) 
(on file with authors). 
[68:793  812 The  Market  for Federal  Judicial  Law Clerks 
1.  Efficiency:  Maximizing  the "sum  of satisfaction"  of judges and 
clerks  with the match. 
Part I.B above discussed two separate efficiency criteria  for as- 
sessing the workings  of the law clerk market:  maximizing  the "sum  of 
satisfaction"  of judges and clerks with the match,  and maximizing  the 
"production  of justice."  Our survey results do not shed light on the 
second criterion (which we concluded was less useful in any event), 
but they have much  to say about the first. 
a)  The nature of the process.  We first consider the ways in which 
the nature of the law clerk hiring process impedes maximizing  the 
"sum  of satisfaction"  of judges and clerks  with the match.  The biggest 
problem is that, as noted above, the process does not permit judges 
and clerks to consider a range of alternatives  before making  their de- 
cisions. 
Our survey  results  provide  strong  quantitative  evidence of the in- 
ability  to consider  a range of options on both sides of this market.  The 
results  show in a systematic  way how the clerkship  market  resolves ex- 
traordinarily  quickly,  with  judges and students  pairing  off in an almost 
frenetic fashion to avoid being left in the cold. The basic chronology, 
as described  more fully below,  is that 
*  interviews  lead very quickly  to offers (section i below); 
*  offers produce  very quick  responses  (section ii); 
*  responses  are generally  acceptances  (section iii); and 
*  many scheduled interviews are canceled as a result (section 
iv). 
Thus, students and judges tend to pair off quickly with those with 
whom they have early  interviews.  As a result, 
*  many students limit the judges to whom they apply to avoid 
being paired off early with a less preferred  judge (section v); 
and 
*  at least some students who might otherwise be interested in 
clerking  avoid the process entirely  (section vi). 
(i) First step: interviews lead quickly to offers.  The time be- 
tween interviews  and offers is typically  very short, as revealed by re- 
sponses to our 2000 survey of second-year  students.  (We did not ask 
about the gap between interview and offer times in our 1999 survey.) 
As shown in Table 1, over half of students' first offers of clerkships 
were made within two days of the offering judge's interview of the 
student;  34 percent  were made at the conclusion  of the interview. 
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TABLE 1 
LENGTH  OF TIME BETWEEN  FIRST OFFER AND  INTERVIEW 
WITH  THE OFFERING  JUDGE (1999-2000) 
Time between first offer and interview with the  % of responding 
offering judge  studentsa 
Offer  made at end of interview  34% 
1-2 days  elapsed  between  interview  and  offer  23% 
3-4 days  elapsed  between  interview  and  offer  10% 
5-7 days  elapsed  between  interview  and offer  15% 
1-2 weeks elapsed  between  interview  and offer  8% 
2+ weeks elapsed  between  interview  and  offer  11% 
Total  number of responses:  10lb 
Source:  2000  Student  Survey. 
aPercentages  in this  column  sum  to 101  percent  as a consequence  of rounding. 
2000  Student  Survey  #23 did not answer  the question  about  the time elapsed  between  the stu- 
dent's  first  offer and  the interview  with  the offering  judge,  even though  this  student  reported  re- 
ceiving  an offer  of a clerkship.  Therefore  we have 101  responses  for this  question,  versus  102  re- 
sponses  for a number  of the questions  discussed  below. 
Moreover,  our survey  results  show that the judge who makes  the 
student's  first offer typically  comes early in the student's  interview 
schedule,  as reported  in Table  2. In other  words,  it is not ordinarily  the 
case that students  interview  with a range of judges and then receive 
their first offer. As the table shows,  59 percent of first offers came 
from  the first  or second  judge  with  whom  the student  interviewed,  and 
36 percent came from the first judge with whom the student inter- 
viewed. 
TABLE 2 
INTERVIEW  PRODUCING  FIRST OFFER (1999-2000) 
Interview producing first offer  % of responding 
studentsa 
First  interview  produced  first  offer  36% 
Second  interview  produced  first  offer  23% 
Third  interview  produced  first  offer  19% 
Fourth  interview  produced  first  offer  8% 
Fifth  or subsequent  interview  produced  first  offer  15% 
Total  number of responses: 102 
Source:  2000  Student  Survey. 
aPercentages  in this  column  sum  to 101  percent  as a consequence  of rounding. 
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Responses to our  judge surveys  in 1999 and  2000 also suggest  lim- 
ited time between interviews and offers.  As Table 3 shows, approxi- 
mately three-quarters  of active judges started  making  offers to candi- 
dates before they had completed  their scheduled  interviews. 
TABLE 3 
THE  PRACTICE  OF MAKING  OFFERS  BEFORE  COMPLETING 
SCHEDULED  INTERVIEWS 
Group  of federal  % of responding  judges  who began  making  offers 
appellate  judges  before  completing  their  scheduled  interviews 
1998-1999  1999-2000 
All judges  64%  64% 
Active judges  74%  73% 
Senior  judges  38%  42% 
Total number of  Total number of 
responses:  responses: 
138  114 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. 
The reasons for the speed of offer behavior are not difficult to 
understand.  In both 1999  and 2000 we asked  judges why they made of- 
fers before completing  interviews,  and many of their explanations  ex- 
plicitly mentioned the fear of losing candidates to other judges. In 
1999, seventy-six of the eighty-eight responding  judges who started 
making offers before the completion of scheduled  interviews  offered 
reasons  for this behavior,  and 42 percent  of those who offered reasons 
specifically  mentioned competition from other judges.  These judges' 
specific responses are listed in Table A6 of the Data Appendix.  The 
situation in 2000 was similar:  fifty-four  of the seventy-three  respond- 
ing judges who had started making offers before the completion of 
scheduled interviews  gave their reason for this choice, and one-third 
of those who offered reasons  specifically  mentioned  the fear of losing 
candidates  to other judges.  Again these judges' specific responses are 
listed in Table A6. Putting both years together, only a single judge 
mentioned the desire to save time (by not conducting  further inter- 
views) as the reason for making offers before the completion of 
scheduled interviews,  while fifty cited competition from rivals.  In re- 
sponse to a different question on our judge survey,  over half of re- 
sponding judges in both 1999 and 2000 said that competition influ- 
enced the time at which offers were made,  as reported  in the top panel 
in Table  4 below.  As described  in sections ii and iii below,  these offers 
typically  lead to quick responses,  which are generally  acceptances,  so 
making  an early offer tends to give a judge a competitive  edge. 
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TABLE 4 
FACTS  ABOUT JUDGES' MOTIVATIONS  FOR EARLY OFFERS 
%  of responding  judges 
1998-1999  1999-2000 
Competition  influenced 
the time at which  offers 
were made: 
All judges  53%  53% 
Active judges  59%  63% 
Senior  judges  40%  30% 
Total  number of  Total  number of 
responses:  responses: 
140  111 
An applicant  requested 
that the timetable  be 
moved up:a 
All judges  N/A  46% 
Active  judges  N/A  53% 
Senior  judges  N/A  31% 
Total  number of 
responses: 
115 
Timetable  was moved 
up in response  to appli- 
cant's  request:a 
All judges  N/A  48% 
Active  judges  N/A  48% 
Senior  judges  N/A  50% 
Total  number of 
responses: 
52 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
These questions were only asked in the 2000 Judge Survey. 
In many  instances,  judges  who made quick  offers may have been 
responding  to explicit requests  by students  to speed up their timeta- 
bles. Our 2000 judge survey  showed that 53 percent  of active  judges 
reported  that an applicant  had asked them to speed up the process 
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because of a pending interview or offer deadline from another  judge, 
as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4.39  Almost half of those who 
received such a request moved up their timetables,  also as shown in 
the bottom panel in Table  4. 
(ii) Second  step:  offers  lead quickly  to responses. Not only do 
interviews  lead quickly  to offers,  but offers lead quickly  to responses; 
this is not a market  in which students collect a substantial  number  of 
offers and then make their decisions.  As Table 5 shows,  our 2000 stu- 
dent survey  revealed  that almost  three-quarters  of students  responded 
to their first offer of a clerkship  within two days of receiving the of- 
fer.4 Clearly  this is a market  in which events move very quickly  with 
little apparent  time to consider  multiple  options.  Indeed,  42 percent  of 
students  responded  to their first  offer immediately. 
TABLE 5 
TIMING OF STUDENT RESPONSE TO FIRST 
CLERKSHIP  OFFER  (1999-2000) 
Time before responding to first offer  % of responding students 
(cumulative % in parentheses) 
Immediate  response  42%  (42%) 
Within  2 days  29%  (71%) 
3 days to 1 week  21%  (92%) 
More than 1 week  8%  (100%) 
Total number of responses: 102 
Source:  2000 Student  Survey. 
The reasons for the quick response times by students are again 
easy to understand.  Most obviously,  many judges impose explicit re- 
sponse deadlines at the time an offer is made.  Among respondents  to 
our 2000  judge survey,  25 percent  reported  requiring  an answer  within 
one day for one or more of their slots, 38 percent reported  requiring 
an answer  within forty-eight  hours,  and 68 percent  reported  requiring 
an answer within a week. These numbers are similar to, although 
slightly higher than, the corresponding  numbers  from 1999, as shown 
in Table 6.4 Student responses colorfully  revealed the practice  of lim- 
ited-response-time  offers,  as shown in Table  7. At least one student at- 
39  We did not ask a similar  question  in 1999. 
40  We did  not ask a similar  question  in 1999. 
41  An earlier  survey  of appellate  judges  by the Administrative  Office of the United States 
Courts  found  still more dramatic  results  regarding  the time to respond  to offers:  "Almost  one in 
six judges] stated that students  should have to respond  on the spot."  Louis  F Oberdorfer  and 
Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection:A Reply To The Bad Apple, 101 Yale L J 1097,1102 n 18 
(1992). 
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tempted unsuccessfully to gain additional time from a judge: "I asked 
for 24 hrs. to consult my wife, but [the judge] said he couldn't give me 
24 hrs. I guaranteed him I would accept."42 
TABLE 6 
TIME-LIMITED  OFFERS  AS REPORTED  BY  JUDGES 
Time within which response to offer  % of responding  judges 
required  1998-1999  1999-2000 
Within  24 hours  22%  25% 
Within  48 hours  34%  38% 
Within a week  67%  68% 
Total  number  Total  number 
of responses:  of responses: 
108  85 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
TABLE 7 
TIME-LIMITED  OFFERS  AS EXPERIENCED  BY  STUDENTS 
Survey  Comment 
1999 Survey  #154"  A Ninth  Circuit judge  in California  made 
clerkship  offers  good  for only  fifteen  minutes. 
1999 Survey  #105  [A particular judge]  made  an offer  on the 
spot  with no time  to decide. 
1999 Survey  #159  [A particular judge]  gave  [me]  1.5 hours  to 
decide  after being  given  an offer. 
2000  Survey  #244  [A particular judge]  wanted  an answer  on the 
spot. 
1999 Survey  #118  [A particular judge]  extended  an offer  only 
until the next  morning. 
1999 Survey  #108  [My] second  choice  judge  g[a]ve  an exploding 
offer  on the phone  (i.e., I had to give  an an- 
swer by the time  I hung up) before  [I was] 
able  to call/talk  to my first choice  judge. 
2000  Survey  #247  I had to respond  [to a particular judge's  offer] 
by the next  morning. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys. 
This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written about the 
market for federal judicial law clerks. 
42  1999 Student Survey #157. 
818  [68:793 The  Market  for Federal  Judicial  Law Clerks 
Even when an offer does not explicitly expire after only a very 
short period, a variety of implicit pressures operate to press for a 
speedy response by the student.  To begin, some judges make offers to 
more candidates  than they have slots available,  with the slots going to 
the first candidates  to accept.  Not surprisingly,  "[u]sually  the clerk ap- 
plicant accepts on the spot."43  Interestingly,  this sort of strategy  is ex- 
plicitly prohibited  by the Harvard  Law School Office of Career Ser- 
vices for law firms  interviewing  Harvard  Law School students.4 
In addition,  many students  may feel the need to respond  to an of- 
fer quickly  if they think there is some chance they would want to ac- 
cept because a delayed acceptance  might start the relationship  off on 
the wrong  foot. 
I had an offer from one judge that I had to respond to during  a 
short period of time, but I was still waiting to hear from my top 
choice. My top choice called me half an hour before my deadline 
with the other judge. I was worried  that the first  judge would be 
offended that I waited so long to respond  to his offer.45 
[A particular  judge] [m]entioned  how,  if he were to give an offer 
to someone and they didn't immediately accept, it would make 
him wonder if he had made the right  choice and 'almost'  ma[k]e 
him want to withdraw  it-but  he said he didn't do that, said he 
might  give a little time.4 
I was frustrated  that my top choice judge hadn't  even started  in- 
terviewing  when I got my offer. I felt my only choice was to take 
the offer, as [I] couldn't make the [offering]  judge wait 2 weeks 
on the chance  that I might  get an offer [from  the other  judge].4 
The following striking anecdote suggests that the perception about 
negative impressions  from a delay followed by an acceptance or at- 
tempted acceptance  is likely to be correct  for at least some judges: 
I have an interview scheduled with my most preferred judge 
([Judge  C]) on [later  date]. [Judge  D] calls and wants  me to inter- 
view on [earlier  date].  I ask [Judge  D] when she would be making 
43  1999  Judge  Survey  #106.  A similar  strategy  was  used  in hiring  economics  professors  at Ohio 
State  University  in 1970.  The  university  "was  authorized  to fill six positions,  and  it made  offers  to 11 
candidates,  saying  that the offer would  remain  open only until the first  six acceptances  were re- 
ceived."  Roth  and  Xing,  84  Am Econ  Rev at 1036  n 78 (cited  in note 3). 
44  See Harvard  Law School Office of Career  Services  1999 Rules and Requests for Or- 
ganizations  Interviewing  Harvard  Law School Students  Rule 3 ("No offer shall  be made condi- 
tional  upon a student's  accepting  it before acceptances  have been received  from  other students 
to whom  offers  have also been made.")  (on file with  authors). 
45  1999  Student  Survey  #131. 
46  1999  Student  Survey  #50. 
47  2000 Student Survey #12. 
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her offers,  and she says,  "I am going to wait until after I finish  all 
the interviews,  talk with my clerks  and then decide--so [after  the 
later date of the Judge C interview]."  So, I go to interview  with 
[Judge  D] on [earlier  date]. I explain that I have another  inter- 
view scheduled  on [later  date] during  the interview.  She calls me 
on [date  prior  to later date of Judge  C interview]  with an offer.  I 
like [Judge  D], but have my heart  set on at least getting  to inter- 
view with [Judge  C].  Because [Judge  D] is not willing  to wait  until 
at least [later  date],  I decline  saying  I would  like to interview  fur- 
ther before making  my decision. [Judge  D] gets fairly offended 
and says,  "you  know,  students  should  withdraw  right  after  the in- 
terview  if they are not going  to accept  an offer.""8 
The perception  that one is "obliged  to accept  every offer"49  is part of 
the reason that, as explained  in the following  section,  students  over- 
whelmingly  respond  not only quickly  but affirmatively  upon receiving 
a clerkship  offer. 
(iii) Third step: responses to offers are generally acceptances- 
even when other positions would be preferred. A significant majority 
(73 percent)  of students  responding  to our 2000  survey  of second-year 
students  accepted  the first offer they received,  as shown in Table  8.' 
Consistent  with this evidence-and  presumably  in large part because 
of it-almost  70 percent  of students  who received  one or more clerk- 
ship offers received  exactly  one, also as shown  in Table  8. Once again, 
the law clerk  market  does not appear  to be one in which  students  have 
the opportunity  to consider a range of options before making their 
decisions. 
8  1999 Student Survey #135. 
49  Id. 
50  We did not ask a similar question in the 1999 survey. 
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TABLE 8 
THE PRACTICE  OF ACCEPTING  THE FIRST 
OFFER  RECEIVED  (1999-2000) 
Offer  information  % of  Cumulative 
responding  % 
students 
First offer was accepted (of  the 102 
students who responded to this ques- 
tion): 
Yes  73%  73% 
No  27%  100% 
Number of offers (of the 101 students 
who responded to  this question and 
received  one or more offers):a 
1  68%  68% 
2  25%  93% 
3  3%  96% 
4  2%  98% 
5  1%  99% 
6  1%  100% 
Source:  2000  Student  Survey. 
2000 Student  Survey  #12 did not indicate  the number  of offers received but did answer  the 
question  about  whether  the first  offer was accepted;  thus  we have 101 responses  here compared 
to 102 above. 
One might  respond  at this point that students'  first offers may of- 
ten come from their top-choice  judges,  so that the inability  to consider 
other options is of little consequence  for them.  Students  certainly  have 
some control over the timing of their interviews,  and thus (one might 
argue) they can arrange  to interview  first  with their top-choice  judges. 
It is clear that at least some students  attempt  to engage in such behav- 
ior;  as one student  wrote in response  to our 1999  survey, 
Throughout the process I ...  strategize[d] and manipulate[d] ... 
not answering  the telephone for fear of being trapped  into a less- 
than-ideal interview early on, and trying to arrange  interviews 
strategically ....51 
The question is how widespread  and, more importantly,  how success- 
ful these efforts prove to be. 
One difficulty  in scheduling  interviews  strategically,  so as to meet 
top-choice judges first, is that prior to interviewing  with a number  of 
judges, students may not know who their top choices are. (And, of 
51  1999  Student  Survey  #112. 
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course,  the same  goes for judges.)  As one student  wrote,  "[T]he  ability 
to research  the federal  judiciary  in advance  so that you know exactly 
for whom you would and would not accept an offer is impossible. 
What  is the point of the interview  on the students'  side if it can't be 
used to further  screen  for [judge]  quality?"52 
But even given their  limited  information,  our 2000  student  survey 
results make clear that students are not able to arrange  their inter- 
views optimally  so that an early offer comes from what they regard 
(based  on the limited  information  they have) as their  top-choice  judge. 
As reported  in Table 9, in only about one-third  of cases was a stu- 
dent's  first  offer from  what  the student  perceived  to be his or her top- 
choice judge.  Yet, as the table shows,  58 percent of students  who re- 
ceived their first offer from a judge who was not their top choice 
nonetheless  accepted  that offer.  Indeed,  correlating  these results  with 
the earlier  results  about the timing  of acceptance,  26 percent  of these 
candidates  accepted  the offer from the non-top-choice  judge immedi- 
ately.  (This  last result  is not shown  on the table.)  The results  in Table  9 
are even more striking  since one might  expect cognitive  dissonance  to 
push students  toward  the ex post belief that the offers they received 
or accepted  were more desirable  than  they otherwise  might  have been 
thought  to be. 
52  1999 Student Survey #135. 
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TABLE 9 
DESIRABILITY OF AND RESPONSE TO A STUDENT'S 
FIRST OFFER (1999-2000) 
Desirability  of and response  to first  offer  % of responding  students 
First offer was first-choice position (of 
the 102 students who responded to this 
question): 
Yes  34% 
No  66% 
First  offer was accepted: 
Of the 35 students  for whom first offer 
was first-choice  position: 
Yes  100% 
No  0% 
Of the 67 students  for whom first offer 
was not first-choice  position: 
Yes  58% 
No  42% 
Source:  2000 Student  Survey. 
Results reported in Table 9 might, of course, suggest that stu- 
dents' first offers are the most desirable of the offers they were going 
to get, even if they are not the most desirable  of all possible offers.  But 
evidence from our 1999 student survey suggests that this is not the 
case.  In 1999  we asked students  to rank  the judges with whom they re- 
ceived interviews  from most to least preferred  and then asked them to 
list the lowest judge from whom they would have accepted an offer if 
they had not yet heard  back from  more preferred  judges.  96 percent  of 
respondents  would have accepted an offer from a judge in the lower 
half of their list rather  than wait for their other scheduled  interviews; 
44 percent would have accepted an offer from their least preferred 
judge.  The point is not that a clerkship  with the least preferred  judge 
would be an undesirable  outcome in an absolute  sense (if no other op- 
tions were available),  but that many students  are apparently  willing  to 
forego any chance at the range  of more attractive  options to avoid los- 
ing the certain opportunity  with the least preferred  judge. Although 
the 1999 question,  unlike the question from the 2000 survey,  has a hy- 
pothetical  element,  it indicates  strongly  that students  will accept  offers 
from less preferred  judges even when they are awaiting  scheduled  in- 
terviews  with more preferred  judges. 
As with the practice of speedy responses to the first offer, the 
reasons for the likelihood of acceptance  of the first offer are easy to 
understand.  To begin, many students may fear that declining  an offer 
2001]  823 The University  of Chicago Law Review 
is an affront  to the judge,  as already  noted.  This  fear may  result  among 
other things  from pressure  exerted by law professors,  who are repeat 
players  with institutional  interests  and who may feel that immediate 
acceptances  from their school's  students  enhance  the chances  for stu- 
dents from that school the following  year. Judge  Becker,  then-Judge 
Breyer,  and then-Dean  Calabresi  bemoan  "the  'conventional  wisdom' 
propagated  in many  law schools that applicants  are obliged to accept 
the first offer tendered," a state of affairs that the authors "find ...  in- 
explicable  and indefensible."53  But institutional  interests  may explain 
the puzzle;  professors (or career services offices) may tell students 
they must or should accept  immediately  even though  some judges do 
not require  this because it serves the broader  interests  of the institu- 
tion over the years. 
A second critical  factor  is the strong  student  aversion  to sacrific- 
ing a "bird  in the hand"  for uncertain  prospects  down the road.  Many 
student  comments,  quoted in Table  10, suggest  that students  often ac- 
cept less preferred  positions  because they do not know whether  they 
will have other options later on. Apparently,  accepting  an early offer 
from  a less preferred  judge is preferred  to waiting  out the market.  But 
obviously  it may mean that students  miss out on the chance  to match 
with  preferred  judges  who may  be extremely  interested  in them. 
53  Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 223 (cited in note 8). 
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TABLE 10 
THE "BIRD IN THE HAND"  RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTING  AN 
EARLY CLERKSHIP  OFFER 
Survey  Comment 
1999 Survey  I was made an offer in late January  before the majority 
#46  of my judges  even started  interviewing.  I chose to accept 
the offer with a judge  who was not in the top 1/2 rather 
than  take the chance  on waiting  for a more  preferred 
judge  to call. 
1999 Survey  I was offered  an early  interview  by one judge  who, 
#120  though  I knew I would  be happy  clerking  for,  was not 
my top choice.  I was led to believe he might  offer a posi- 
tion at the interview.  I had a difficult  time deciding 
whether  to go to the interview  (and  possibly  foreclose 
other  options)  or cancel (and  possibly  lose the bird  in 
the hand).  I went.  Got an offer.  Accepted. 
1999 Survey  [A]t the end I was in Union Station  in DC, waiting  to get 
#164  a bus to Dulles,  [Judge  A's] office had me on hold be- 
cause  they said  they'd  tell me yes/no by [a particular 
time],  and I was missing  calling  back [Judge  B], whose 
offer exploded  at [that  same  time].  I ended up calling 
[Judge  B] to ask for more time,  but realized  how rude 
that  would  be, so I accepted  [Judge  B] without  knowing 
[Judge  A's] decision.  And I missed  my plane! 
1999 Survey  [W]hile  in [southern  city] I had received  an offer from  a 
#5  district  court  judge (with  24 hours  to reply).  I checked 
my messages  at home and  found I had been offered  an 
interview  with an appellate  court  judge (I had essentially 
given  up on the appellate  court  market  at this time).  But 
I decided  just to take the 'bird  in the hand.' 
2000 Survey  The day after  my offer,  I was very  interested  in the offer, 
#246  but I also wanted  to continue  interviewing  because  I 
wanted  more information  to make [my]  decision.  How- 
ever,  my  judge (the one I accepted  with) indicated  that 
he would  continue  to interview  and  might  fill my slot. 
2000 Survey  I got an offer from  a judge  who was not my first  choice, 
#247  at the end of an interview,  and had to respond  by the 
next morning.  I had an interview  with  my first  choice 
judge scheduled  for the next day.  I was risk  averse  and 
took the exploding  offer,  but still wonder  if I did the 
right  thing. 
Source:  1999  and  2000 Student  Surveys. 
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(iv) Fourth step: subsequent interviews are cancelled.  As a re- 
sult of the speed with  which  judges  and  students  pair  off early  on, both 
students and judges end up canceling large numbers  of previously 
scheduled  interviews.  Two-thirds  (66 percent)  of the judges  responding 
to our 2000 survey,  and 79 percent of those responding  to our 1999 
survey,  had at least one applicant  cancel a scheduled interview,  as 
shown in the bottom panel of Table 11. On average,  each judge con- 
ducted approximately  eight interviews and experienced approxi- 
mately  two cancellations  in each year,4  so approximately  20 percent  of 
all scheduled  interviews  were cancelled  by students  (two cancellations 
for every ten scheduled  interviews).  These numbers  fit nicely  with the 
student  surveys:  as reported  in Table 12, of the 127 students  respond- 
ing to our 2000 survey  who had scheduled  interviews,  almost  half (57) 
reported  that they cancelled  at least one interview,  and a total of 161 
of 695 scheduled interviews,  or 23 percent, were cancelled by stu- 
dents.5  Presumably  judges also cancelled  at least some interviews  (or 
at least one would hope that they did), since,  as reported  in Table 16 
below,  a substantial  number  of judges had no clerkship  positions  left 
by the time of their  last scheduled  interview. 
Of course,  some cancellations  of later  interviews  may be efficient, 
as when neither  judge  nor student  was at the top of the other's  list and 
preferred  options  materialize  for both.  But, as demonstrated  above,  at 
least from the student side, early offers often come from non-top- 
choice judges,  and so applicants  are missing the chance to consider 
what  might  be more  preferred  alternatives. 
54  These numbers  are based  on the figures  reported  in Table  11.  The calculations  assume 
the mean value for the ranges  reported  on the actual  survey  (for instance,  1.5 interviews  for a 
judge  who  chose  the "1  to 2"  option);  for the "more  than  12"  range  for  interviews  conducted,  the 
calculations  assume  a value  of 14,  and  for the "more  than  6"  range  for interviews  cancelled,  they 
assume  a value  of 8. 
55  These  numbers  are  based  on the figures  reported  in Table  12.  Twenty-eight  students  who 
reported  the number  of interviews  they had scheduled  did not report  the number  of interviews 
they cancelled.  This is probably  a consequence  of our wording  of the cancellation  question, 
which  said  "How  many  interviews  did you schedule  and  later  cancel  when  you accepted  a posi- 
tion?"  It seems plausible  that students  who did not receive any offers  did not respond  to this 
question.  Such  students  presumably  did not cancel  any interviews.  The 23 percent  figure  in the 
text thus  reflects  the assumption  that  students  who  responded  to the question  about  the number 
of interviews  scheduled  but  not to the question  about  the number  of cancellations  did  not cancel 
any scheduled  interviews.  The percent  cancelled  would  be slightly  greater  under  a different  as- 
sumption. 
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TABLE 11 
INTERVIEWS  AND STUDENT CANCELLATIONS 
AS  REPORTED  BY JUDGES 
% of responding  judges 
(cumulative  % in parentheses) 
1998-1999  1999-2000 
Number  of interviews 
conducted: 
lto3  8%  (8%)  16%  (16%) 
4to6  25%  (33%)  26%  (42%) 
7to9  24%  (57%)  20%  (62%) 
10 to 12  25%  (82%)  16%  (78%) 
More than 12  18%  (100%)  22%  (100%) 
Total number of  Total number of 
responses:  responses: 
134  105 
Number  of cancellations 
by students: 
lto2  40%  (40%)  31%  (31%) 
3 to 4  21%  (61%)  21%  (52%) 
5 to 6  13%  (74%)  7%  (59%) 
More than 6  4%  (79%)a  7%  (66%) 
None  21%  (100%)  34%  (100%) 
Total number of  Total number of 
responses:  responses: 
137  113 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. 
aThe  cumulative  percentage  does not equal the sum of the previous  cumulative  percentage  and 
the new percentage  as a consequence  of rounding. 
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TABLE 12 
INTERVIEWS  AND STUDENT-INITIATED 
CANCELLATIONS  (1999-200) 
Number of  % of  Cumulative  Number 
responding  responding  %  of inter- 
students  students  views 
Number of in- 
terviews sched- 
uled: 
0  4  3%  3%  0 
1  15  12%  15%  15 
2  14  11%  26%  28 
3  17  13%  39%  51 
4  10  8%  47%  40 
5  12  9%  57%a  60 
6  13  10%  67%  78 
7  14  11%  78%  98 
8  7  6%  83%a  56 
9  1  1%  84%  9 
10  4  3%  87%  40 
11  3  2%  90%a  33 
12  3  2%  92%  36 
13  4  3%  95%  52 
14  1  1%  96%  14 
15  3  2%  98%  45 
20  2  2%  100%  40 
Total  127  695 
Number of 
interviews 
cancelled: 
0  42  42%  42%  0 
1  16  16%  59%"  16 
2  14  14%  73%  28 
3  13  13%  86%  39 
4  6  6%  92%  24 
5  4  4%  96%  20 
6  1  1%  97%  6 
7  1  1%  98%  7 
10  1  1%  99%  10 
11  1  1%  100%  11 
Total  99  161 
Source: 2000 Student Survey. 
The cumulative percentage does not equal the sum of the previous cumulative percentage and 
the new percentage as a consequence of rounding. 
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(v) Corollary:  students  limit their  application  pools.  A natural 
consequence of the speed with which things  resolve in the market  for 
federal  judicial  law clerks  is that students  have an incentive  not to ap- 
ply to judges within that market  in whom they are interested but not 
that  interested.  Our student survey  in both 1999 and 2000 asked,  "Did 
you limit the number  of judges to whom you applied  based on a con- 
cern that some of your less-preferred  judges would offer you inter- 
views or positions before you  had heard back from your more- 
preferred  judges?"  More than half of the respondents  (55 percent) an- 
swered "yes"  to this question in 2000 (of a total of 128 responses to 
this question).  In 1999  42 percent answered  "yes"  (of a total of 108 re- 
sponses to this question). 
It should be noted that the efficiency  aspects  of this feature  of the 
clerkship  market are less clear than the efficiency aspects of the fea- 
tures discussed  above. Some desirable  matches may not be made-as 
when a student  does not apply  to a given judge who would have hired 
the student,  and for whom the student would have liked to clerk,  and 
the student ends up with no clerkship at all-but  at the same time, 
limited application  pools save resources  that would have been spent 
by judges, recommenders,  and other parties on matches that might 
never have materialized. 
(vi) Another corollary:  students  opt out of the  process entirely. 
The nature of the law clerk hiring process may also lead some stu- 
dents not to apply at all. More than half (58 percent) of the students 
who said in response to our 2000 survey that they did not apply for 
federal appellate clerkships  reported that their decision not to apply 
was influenced  by either the nature or the timing of the market.  (We 
discuss the timing of the market-the  early date at which the market 
takes place-in  more detail below.)  We did not ask a similar  quantita- 
tive question of students  in 1999,  but from that year we have anecdo- 
tal evidence,  summarized  in Table  A7 in the Data Appendix,  of a simi- 
lar effect of the nature of the process on students'  decisions to apply. 
Obviously,  if students  who choose not to apply are missing  opportuni- 
ties that they would (in a better world) want to pursue,  and judges 
would be interested in some of these individuals,  then the nature of 
the process of law clerk hiring  is impeding  the satisfaction  of judges' 
and students'  preferences. 
b) Early hiring.  The law clerk market may fail to  maximize 
judges' and clerks'  satisfaction  not only as a result of the nature  of the 
process (the focus of the previous discussion) but also as a result of 
the early time at which hiring  occurs.  As noted in Part I above, when 
hiring  occurs  early,  judges have less information  on which  to base their 
decisions about which clerks would be most attractive  to them. Like- 
wise, students have less information  about whether and where they 
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would like to clerk. Our survey  results  show both that the clerkship 
market  has moved  progressively  earlier  in time over the last three  hir- 
ing seasons and that the early time at which  the market  moves-like 
the nature  of the process  itself-discourages some students  from ap- 
plying  at all. 
(i) Evidence on timing in the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 clerk- 
ship markets.  Our survey results show that the clerkship market 
moved relatively  early in the second year of law school in 1998-1999 
and  earlier  still  in 1999-2000;  these results  thus  provide  a striking  illus- 
tration  of unraveling  in progress. 
Table 13 compiles the information  reported  by judges about 
the timing  of the market  in these two years.  For 1998-1999,28  percent 
of judges had begun interviewing  and making offers by the end of 
January  1999,  and 61 percent  had reviewed  applications  by that time. 
These numbers  are remarkable  in light  of the policy  of the leading  law 
schools during  1998-1999  that applications  and recommendation  let- 
ters from law school faculty  were not to be sent prior  to February  1. 
As the data dramatically  show,  this policy did not hold up.  The data 
also reveal  that a substantial  number  of judges  moved earlier  in 1998- 
1999 than they had in 1997-1998,  as reported  in the penultimate  row 
of Table  13. 
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TABLE 13 
TIMING OF THE MARKET AS REPORTED BY JUDGES 
% of judges responding 
(cumulative % in narentheses) 
Date of Review  of  Date of Interviews  and Offers 
Applications 
1998-  1999-  1998-  1999- 
1999  2000  1999  2000 
Start  Finish  Start  Finish 
Datea  Dateb  Datea  Dateb 
Sept or  1%  12%  1%  1%  0%  0% 
earlier  (1%)  (12%)  (1%)  (1%)  (0%)  (0%) 
Oct  2%  8%  0%  0%  3%  1% 
(3%)  (20%)  (1%)  (1%)  (3%)  (1%) 
Nov  2%  24%  1%  1%  11%  7% 
(5%)  (44%)  (2%)  (2%)  (14%)  (8%) 
Dec  20%  29%  8%  2%  29%  22% 
(25%)  (72%)C  (9%)C  (3%)C  (43%)  (30%) 
Jan  35%  11%  18%  13%  29%  34% 
(61%)C  (84%)C  (28%)C  (16%)  (71%)C  (64%) 
Feb  25%  3%  42%  38%  10%  17% 
(86%)  (87%)  (69%)C  (54%)  (81%)  (81%) 
Mar  or  14%  13%  31%  46%  19%  19% 
later  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%) 
Earlier  29%  55%  35%  57% 
than the 
prior 
year 
Later  2%  4%  2%  3% 
than the 
prior 
year 
Total number of judges responding: 
127 for 1998-1999,105  for 1999-2000 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. 
a 
The start  date is the date at which  the judge  started  conducting  interviews  and  making  offers. 
bThe finish  date is the date at which  the judge  finished  conducting  interviews  and  making  offers. 
The cumulative  percentage  does not equal the sum of the previous  cumulative  percentage  and 
the new percentage  as a consequence  of rounding. 
Things  happened even more quickly,  and by a substantial  margin, 
in 1999-2000.  As shown in Table 13, 72 percent of responding  judges 
indicated that they had reviewed applications  by the end of Decem- 
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ber, compared  to only 25 percent  in 1998-1999.  43 percent  indicated 
that they had started  to interview  candidates  and make offers by the 
end of December,  compared  to only 9 percent in 1998-1999.  By the 
end of January,  64 percent  were completely  done with interviews  and 
offers,  compared  to only 16 percent in 1998-1999.  Also as shown in 
Table  13, 55 percent  of responding  judges  said that they reviewed  ap- 
plications earlier in 1999-2000 than they had in 1998-1999,  and 57 
percent said they conducted interviews and made offers earlier in 
1999-2000,  while almost no judges said they did either step later.  By 
any measure,  then,  the clerkship  market  moved  substantially  earlier  in 
1999-2000 than in 1998-1999.  Table  A8 in the Data Appendix pro- 
vides similar  timing  information  broken  down  by circuit. 
On the student side, 81 percent of the students  who did one or 
more interviews  in 1999-2000  reported  having  at least one interview 
before the end of December  of 1999,  as shown  on Table  14.  57 percent 
of the students  who received  one or more offers  during  1999-2000  re- 
ported  having  at least one offer before the end of December  of 1999, 
as also shown  on the table. 
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TABLE 14 
TIMING  OF  THE  MARKET  REPORTED  BY STUDENTS  (1999-2000) 
Date  Sent  First  contact  First  inter-  First  offer 
applications  from  a judge  view (among  (among 
(among  students  students  who 
students  who  who did  received 
received  interviews)  offers) 
such 
contacts) 
% of responding  students 
(cumulative  % in parentheses) 
Sept or  2% (2%)  0% (0%)  0% (0%)  0% (0%) 
earlier 
Oct  20% (22%)  3% (3%)  2% (2%)  0% (0%) 
Nov  67% (89%)  42% (45%)  24% (26%)  14% (14%) 
Dec  10% (99%)  42% (87%)  55% (81%)  43% (57%) 
Jan  0% (99%)  10% (97%)  15% (96%)  29% (86%) 
Feb or  1% (100%)  3% (100%)  4% (100%)  14%  (100%) 
later 
Total  Total  Total  Total 
number  of  number  of  number  of  number  of 
responses:  responses:  responses:  responses: 
128  124  120  102 
Source:  2000  Student  Survey. 
For skeptics who tend toward the view that the current  market 
for federal judicial law clerks must be operating  efficiently,  the data 
presented  here raise serious  questions.  If 1999-2000  was efficient,  then 
was 1998-1999,  when hiring  occurred  substantially  later,  also efficient, 
or was it inefficient? More generally,  given how much the timing in 
this market  has bounced around  over the years,  it seems hard  to assert 
that any current  resting  point is efficient. 
The efficiency  argument  seems particularly  strained  for the 1999- 
2000 market,  when the timing of the market clashed with both stu- 
dents' final exams and the law firm recruitment  process.  Tables  A9-1 
and A9-2 in the Data Appendix summarize  student complaints  about 
these clashes.  It seems hard to believe that the 1999-2000 timing was 
optimal  in any respect. 
(ii) Effects of early hiring on decisions to participate  in the 
market. As noted above,  students  may opt out of the law clerk market 
because of the nature  of the hiring  process;  they may also opt out be- 
cause of the early time at which hiring occurs.  As noted above, we 
know that more than half (58 percent) of the students  who said in re- 
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sponse to our 2000  survey  that  they did not apply  for federal  appellate 
clerkships  reported  that their decision  not to apply  was influenced  by 
either  the nature  or the timing  of the market.  Also as noted above,  for 
1999  we have anecdotal  evidence  from  students  who did not apply  for 
federal clerkships,  and, as shown in Table  A7 in the Data Appendix, 
for a number  of these students  the early time at which hiring  occurs 
was a significant  factor.  Thus,  the early  time at which  hiring  occurs,  like 
the nature of the process,  may reduce the satisfaction  of judges and 
students  by dissuading  some students  from  applying  at all. 
2.  Disillusionment  with  the federal  bench. 
Moving  from the efficiency  criterion  to the concern  with disillu- 
sionment  with  the federal  bench,  our survey  results  provide  strong  sup- 
port for the view that the rough-and-tumble  nature  of the clerk  hiring 
process  carries  certain  risks  to the regard  in which  the federal  judiciary 
is held,  at least in the direct  aftermath  of the hiring  process.  A number 
of respondents  to our  judge  and  student  surveys  emphasized  this  sort  of 
concern,  as summarized  by the often poignant  comments  quoted  in Ta- 
ble 15. 
834  [68:793 The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks 
TABLE  15 
LAW CLERK HIRING AND REGARD FOR 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
Survey  Comment 
1999 Judge  [T]he current non-system makes applicants see judges be- 
Survey #7  having in ways which are unseemly, to put it mildly.  That 
view of our behavior will inevitably shape what these peo- 
ple think of the judiciary.  To the extent that many of these 
applicants will become leaders in the bar and in politics, 
we will as judges reap what we have sown. They will hold 
us in contempt and will not be wholly wrong. 
2000 Judge  The unseemly haste to hire law clerks is a disgrace to the 
Survey #11  federal bench. 
2000 Judge  The students think our hiring process is foolish. We are 
Survey #5  presently embarrassing ourselves with our lack of self- 
control. 
2000 Judge  The current approach reflects poorly on the judiciary. 
Survey #101 
1999 Student  I can't overstate how disillusioned, disgusted and de- 
Survey #111  pressed the whole clerkship application system has left me 
....  [W]atching federal judges panic and lie [and] having 
interviews canceled after traveling to New York makes me 
clearly realize that this system needs reform. 
1999 Student  Some judges scrapped decorum and even bare civility. 
Survey #154a  One federal district court judge asked a student to sneak 
into his office on a Sunday in January,  through the service 
entrance. His court had agreed not to conduct early inter- 
views, he explained, and he wanted to cheat in secret. 
2000 Student  Federal judges (many of them) suffer from immaturity, 
Survey #6  unprofessionalism, and egotism that I guess should be ex- 
pected from life-tenured government employees who have 
no incentive to behave like adults. 
2000 Student  The gamesmanship that currently pervades the process is 
Survey #43  incredibly frustrating to students and ...  corrosive of the 
dignity of the federal judiciary. 
1999 Student  I accepted an interview offer with a judge on the West 
Survey #104  Coast and flew out at considerable expense. At the end of 
the interview, it became evident that the judge had already 
made enough outstanding offers to fill his slots. I believe 
that he interviewed me as a'backup.' 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys;  1999  and  2000 Student  Surveys. 
This response  took the form of a newspaper  editorial  that the student  had written  about the 
market  for federal  judicial  law clerks. 
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The comments  in Table  15 are obviously  anecdotal  and should  be 
viewed  as such.  At the same time,  however,  quantitative  data  from  our 
judge surveys  make clear that the underlying  forms  of judicial  behav- 
ior noted in the table are far from isolated.  The practice  of interview- 
ing candidates (at the candidates'  expense) when no slots remain 
available  is far less rare  than we would  have guessed  prior  to the sur- 
veys.  We would  have guessed  that this occurred  only very  occasionally; 
indeed,  one judge wrote in response  to our inquiry  about  whether  the 
judge had at least one slot left by the time of the last scheduled  inter- 
view,  "Yes,  of course.  What  kind of a slug do you take me for?"' 
The numbers,  however,  show a striking  number  of self-confessed 
"slugs."  In 2000,  15 percent  of responding  judges  had  no slots available 
by the time of their last scheduled interview with a candidate,  as 
shown  in Table  16.  Senior  judges  were more likely to have no slots left 
than active  judges,  as the table shows,  but still,  in both 1999  and 2000, 
almost one in ten active  judges admitted  to having  no slots available 
by the time of their  last scheduled  interview.  Some  judges  presumably 
cancel scheduled  interviews  once their slots are filled,  but this may or 
may not spare  the candidate  the expense of a fruitless  trip  depending 
on the refundability  of the candidate's  airplane  ticket. 
TABLE 16 
JUDGES WHO HAD NO SLOTS  LEFT BY THE  TIME 
OF  THEIR LAST SCHEDULED  INTERVIEW 
Group  of federal  appellate  judges  %  of responding  judges  with  no 
slots  left by the time of their  last 
scheduled  interview 
1998-1999  1999-2000 
All federal  appellate  judges  11%  15% 
Active  judges  9%  9% 
Senior  judges  13%  32% 
Total  number  Total  number 
of responses:  of responses: 
139  110 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
The lack of open slots by the end of the interview  period is a 
natural  tendency  of a process  under  which  the great  majority  of judges 
start making  offers before completing  their interviews.  In both 1999 
and  2000,  approximately  three-quarters  of active  judges  responding  to 
our surveys  had made at least some offers before the completion  of 
56  2000 Judge Survey #90. 
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interviews,  as shown in Table  3 above.  We do not mean to suggest  that 
offering some positions before the end of interviewing  is necessarily 
objectionable, but it  does obviously mean that those interviewing 
later-who  may be paying large sums to travel to the interview-are 
competing  for fewer and fewer positions. 
Students responding to our surveys expressed not only direct 
concerns about judges' conduct but also a general disenchantment 
(voiced in no uncertain  terms)  with the clerk hiring  process.  Tables  17- 
1 and 17-2 provide a sampling  of some of the most striking  comments. 
Of course, these responses may not represent a random slice of stu- 
dent opinion;  presumably  we were more likely to hear from students 
dissatisfied  with the process  than from those who were pleased with it. 
At the same time,  it is critical  to emphasize  that,  as the right-hand  col- 
umn of the tables reveals, the sources of the negative student com- 
ments appear  generally  to have been quite successful  in the clerkship 
market.  This is particularly  clear for 1999,  when we asked for detailed 
information  about the judges from whom the student received offers. 
Our measure for 2000-the  total number of offers the student re- 
ceived-is  less informative,  but it still seems noteworthy  that none of 
the students  quoted failed to receive at least one clerkship  offer.  Thus, 
this is not a group of disgruntled  students who received no clerkship 
offers or (at least insofar as 1999 reveals) only offers from relatively 
unappealing  judges. 
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TABLE 17-1 
STUDENT  REACTIONS  TO  THE LAW CLERK  MARKET (1998-1999) 
Survey  Comment  Student's  Outcome 
Survey  It's terrible.  Just  about  anything,  No offer. 
#184  including  malicious  lies,  forcible 
running  with scissors,  and active 
misuse  of electric  cords,  would  be 
better. 
Survey  Craziness.  Two  offers  from 
#119  highly  prestigious 
court  of appeals 
judges. 
Survey  Insane.  Three  offers  from 
#172  highly  prestigious 
court  of appeals 
judges. 
Survey  Chaotic.  Three  offers  from 
#178  top district  court 
judges  in Washing- 
ton D.C.  and  New 
York  City. 
Survey  Brutal.  Offer  from  a highly 
#168  prestigious  court  of 
appeals  judge. 
Survey  A total mess.  Offers  from  three 
#123  prestigious  court  of 
appeals  and  district 
court  judges. 
Survey  [A] complete  mess.  Offers  from  four 
#121  prestigious  Second 
Circuit  judges. 
Source:  1999  Student  Survey. 
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TABLE 17-2 
STUDENT  REACTIONS  TO  THE  LAW  CLERK  MARKET  (1999-2000) 
Survey  Comment  Student's  Outcome 
Survey  You will have to arrest  me before  One offer. 
#26  I will again  set foot in [specified 
courthouse].  I would not wish 
this process on my worst enemy. 
Survey  One of the most arbitrary  and ill-  One offer. 
#9  designed  processes  I've ever 
come across. 
Survey  A crap  shoot.  One offer. 
#20 
Survey  Horrible.  Two  offers. 
#21 
Survey  Chaos.  Two  offers. 
#25 
Survey  Absolute hell.  One offer. 
#28 
Survey  Crazy.  Two  offers. 
#32 
Survey  Disorganized  and chaotic.  Two offers. 
#40 
Survey  A zoo.  Two  offers. 
#200 
Survey  A mess.  One offer. 
#234 
Survey  The clerkship  hiring  process  is a  One offer. 
#240  disgrace.  It is everything  that we 
are taught  at law school to dis- 
like:  inefficient,  arbitrary  and ca- 
pricious  and designed  to benefit 
those with connections  and  inside 
information. 
Survey  Deeply unfair.  One offer. 
#245 
Survey  An extremely  unpleasant  proc-  One offer. 
#246  ess. 
Survey  Terrible.  Three  offers. 
#247 
Survey  Totally  outrageous,... stressful  Two  offers. 
#252  [and]  chaotic. 
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TABLE 17-2 
STUDENT  REACTIONS  TO  THE LAW CLERK  MARKET (1999-2000) 
(CONTINUED) 
Survey  Comment  Student's  Outcome 
Survey  Clerkship  hiring  is like flying  One offer. 
#255  through  the air  without  a net,  you 
never  know  where  you'll  land, 
and  how hurt  you'll  be in the 
process. 
Source: 2000 Student Survey. 
Almost as interesting  as some of the quotations  in Tables 17-1 
and 17-2 was the following remark  from a student who had a more 
positive view of the clerkship  hiring  process:  "I think it benefits law 
students  at privileged  schools  to be subjected  to the same  random,  dif- 
ficult job search process that people in other fields have to  [un- 
dergo]."5  Perhaps  that  is the best argument  to be made  for the current 
process,  but it does not suggest  that this process  is one that  is likely to 
cast the federal  judiciary  in a particularly  favorable  light. 
3.  Perceived  fairness. 
As noted in Part I above,  participants  may regard  the law clerk 
market  as unfair  to the extent that the frenzied  manner  and early  tim- 
ing of hiring  lead the market  to rely on various  forms  of personal  well- 
connectedness  in matching  applicants  and  judges.  Students  with rela- 
tionships  to previous  high achievers  in the legal world and elsewhere 
may be advantaged  in the clerkship  competition  as a result  of the lim- 
ited information  available  to judges.  Our survey  results  provide evi- 
dence both that personal  well-connectedness  does matter  in at least 
some cases and that some students  (and  judges) regard  this as unfair. 
Note that our claim  is not that such reliance  is "unfair"  (however  de- 
fined) but simply that some participants  in this market regard  it as 
such and experience disutility  as a result.  Also, it may be that any 
process  would be regarded  as unfair  by some, but the fairness  objec- 
tions we describe  below appear  to be shared  by a larger  group than 
would  probably  be the case under  a different  system. 
a) Peer  recommendations.  An intriguing  feature  of the market  for 
federal  judicial  law clerks  is the role played  by other students'  and re- 
cent graduates'  recommendations.  In some instances  clerks or judges 
solicit  the opinions  of applicants'  current  classmates,  as reflected  in the 
57  2000 Student Survey #264. 
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survey comments  reported  in Table  A10 in the Data Appendix.  These 
comments  show both that peer references  from  current  classmates  mat- 
ter in this market  and  that at least some students  regard  this as unfair. 
At least as important  as recommendations  from  current  classmates 
are recommendations  from recent law school graduates  who are cur- 
rently clerking.  Our 1999 and 2000 judge surveys  show that two-thirds 
of responding  judges (67 percent in 1999 and 66 percent in 2000) use 
current clerks to  screen applications.  Table 18 shows that, at least 
anecdotally, current clerks  may  rely  in  part  on  their  personal 
connections  in performing  the screening  function.  Interestingly,  at least 
two of  the  students quoted in the  table (the  third and eleventh 
quotations)  seemed to regard  the effect of the personal  connection as 
unfair  even though  they were presumably  helped by it. The University  of Chicago Law Review 
TABLE 18 
THE ROLE OF CONNECTIONS  WITH  CURRENT  LAW  CLERKS 
Survey  Comment 
1999 Survey #109  With  [a particular  judge]  one of his clerks  I knew 
from  law  school.  The  judge  made  it clear  that  this 
clerk  was  rooting  for me. 
1999 Survey #160  I have  a good friend  clerking  for [a particular  judge] 
who thought  we would  be a good fit-I'm  sure  her 
influence  was helpful. 
1999 Survey #163  I know  the current  clerks  of [two  particular  judges 
with  whom  the candidate  received  interviews].  Both 
have  assured  me that  I received  interviews  on my 
merits ....  That's what they say,  but I can't help but 
feel like perhaps  they had  some influence. 
1999 Survey #134  A current  clerk  [of a judge  from  whom  the student 
received  an offer]  is an acquaintance  of mine  and 
helped  get me an interview. 
1999 Survey #115  Current  clerks  in [two  particular  judges'  chambers, 
who were  graduates  of the candidate's  law  school, 
played  an important  role].  I am pretty  sure  they  had 
good things  to say about  me to their  respective 
judges. 
1999 Survey #49  A [clerk  for a particular  judge]  helped  me get an in- 
terview. 
1999 Survey #55  [Knowing  a current  clerk  for a particular  judge] 
probably  expedited  my ability  to get the interview 
[with  that  judge]. 
2000 Survey #5  [T]wo  current  clerks  with  whom  I had  worked  either 
called  me for an interview  with  their  judge  or rec- 
ommended  me to another  judge  in the same  circuit. 
2000 Survey #12  I knew  the current  clerk  of a judge  who interviewed 
me,  I'm  sure  that  clerk  played  a role in my getting 
the interview. 
2000 Survey #20  I was  acquainted  with  one of the clerks  currently 
working  for [a  judge  from  whom  this  candidate  re- 
ceived  a clerkship  offer]. 
2000 Survey #32  I think  there  would  have  been no chance  of me in- 
terviewing  with  [a particular  judge]  if a friend  of 
mine  hadn't  been one of her clerks.  That  made  it all 
the more  satisfying  when  I [later]  got an interview 
with  [a different  judge]  whom  I know  I have  no con- 
tact  with. 
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TABLE 18 
THE ROLE OF CONNECTIONS  WITH  CURRENT LAW CLERKS 
(CONTINUED) 
Survey  Comment 
2000 Survey #251  The two appellate  and six SDNY [Southern  District 
of New York]  interviews  were all with  judges  with 
whom  I had some connection  through  their  clerks. 
2000 Survey #254  I know,  and  was not hurt  by,  a current  clerk. 
2000 Survey #10  One current  clerk  for [a particular  judge]  used to be 
an acquaintance  at school.  I think  he helped  get me 
an interview. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys. 
b) Faculty  "clerkship brokers." Clearly  law  professors  play  an 
important role in the clerkship process; their recommendations  of 
students  are a significant  component  in judges'  evaluation  of applicants, 
as shown in Table  All  in the Data Appendix.  No one seems to regard 
that in itself as unfair.  But sometimes the role of the faculty  member 
goes beyond the familiar role of  recommender.  In some instances 
professors  play the role of "interview  broker"  or "offer  broker"  in the 
clerkship  market  or even choose the clerks  themselves.  This  is reflected 
in the comments  from our student  and  judge surveys  reported  in Table 
A12  in the Data Appendix; it is also reflected more quantitatively in 
responses to our judge surveys,  which showed that approximately  27 
percent  of judges  in 1999  and 19 percent  in 2000 relied on professors  to 
screen  applications. 
At least some students and judges seem to regard the sort of 
"faculty  feeding"  described  in our student  and  judge surveys  as unfair: 
I am and was completely  repulsed  by the "this  professor  secretly 
handpicks and recommends a favorite student to  a particular 
judge"  routine.58 
[T]he biggest problem ...  for students [is] the old boy's network. 
If you are not the darling  of an aged white male professor,  who 
may be severely uncomfortable  working  with talented women or 
people of  color, you should kiss your chances of  a clerkship 
goodbye and not bother applying.  In my [particular  school] class, 
approximately  80% of the students who received circuit court 
clerkships  "applied"  as [a] formality only, their clerkships  were 
delivered  to them by 2 or 3 faculty  members.59 
58  2000 Student Survey #16. 
59  2000 Student Survey #251. 
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The "special deals" between  judges  and professors violate  the 
spirit if not the letter of attempts to hire in a more orderly way.6 
c)  Other forms  of  well-connectedness.  Social connections may 
also aid some applicants,  and again this may be regarded as unfair.  Ta- 
ble  19 lists student comments suggesting the  importance of  various 
forms of social well-connectedness, including connections with friends 
of a judge or a judge's former clerks. Some participants in the market 
are likely to view the role of such connections as unfair;  as one student 
lamented, "I feel that I was not a party to the network."61 
TABLE 19 
THE  ROLE  OF  VARIOUS  TYPES  OF  SOCIAL  CONNECTIONS 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Survey  #177  A good family  friend  called  [a particular  judge],  and 
I received  a call  from  the judge  about  thirty  minutes 
thereafter.  [The  student  ultimately  received  an offer 
from  this  judge.] 
1999  Survey  #120  [A] close friend  of [a particular  judge]  made  a call 
on my behalf. 
1999  Survey  #129  A former  [clerk  for a particular  judge]  called  [that 
judge]  to recommend  me.  I think  I was [that  judge's] 
top ...  choice based on that clerk's recommendation. 
1999  Survey  #130  A former  clerk  of [a particular  judge]  is a good 
friend  of mine,  and  played  a big role. 
1999  Survey  #189  With  [a particular  judge]  a family  connection  helped. 
2000  Survey  #7  A former  clerk  who knew  me well called  her  judge 
for me. 
2000  Survey  #11  Got an interview  (and  the offer)  in [specified  court] 
because  old college  friend  was  ex clerk  and  talked 
me up to judge. 
2000  Survey  #12  One of my best friend's  [sic]  father  is a law  professor 
and  he put in a call  for me to a judge  he knows. 
2000  Survey  #59  A friend  of my mother's  put in a good word  with  a 
judge  they knew. 
2000  Survey  #234  The  clerkship  I eventually  accepted  was  offered  af- 
ter a professor  at another  law  school  (who  I know 
well) made  a phone  call  to the judge. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys. 
60  1999 Judge Survey #26. 
61  2000 Student Survey #24. 
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In short,  the law clerk market appears  to rely heavily on various 
forms of personal well-connectedness,  and at least some participants 
seem to regard  this as unfair. 
III.  THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER MARKETS 
The market  for federal  judicial  law clerks is far from alone in its 
difficulty  in establishing  the timing of transactions,  with the variety  of 
efficiency  and other problems  that result.  Table 20 below lists several 
dozen markets  and submarkets  that have experienced  the unraveling  of 
transaction  dates.  Table  20 concentrates  primarily  on markets  that,  like 
the law clerk  market,  are entry-level  professional  labor  markets.  Timing 
problems are particularly  easy to identify in these markets because 
generally employment cannot begin until the professional  has com- 
pleted his or her education,  yet arrangements  may be made far in ad- 
vance. 
Timing  problems  are not restricted  to labor  markets,  however.  The 
list in Table 20 includes the market for postseason college football 
bowls;  again  timing  problems  are easy to identify  here,  since  postseason 
bowl games cannot be played until the end of the regular  season.  An- 
other good example  of timing  problems  in a nonlabor  context  is frater- 
nity and sorority  rush,  where recruitment  had at one point moved back 
to the pre-college  years  even though  the activities  of the organization  in 
question  did not commence  until  college.62  Yet another  example  is early 
admission  to college;  nearly  three-quarters  of high school students  who 
go on to attend elite colleges now apply  for early admission  to one or 
more colleges  in response  to incentives  offered  by colleges.6 
62  See Roth and  Xing,  84 Am Econ  Rev at 1019  (cited  in note 3). Indeed,  here  the unraveling 
of selection  dates  has even entered  the language  in the form  of the term  "rush."  See Susan  Mongell 
and Alvin E. Roth, Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism, 81 Am Econ Rev 441,441 
(1991). 
63  See Christopher  Avery,  Andrew  Fairbanks,  and Richard  Zeckhauser,  The Early  Admis- 
sions Game: The Perspective  of Participants  (work in progress) (on file with authors). 
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TABLE 20 
A SELECTION  OF  MARKETS  WITH  TIMING  PROBLEMS 
Market  Organi7ation  Stage' 
Entry-Level  Medical  Labor 
Market: 
American  first-year 
postgraduate  (PGY1)  positions 
Canadian  first-year  positions 
U.K.  regional  markets  for 
preregistration  positions: 
Edinburgh 
Cardiff 
Birmingham 
Newcastle 
Sheffield 
Cambridge 
London  Hospital 
American  specialty  residen- 
cies: 
Neurosurgery 
Ophthalmology 
Otolaryngology 
Neurology 
Urology 
Other  specialtiesb 
Advanced  specialty  positions: 
Twelve  (primarily  surgical) 
specialtiesc 
Medical 
Subspecialties: 
Four  ophthalmology 
subspecialties 
Plastic  surgery 
National  Resident  Matching 
Program  (NRMP) 
Canadian  Intern  and  Resident 
Matching  Service 
Regional  health  authorities 
Neurological  Surgery  Matching 
Program 
Ophthalmology  Matching  Program 
Otolaryngology  Matching  Program 
Neurology  Matching  Program 
AUA  Residency  Matching  Program 
NRMP 
Specialties  Matching  Services 
Medical  Specialties  Matching 
Program 
Ophthalmology  Fellowship  Match 
Plastic  Surgery  Matching  Program 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4,1 
4,1 
3 or 4,1 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 and  4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
"The  "stages"  are explained in the text just below. 
'Anesthesiology,  emergency medicine, orthopedics, physical medicine, psychiatry,  and diagnostic 
radiology. 
cColon/rectal surgery, dermatology, emergency medicine, foot/ankle surgery,  hand surgery,  oph- 
thalmic plastic and reconstructive surgery,  pediatric emergency medicine, pediatric orthopedics, 
pediatric surgery,  reproductive endocrinology, sports medicine, and vascular surgery. 
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TABLE 20 
A  SELECTION  OF MARKETS WIIH TIMING PROBLEMS 
(CONTINUED) 
Market  Organization  Stage 
Entry-Level Legal Labor 
Markets: 
Federal court clerkships  Judicial Conferences  2, then 1 
Canadian articling  Articling Student Matching 
positions:  Program 
Toronto  3 and 4 
Vancouver  3 or 4, 
then 1 
Alberta (Calgary)  3 
Entry-Level Business School 
Markets: 
New MBA's  1d 
New marketing professors  1 
Other Entry-Level Labor Mar- 
kets: 
Japanese university  Ministry of Labor; Nikkeiren  2 
graduates 
Clinical psychology  Association of Psychology Post-  2, then 3 
internships  doctoral & Internship Centerse 
Dental residencies  Postdoctoral Dental Matching  3 
(three specialties and  Program 
other general programs) 
Optometry residencies  Optometric Residency Matching  1 and 3 
Services 
Postseason College Football  National Collegiate Athletic  1, then 
Bowls  Association ("NCAA")  3 
Other Two-Sided  Matching: 
Fraternity rush  1 
Sorority rush  National Panhellenic Conference  3 
Source:  Roth  and  Xing,  84  Am Econ  Rev at 993 (cited  in note  3). 
dOccasionally. 
"The  name of this organization  used to be "Association  of Psychology  Internship  Centers." 
In many of the markets in Table 20, considerable effort has been 
expended  to halt, reverse, or otherwise  control the timing of transac- 
tions. The table lists for many of the markets the organization that has 
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been entrusted  with this task.  Many of these organizations  were cre- 
ated expressly  for the purpose  of controlling  the unraveling  of trans- 
action times.  In many  instances  these organizations  can bring  to bear 
considerable  compulsory  power.  But frequently  a solution  to the tim- 
ing problem  has nonetheless  proved elusive.  The difficulties  encoun- 
tered by these other markets  may therefore  illuminate  the problems 
in the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks  and the prospects  and  po- 
tential  pitfalls  in the road  to reform  of this market. 
A.  A Framework:  Four  Stages  of Unraveling  Markets 
To make  it easy to describe  the common  phenomena  found  in a di- 
verse set of markets,  Table  20 loosely categorizes  each market  it de- 
scribes  as most  recently  being  in one of four  "stages,"  as follows.64 
Markets that are in the process of  unraveling-in  which ap- 
pointment  dates are getting  earlier  from  year to year,  or in which  they 
have moved to the earliest  feasible  date  -are  stage  one markets.  Here 
is a generic  description  of stage one: 
Stage 1 begins when  ...  the relatively few transactions [in the 
market]  are made without  overt timing  problems.  By the middle 
of stage 1 ...  some  appointments are being made rather early, 
with some participants  finding that they don't have as wide a 
range of choices as they would like: students have to decide 
whether  to accept early  job offers or take a chance and wait for 
better  jobs, and some employers  find that not all of the students 
they are interested  in are available  by the time they get around  to 
making  offers.  The trade  journals  start to be full of exhortations 
urging  employers  to wait  until  the traditional  time to make  offers, 
or at least not to make them any earlier  next year than this year. 
Towards  the end of stage 1, the rate of unraveling  accelerates,  un- 
til sometimes  quite suddenly  offers are being made so early that 
there are serious  difficulties  distinguishing  among  the candidates. 
There is no uniform  time for offers to be made nor is there a 
customary  duration  for them to be left open, so participants  find 
themselves  facing  unnaturally  thin markets,  and on both sides of 
the market a variety of strategic behaviors emerge, many of 
which are regarded  as unethical  practices.  Various  organizations 
concerned with the market may have proposed guidelines in- 
tended to regulate  it, without  notable  success.  As stage 1 ends,  in- 
fluential market participants  are engaged in a vigorous debate 
about  what  can and  should  be done.65 
64  This section draws  from Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 996-98 (cited in note 3). 
65  Id at 996. 
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Although this was not written  as a description  of the law clerk  market, 
it fits it to a "T." 
Stage two markets  are those that have instituted  regulations  speci- 
fying  the time before  which  offers  and sometimes  other  contacts  cannot 
be made,  and sometimes  how long offers must remain  open. Stage two 
markets  are still decentralized,  with employers  contacting  potential  em- 
ployees directly  to make offers.  During each of the six attempted  re- 
forms of the law clerk market,  this market was in stage two. For in- 
stance,  the most recent attempted  reform specified  February  1 as the 
date before which  contacts  could not be made and March  1 as the date 
before  which  (in effect) offers  could  not be made.6 
Stage three markets are those that have instituted centralized 
market clearing procedures,  which not only serve to determine the 
time at which transactions  take place but also organize the transac- 
tions (the order in which offers are made and the point at which 
transactions  are finalized).  The most common form of stage three or- 
ganization has potential employers and employees contacting each 
other (via applications,  interviews,  etc.) in a decentralized  way, after 
which each employer submits a rank ordering  of applicants  to a cen- 
tral clearinghouse,  to which each applicant  also submits  a rank order- 
ing of positions.67  The clearinghouse  then uses these preference  lists,  in 
some pre-specified way (now often formalized in a computer pro- 
gram), to produce a match, and employers and employees are in- 
formed of the results of the match.68  Perhaps the largest and best 
known of the centralized  markets is the one by which new medical 
school graduates  are matched to first-year  residencies.9  But, as Table 
20 makes clear, lawyers too participate  in stage three markets;  "arti- 
cling"  positions required  before being called to the bar in Canada  are 
arranged  in this way in several  major  cities. 
Stage four markets  are those with centralized  mechanisms,  but in 
which there has been at least some unraveling  prior  to the centralized 
market,  as participants  jockey for advantage  in the centralized  proce- 
dure. 
[T]he unraveling  has often taken the form of recruiting  students 
for summer  internships  (or in the case of some medical special- 
ties for 'audition electives'), which amount to extensive inter- 
viewing opportunities  in which the student spends a period of 
66  Becker,  Breyer,  and  Calabresi,  104  Yale  L J at 209-15 (cited  in note 8), describe  the six at- 
tempted  reforms.  As discussed  in Part  IV.B.l.a  below,  the March  1 date  specified  by the most  recent 
reform  technically  applied  to interviews,  but most, although  not all, judges are reluctant  to hire 
without  an interview. 
67  Roth and  Xing,  84 Am Econ Rev at 997 (cited  in note 3). 
68  Id. 
69  See Roth and  Peranson,  89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9). 
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weeks or even months  at the firm.  Because of the length of time 
involved,  students  can interview  in this way at only a very small 
number of firms ...  and firms can interview only a few students 
in this way.  Because the percentage  of new employees hired by 
each firm  who were previously  summer  interns  there sometimes 
becomes quite high,  these internships  can become a way of mov- 
ing  the  recruiting process before  the  centralized matching 
70 
mechanism.7 
These four stages provide a framework  within which to discuss the 
particular  markets  from  Table  20 in more  detail.  In the next section  we 
offer some vignettes  from those other markets  in the hope that they 
will illuminate  the problems  experienced  in the market  for federal  ju- 
dicial  law clerks. 
B.  Vignettes 
1.  Medical  residencies. 
A good place to begin is with the history  of the market  for new 
American  medical  school graduates,  both because that is the first of 
these "unraveling"  markets  to have been studied as such by econo- 
mists7'  and because  of its role (discussed  more fully in Parts  IV.C  and 
IV.D below) in the debate over how to reform  the clerkship  market.72 
But it is not the successful  experience  of the centralized  stage three 
medical  market  that we wish to discuss  here but, instead,  the period 
from 1945  to 1951,  when the medical  market  was organized  as a stage 
two market. 
Prior  to 1945  there had been a severe unraveling  of appointment 
dates, so  that  medical students were  being  selected  for  post- 
graduation  employment  when they still had two full years remaining 
of medical school (much like today's market  for federal  judicial  law 
clerks).73  In 1945  the medical  schools,  working  in conjunction  with the 
residency  programs,  successfully  implemented  an embargo  on letters 
of reference  until  a specified  date,  and this proved  effective.74  The date 
70  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 997 (cited in note 3). 
71  See Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market  for Medical Interns  and Residents:A 
Case Study in Game Theory,  92 J Pol Econ 991 (1984). 
72  See Annette E. Clark, On Comparing  Apples and Oranges:  The Judicial Clerk Selection 
Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 Georgetown L J 1749, 1753-97 (1995); Kozinski, 100 
Yale L J at 1721-24 (cited in note 1);  Trenton  H. Norris, The  Judicial Clerkship  Selection Process:An 
Applicant's  Perspective  on Bad Apples, Sour Grapes and Fruitful  Reform,  81 Cal L Rev 765,791-98 
(1993); Oberdorfer and Levy, 101 Yale L J at 1098-1108 (cited in note 41);Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 
160-63 (cited in note 2). Several of these authors have cited the economic investigation into the 
medical market in support of their (opposing) positions on reform of the clerkship market. See 
Kozinski,  100 Yale L J at 1721 n 29; Oberdorfer  and Levy, 101 Yale L J at 1100-01 n 15,1103 n 27. 
73  Roth, 92 J Pol Econ at 994 (cited in note 71). 
74  Id. 
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of appointment  was successfully  moved to one year before employ- 
ment would begin, and in subsequent  years the dates at which letters 
were released,  and appointments  made,  were moved into the last year 
of medical  school,  nearer  to the time of appointment.5 
But the problems experienced  by this market did not end when 
the  appointment date was controlled (a  stage-two-type solution). 
There followed a period in which the market was extremely disor- 
derly,  with students being called upon to make increasingly  prompt 
decisions whether to accept offers. In 1945 offers were supposed to 
remain open for ten days.6  Each subsequent year that interval was 
shortened,  until by 1949 a grace period of twelve hours had been re- 
jected as too long, and exploding  offers were explicitly  allowed.7  What 
had happened was that hospitals found that if an offer was rejected 
very near the deadline,  it was often too late for them to reach their 
next most preferred candidates before they had accepted other of- 
fers.78  Even when there was a long deadline,  much of this action was 
compressed  into the last moments,  since a student who had been of- 
fered a position at, say, his or her third choice hospital would be in- 
clined to wait as long as possible before accepting,  in the hope of 
eventually  being offered a preferable  position.79 
A central clearinghouse  was proposed and adopted only when 
these attempts  to organize a stage two market had been exhausted.80 
With modifications,  this kind of central clearinghouse  has been used 
now in the medical  residency  market  for almost  half a century.  The de- 
sign of the current  medical clearinghouse  was directed by one of the 
authors  of this work,81  and its details are discussed  more fully in Parts 
IV.C  and IV.D below. 
2.  Postseason  college bowls. 
The American medical market is large and impersonal,  and one 
important  feature of this market,  both before and after the move to a 
centralized  clearinghouse,  is that informal  understandings  between  par- 
ticipants  are not always  honored.  But in smaller  markets,  in which  par- 
ticipants  can expect to encounter each other again at later points in 
time, promises  can often be relied on. Paradoxically  (since one would 
75  Id. 
76  Id at 994-95. 
77  See id at 995 (describing the decision of the Association  of American Medical Colleges 
to permit offers at 12:01 a.m. on a specified date with no required waiting period for responses). 
78  Id at 994. 
79  Id. 
80  See  id  at 995-96  (describing  the  adoption  of the  matching system  for the  1951-1952 
market for medical residents). 
81  See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9). 
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ordinarily  think that a small market  would make an agreement  on a 
fixed starting  date for transactions  easier  to sustain),  the small  size can 
further  increase  the difficulty  of achieving  a stage  two solution. 
The experience  of postseason  college football  bowls  is illustrative. 
For  many  years  the  National  Collegiate Athletic  Association 
("NCAA")  attempted  to control the date at which bowl agreements 
were signed by specifying  a date (commonly  called "Pick-Em  Day") 
before which  such  agreements  were forbidden.8  The idea was to delay 
selection until sufficiently  late in the regular  season that teams with 
the best regular-season  records  would  be likely to be matched  against 
one another  in the bowls.8  However,  despite the considerable  penal- 
ties the NCAA can levy on teams and bowls,  the fact that informal 
agreements  could be relied upon allowed teams and bowls to make 
early  agreements  and avoid  penalties.84 
During  the  1990-1991 football  season  there  were  highly 
publicized informal agreements,  four weeks before the end of the 
regular season (and two weeks before Pick-Em Day), which sent 
Notre Dame to the Orange  Bowl,  Miami  to the Cotton  Bowl,  and  Vir- 
ginia to the Sugar  Bowl.85  At that time (with four games left to play) 
Notre Dame, Miami,  and Virginia  were ranked  by the sportswriters' 
poll as the number  one, three,  and eight teams  in the nation.96  But,  fol- 
lowing  some losses before the bowl games  were actually  played,  Notre 
Dame had dropped  from number  one to number  five, and Virginia 
had dropped  out of the top twenty  altogether.8  Because of the signifi- 
cant penalties associated with breaking  NCAA rules, there are no 
public  accounts  of the details  of these informal  agreements.8  However, 
"in  confidential  discussions  with  participants  in this market,  great  con- 
fidence was expressed in the reliability of such agreements,  once 
made."89 
The NCAA gave up trying  to enforce  a date for bowl agreements 
following the embarrassing  experience in  the  1990-1991 season.9 
Since then bowl selection has become more centrally  organized  (a 
stage three model), based on agreements  between consortia  of foot- 
ball conferences  and  independent  teams  and  consortia  of bowls.91  Thus, 
82  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1009 (cited in note 3). 
83  Id at 1008-09. 
84  Id at 1009-12. 
85  Id at 1009. 
86  Id at 1009-10. 
87  Id at 1012. 
88  Id at 1012 n  22. 
89  Id. 
90  Id at 1012. 
91  See id at 1013. 
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as with the medical  market,  the attempt  at a stage two solution  proved 
infeasible,  and a more centralized  mechanism  was adopted. 
3.  Clinical  psychology  positions. 
One of the longest-running  stage two markets  was the American 
market  for pre- and post-doctoral  internships  for clinical  psychologists, 
which  operated  as a stage two market  from  the 1970s  through  the 1997- 
1998 academic  year.9  In this market,  transactions  were all to be made 
by telephone on "Selection  Day" (akin to Pick-Em  Day93),  a specified 
date of each year.94  The rules  required  that  no offers  be made  before  the 
opening time of the market (9:00 a.m. Central  Standard  Time in the 
early 1990s),  and that all offers made during  the course of the market 
and not yet rejected  remain  open until the closing  time (4:00  p.m.  Cen- 
tral  Standard  Time  in the early  1990s).95  Thus,  "both  early  offers  and  'ex- 
ploding  offers' (which  require  a decision  before the end of the market) 
[we]re  not allowed."96 
This market  survived  for roughly  twenty-five  years despite a cer- 
tain level of noncompliance,  with somewhere  between 10 percent and 
25 percent of students reporting  forbidden contacts from employers 
before the start of Selection Day and with reports also of informal 
pressure  to signal  in advance  that if offered a job the candidate  would 
accept it.97  Various  rules were formulated  to discourage  such forms of 
behavior,  but these too were difficult  to enforce.98  Both the early con- 
tacts and the solicitation  of promises  seemed to be related to the fact 
that employers had good reason to try to avoid making offers that 
might be rejected late in the day on Selection Day.  The reason is that, 
at 4:00 p.m., students who had offers in hand would accept them be- 
fore they expired,  so that a firm that had an offer rejected  just before 
then might find that many of its more preferred  alternate  candidates 
had already accepted positions before they could be contacted. Ob- 
servations  of this market  and interviews  with participants  suggest  that, 
in deciding  to whom to make offers,  employers  were substantially  in- 
fluenced by which students  had indicated  in advance  that they would 
accept,  and that, knowing  this,  students  very often made such an indi- 
92  See Roth and Xing, 105 J Pol Econ at 285 (cited in note 20); Jamie Chamberlin, Would-be 
Interns  Hopeful about 'Matchmaker'  Selection System:  New System Could Eliminate Pitfalls of the 
Old Process, 29 APA Monitor (Oct 1998), available online at <http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct98/ 
inter.html>  (visited Apr 20,2001). 
93  See text accompanying note 82. 
94  Roth and Xing, 105 J Pol Econ at 285 (cited in note 20). 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1017 (cited in note 3). 
98  Id. 
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cation  to some employer."  Early  contacts  and  promises  had much  less 
force in the market for medical residencies  prior to the move to a 
stage three solution,  despite the similar  congestion  problems  that ex- 
isted,  because (among  other things)  the size of the market  means  that 
a student  who breaks  an informal  promise  in the medical  market  may 
never  have to deal again  with the residency  director  who elicited  it. In 
the clinical psychology market, by contrast,  promises are reliable, 
since,  as one program  director  said  to one of us (Roth),  "You  see these 
people again." 
As a result  of these problems,  the clinical  psychology  market  con- 
verted recently to  a  centralized clearinghouse,  modeled on  the 
medical  market  but adapted  to the special  features  of the clinical  psy- 
chology market.  This centralized  market  ran for the first time in aca- 
demic year 1998-1999.1?'  So, once again, the market moved from stage 
two (which  proved  unsuccessful)  to stage three. 
4.  Japanese  university  graduates. 
Yet another example of a stage two market is the market for 
graduates  of elite Japanese  universities.1?  The unraveling  in this mar- 
ket is so persistent  and widespread  that it has a popular  name,  aota- 
gai, which  translates  as "harvesting  rice while  it is still green."'03 
Although  hiring  before  specified  dates  is formally  prohibited,  hir- 
ing well in advance  of graduation  nevertheless  persists  through  infor- 
mal but effective guarantees  of employment  known as naitei.'4  These 
informal  arrangements  are similar  to the understandings  that brought 
down the stage two approaches  in the college football and clinical 
psychology  markets. 
After a company has offered naitei to a particular candidate, the 
informal agreement is enforced through an interesting  mechanism. 
Companies that offer naitei to students long before the beginning of 
employment  try to prevent them, via physical  restraint,  from inter- 
viewing  with other companies  or government  ministries.10'  For exam- 
ple, a company  might  invite all of the students  to whom  it had offered 
naitei  to come to the company  on the day the Finance  Ministry  was  of- 
fering  its civil service  exam,  with  the understanding  that  the guarantee 
99  See Roth and Xing, 105 J Pol Econ at 289-90 (cited in note 20) (describing a 1993 selec- 
tion day where the clinical psychology program directors extended offers to less preferred can- 
didates who had given oral assurances that they would accept the offers immediately). 
100 Idat289 n 6. 
101 See Chamberlin, 29 APA Monitor (cited in note 92). 
102  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1015-16 (cited in note 3). 
103  Id at 1015. 
104  Id. 
105  See id at 1016 & n 35. 
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of employment would be withdrawn  from any student who failed to 
106 
show up. 
Naitei, then, is a very effective means of making arrangements 
prior  to the official  date allowed  in this stage two market.  Despite the 
effectiveness  of naitei,  this market  has continued  to be organized  (offi- 
cially)  as a stage two market,  although  in its practical  effects  it is proba- 
bly more akin  to a stage one market  as a result  of the role of naitei. 
5.  Canadian  articling  positions. 
Canadian law graduates take an "articling"  position following 
graduation  and before being called to the bar.107  The various regional 
markets  for articling  slots have been subject  to unraveling,  just as has 
the American market for federal judicial law clerks.10  In response to 
this problem,  two of the articling  markets,  in Toronto,  Ontario,  and in 
Alberta (primarily  in Calgary),  are now organized  as stage three mar- 
kets employing  an algorithm  developed in part by one of the present 
authors initially for the medical match.1 As described above, stage 
three markets are ones in which matching  of applicants  to positions 
occurs through a centralized  clearinghouse.  Participation  in the arti- 
cling clearinghouses  is by a subset of the firms in each regional mar- 
ket;  some firms  in each market  do not participate.110 
A  centralized matching system solves one of the fundamental 
problems  with a stage two solution,  which is that congestion may oc- 
cur on the start  date. (Recall that this was the reason  for the move to a 
stage three solution in the market for medical residency positions.) 
But the problem of implied or informal  agreements  in circumvention 
of the centralized  clearinghouse  remains.  "Offers"  and "acceptances" 
may be communicated  outside the match with one side telling the 
other,  "I'll  rank  you first in the match  if you rank  me first."  This  effec- 
tively moves the match date earlier,  even if there is 100 percent pro 
forma  participation  in the centralized  process.  Applicants  and firms  will 
simply submit forms requesting  to be matched with the parties with 
whom they had already  agreed  months  in advance.  This  is by no means 
an academic  problem;  in some failed matches,  up to 80 percent  of the 
106 Id. 
107  See id at 1024. 
108  Id. 
109 See Roth and Peranson,  89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9) (medical  match  algo- 
rithm). 
110 See,  for example, The  Law Society  of  Upper  Canada, Procedures  Governing the Re- 
cruitment  of  Articling  Students for  the  2001-2002  Articling  Term A.6,  available  online  at 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/services_articlingproc2001_en.shtml>  (visited  Jan  18,  2001). 
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matching  forms submitted  to the centralized  mechanism  list only one 
partner,  making  clear  that  everything  has  been settled  in advance.1' 
The stage  three  market  for articling  positions  in Canada  has taken 
a number of interesting  steps to  address the problem of informal 
agreements.  In the Toronto  match  there are detailed  regulations  gov- 
erning  the nature  of permissible  communications  between candidates 
and firms."2  The Law Society of Upper Canada  regulations  seek to 
control the communication  between firms and students  both before 
and after  interviews  occur.  Recognizing  that,  in light  of the incomplete 
coverage  of the centralized  match and the fact that offers from non- 
participating  firms  may need to be acted upon before the match  date, 
it is impossible  to eliminate  completely  the discussion  of rank  order- 
ings among  participants-but wishing  to prevent  students  being pres- 
sured  into "deals"  that would  subvert  the intention  of the match-the 
regulations  attempt  to define and limit what kinds  of communication 
are allowed  when firms  and students  discuss  the upcoming  match.  The 
regulations  specify  that firms  may  provide  ranking  information  to stu- 
dents  in advance  of the match,  but only within  a specified  time period. 
As the regulations  provide: 
A.8. Subject to the exception noted below regarding  summer 
students,  no communication  of ranking  intentions  shall  take place 
prior  to 8:00  a.m.  on Monday,  August  14,2000. 
Exception:  Firms in the matching  program  may communicate 
ranking  intentions  to summer  students  employed  with their firm 
in the summer months of 2000 prior to Monday,  August 14, 
2000.113 
The regulations  further  specify that students  may,  but cannot be re- 
quired  or pressured  to, provide  ranking  information  to firms: 
A.9. Firms  shall not request  from a student,  explicitly  or implic- 
itly,  information  on intentions  as to where the student  will rank 
the firm. 
Commentary:  Voluntary  communication  of ranking  intentions  by 
firms  made in accordance  with procedure  A.8 will be permitted, 
provided  the manner  of communication  does not impose pres- 
sure on students  to reciprocate  with communication  of their  own 
ranking  intentions.  For  example,  it is improper  for a firm  to say to 
a student  "we  will rank  you within  the firm's  complement  of stu- 
111  See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1000 (cited in note 3). 
112  See The Law Society of Upper Canada, Procedures Governing the Recruitment  of Arti- 
cling Students (cited in note 110). 
113  Id at A.8 (emphasis omitted). 
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dents in the match (or first, etc.) if you rank us, or tell us, or 
commit  to us,  that you will rank  us first." 
A.11. Firms communicating ranking intentions to students ...  are 
strongly  encouraged  to communicate  their ranking  intentions  us- 
ing the terminology  set out in the Society's  "Guidelines  for Firms 
Participating  in the Matching Program re: Communication  of 
Ranking  Intentions  to Articling  Candidates."114 
A  major source of  the pressure to  communicate outside the 
match in the articling  market is the fact that some students have ap- 
plied both to firms in the match and firms not in the match. Since 
many more students  participate  in the match than there are positions 
offered in the match,  the intention  of permitting  firms  to communicate 
ranking  information  is to help students to decide whether or not to 
accept an offer they may have received  from a nonparticipating  firm. 
The centralized  clearinghouse  in the Canadian  articling  market 
seems to be working, although the regulations also show that this 
market requires some careful maintenance.  The central remaining 
problem with the Canadian  articling  match is the heavy reliance on 
summer  positions  to "audition"  articling  candidates.  In this respect  the 
market has sharp tendencies toward stage four unraveling.  There is 
significant  interaction  between the market  for articling  positions and 
the market for summer associateships  for students who have com- 
pleted their second year of law school. This is not a recent develop- 
ment but rather one with which the articling  market has dealt for a 
long time. As a partner  at the Toronto  law firm of Blake, Cassels  and 
Graydon  observed  roughly  a decade  ago: 
Students  now feel virtually  compelled to obtain a summer  job in 
Toronto after their second year in law school and as a result, a 
substantial  portion of the articling  hiring process has now been 
placed on the shoulders  of the summer  program.  Students  are be- 
ing hired  for summer  positions  halfway  through  their  second year 
in law school  ....  Everyone  recognizes  that this is a back-door 
method of obtaining  an articling  position.115 
The market for medical residencies  is marked  by the same stage 
four tendencies  in a number  of subspecialties,  as described  just below. 
114  Id at A.9,A.11  (emphasis omitted). 
115  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1024 (cited in note 3) (quoting correspondence from 
Barry McGee to Alvin E. Roth, Mar 25,1991). 
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6.  Medical  residencies  (again). 
As described  above, the medical market adopted a centralized 
clearinghouse  after  the failure  to organize  a successful  stage  two market 
in the middle  of this century.  But, as in the Canadian  articling  market, 
the selection  process  in certain  medical  subspecialties  may  in fact  begin 
well before the centralized  match.  In highly  competitive  areas  such as 
orthopedic  surgery  and  neurosurgery,  preference  for residency  positions 
is often given to candidates  who have done audition  electives  with the 
program  in question.16  These auditions  last several  weeks and give the 
program  and student  a chance  to become  acquainted  with one another 
well in advance  of the centralized  match.'7  Since students  can audition 
with only a few programs,  and programs  can offer auditions  to only a 
few students,  the auditions  represent  a form of "prematching,"  where 
some selection  occurs  on both  sides  well before  the centralized  match."8 
Note that sometimes (in other markets,  including  the American 
market  for new law school graduates)  summer  or "elective"  positions 
do not reflect  efforts  to circumvent  stage three mechanisms.  These  po- 
sitions  may exist even in markets  without  a stage three (or stage two) 
regime  because  they provide  employers  with useful  information  about 
candidates,  or candidates  with useful information  about employers, 
prior  to entry  into a more permanent  commitment.  An obvious  exam- 
ple here may be summer  associate  positions at American  law firms; 
these positions  do not represent  an attempt  to "prematch"  in advance 
of a centralized  procedure  or specified  offer date (since neither  exists 
in this market,  although  once an offer for a permanent  associateship  - 
which may be made at any time-is  made,  the National  Association 
for Law Placement  regulates  the amount  of time for which  it must  be 
kept open"9).  Rather  the summer  associateship  seems to be a way for 
law firms to gather information  about candidates  and provide  infor- 
mation  to them about the firm.  Interestingly,  though,  the dates of ap- 
pointment for summer associateships  at American law firms them- 
selves  have unraveled  over the years;2?  thus,  instead  of the summer  as- 
sociateship  being a way around  a mechanism  adopted to control  un- 
raveling,  the market  for summer  associateships  is itself subject  to un- 
raveling. 
116  See id at 1023. 
117 Id. 
118  Id at 1023-24. 
119  See Principles and Standards  for Law Placement and Recruitment  Activities, in National 
Association for Law Placement, Member Handbook & Membership  Directory 29, 33-34  (NALP 
2000). 
120  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1004-05 (cited in note 3). 
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IV.  THREE DECREASINGLY  MODEST PROPOSALS  FOR GOVERNING 
THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS  -AND  HOW 
THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS  CAN BE MADE LESS BLEAK 
What can be done about the law clerk market?  The possibilities 
for reform (or not) are familiar  from past experience  and the existing 
literature:  (1) Let the market  go without attempting  to regulate  it (so 
that it will remain  at stage one); (2) Establish  a start  date for offers  and 
perhaps  also interviews  (the stage two solution,  tried several times in 
the past);  and (3) Institute  a centralized  clearinghouse  (the stage three 
approach).  As noted above,  because  there is a range  of existing  opinion 
on reform,  we consider each of the three possibilities  just described 
rather  than focusing  on a single one. We attempt  to describe  how each 
could best be implemented  and what its odds of success  are in light of 
what we know from our empirical  evidence  about  the law clerk  market 
and the experience of other markets.  Ultimately we conclude that a 
centralized  matching  system for those judges who wish their clerks to 
be eligible for United States Supreme  Court  clerkships  holds the most 
hope for reforming  the presently  unraveling  market. 
A.  The "Do Nothing"  Approach:  A Decentralized  Market  in Which 
Participants  Are Free to Act As They  Wish 
Despite what seems to be a reasonably  broad consensus among 
judges, clerks,  and observers  that the market for federal judicial law 
clerks is not working  particularly  well, a number  of judges responding 
to our surveys  expressed  strong  support,  often in colorful  terms,  for the 
"do nothing"  approach.  Their comments are summarized  in Table 21. 
These statements were not made in response to a specific question 
about the desirability  of regulation;  they were offered in response to 
an open-ended question asking judges whether there was anything 
else they would like to share  with us about their  views of the law clerk 
market. 
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TABLE 21 
JUDGES' CRITICISM  OF EFFORTS  TO REFORM  THE MARKET  FOR 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Survey  #54  I think  that  it is a waste  of time  to try  to devise 
'systems'  for this  'process'.  I get excellent  clerks  in 
the free market  and  I see no need for regulation 
(but  then I never  do). 
1999  Survey  #51  Cartels  do not work.  People  cheat.  Judges  cheat. 
Law  schools  cheat.  Attempts  at regulation  are an 
attempt  by established  eastern  law  schools,  espe- 
cially  Harvard  whose  professors  are conducting 
this  survey,  to improve  their  lock on the market. 
1999  Survey  #60  Is this  an attempt  to resurrect  the 'East  Coast  Law 
School  Cabal?' 
1999  Survey  #12  Forget  it! Leave  it up to the judges  and  the appli- 
cant  when  to interview,  apply  or hire. 
1999  Survey  #14  The free market  should  govern  the process.  Gov- 
ernment  intervention  is not justified.  If judges 
want  to make  offers  on the basis  of insufficient 
data  they should  be free to do so. If students  want 
to accept  clerkship  offers  after  one day  of law 
school  thereby  passing  up better  opportunities 
later,  the market  should  allow  them  to do so. 
1999  Survey  #37  I would  leave  it alone  and  just  let judges  and  law 
clerks  do what  they want  to. Laissez  faire. 
1999  Survey  #72  I will  refuse  to be bound  by any  combination 
agreement  or conspiracy  in restraint  of trade.  All 
cures  are  worse  than  the "disease".... Leave  it 
alone  and  get out of our  hair.... Free  trade  is the 
best.  I do not believe  the system  is either  chaotic 
or bad.  Get off it. 
1999  Survey  #84f  I have  no problems  and  would  be happy  if nobody 
tries  to impose  rigid  rules  on me or anyone  else. 
2000  Survey  #38  [T]he  less regulation[  ] the better.  I have  never 
had any  problem  handling  the process  of hiring 
law  clerks.... [T]he  system  is fine as it is. 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. 
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What is likely to happen if, in accord with these sentiments,  the 
market  is left unregulated? 
1.  Prognosis. 
Grim. Hiring will continue to occur in a frenzied manner  and is 
likely to move back even further  in the student's  law school career,  so 
that even less information  is available.  As already  noted, in 1999-2000 
interviewing  commenced  in mid-fall  of the second year of law school, 
and there  is no reason  in principle  why it could  not move back  until  late 
in the summer  after the first year (when, indeed, travel for interviews 
might be particularly  easy);  no new information  emerges between the 
late part of the summer  (after spring  grades,  law review selection,  and 
references from professors  for whom students may have worked as 
summer  research  assistants  become available)  and the early to middle 
fall. It is even possible  that hiring  would move back to the beginning  of 
the second semester of first year, by which time first-semester  grades 
would be available  (except at Yale,  where all first-semester  classes are 
pass-fail;  Yale students  would  thus  be at a significant  disadvantage).  The 
good news is that clerkship  hiring probably  cannot move any earlier 
than  the first  semester  of law school. 
2.  Palliatives. 
While  we are waiting  to see how early  is early,  judges  could be en- 
couraged  to enter their hiring  schedules  in a generally  available  data- 
base. Indeed,  an approach  along these lines was instituted  last year by 
the Administrative  Office  of the United States  Courts.121 
An information  database  would,  if there were a reasonable  degree 
of participation,  and if participating  judges  provided  accurate  dates in a 
timely  manner,  ameliorate  some of the existing  confusion  about  judges' 
timing,  and this would certainly  be a valuable  service.  However,  neither 
of the two conditions  just noted is likely to hold.  The judges  who move 
early  to gain a strategic  advantage  over other  judges  are unlikely  to par- 
ticipate  in a database  for precisely  the reasons  that drive  them to jump 
the gun in the first  place.  If it is widely  known  that they are moving  at a 
given time, other judges are likely to move up their schedules in re- 
sponse,  and this will reduce  the competitive  gain  from  going early.  Con- 
sistent with this suggestion,  relatively  few court of appeals  judges list 
their  hiring  times  in the Administrative  Office database. 
121  See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Looking for a Federal Clerkship? Look On- 
Line (Oct 10, 2000),  available  online at <http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/press_10102000. 
html>  (visited  Feb 16,  2001) (describing  the Federal  Law  Clerk  Information  System,  a free public 
database  containing  information  on law  clerk  vacancies  and  judges'  hiring  practices). 
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A further  reason  for limited  participation  is that  once some  judges 
are not participating  in the database,  other  judges  will be reluctant  to 
commit  to particular  dates for hiring  clerks  because developments  in 
the market  may cause  them to want  to move earlier;  alternatively  they 
may specify  particular  dates  in the database  but then feel compelled  to 
move earlier  as a result  of changes  in the market.  Indeed,  even without 
a centralized  database  this sort of problem  comes up.  Before the crea- 
tion of the Administrative  Office database,  chambers  frequently  told 
law school placement  offices that they would  begin the hiring  process 
on a certain  date but then departed  from  this date as changes  occurred 
elsewhere  in the market.  For  all of these reasons,  a centralized  database 
is unlikely  to address  the fundamental  problems  in the market  for fed- 
eral  judicial  law  clerks. 
B.  If at First  You Don't Succeed,  Try  Again:  Set Start  Dates 
If remaining  in stage one seems unappealing,  what about a stage 
two solution?  The key feature  of a stage two approach  would be that 
some authority  would  set (1) a start  date  for offers,  and  perhaps  also (2) 
a start  date for interviews,  a length  of time for which  offers  must  be left 
open,  or both in an effort  to govern  the market  for federal  judicial  law 
clerks.  Obviously  various  incarnations  of this approach  have been tried, 
and have failed,  on several  past occasions  in this market.l22  Also, as the 
vignettes  above  show,  such  approaches  have  been tried,  and  have  failed, 
in the markets  for medical  residencies,  college football bowls,  clinical 
psychology  positions,  and Japanese  university  graduates.  Indeed,  many 
of the markets  listed  in Table  20 have at some points  in their  history  at- 
tempted  to organize  themselves  as stage two markets  but have failed 
and either have slipped  back into stage one or have adopted  a more 
centralized  (stage  three)  organization. 
The point is in fact very general:  We are aware  of no market  that 
has successfully  organized  itself as a stage two market  for an extended 
period  without  problems  of the sort  observed  in the markets  discussed 
above. The clinical psychology market is the closest case, but even 
there,  as noted above,  there were serious  problems  of congestion  and 
informal agreements  prior to the specified Selection Day, and this 
market  has now moved to a stage three  organization.12 
Do the same factors that explain the failures of stage two ap- 
proaches  in the other  markets  explain  the past  failures  in the law clerk 
market?  Might a new and improved  stage two approach  work in the 
latter  setting? 
122 See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 208-21 (cited in note 8). 
123 See Part III.B.3. 
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1.  Prognosis. 
Grim.  There are several  problems,  illuminated  by the experiences 
of the markets  described  in Part  III. 
a) Congestion. The first difficulty is that even if the start date 
were fully adhered to by all parties (an unlikely outcome, as we dis- 
cuss below), there would be severe congestion in the market on the 
start date, and this would preclude participants  from considering a 
range of possible transactions  before making  their decisions.  Our ear- 
lier discussion  of the medical residency  market  in the late 1940s is il- 
lustrative;  the reason that the stage two solution failed was not that 
the start  date was not adhered  to, but that there was severe congestion 
in the market  on the start  date. 
Within  the category  of start-date  regimes,  there are two main ap- 
proaches.  Under the first, there is an offer start date and then either 
an earlier  start date or no start date for interviews.  This was the situa- 
tion in the clinical psychology market prior to the institution of the 
centralized match. As  described above, substantial congestion oc- 
curred  on Selection Day in this market.  Past reform  efforts in the law 
clerk market  likewise demonstrate  the problem.  Judge  Wald's  account 
of the 1989-1990  clerk market,  when the Judicial  Councils  in many  cir- 
cuits had adopted a deadline of May 1 at noon (Eastern Standard 
Time) for offers, with a consensus on a one-hour minimum  response 
time and no limits on interviews  prior  to May 1, is representative  in its 
essential  features: 
[T]he major  complaint  was the frenzy  with which  offers had to be 
made and accepted.  Those judges who gave their choices time to 
reflect found themselves severely disadvantaged.  The one-hour 
window  collapsed  as applicants  felt constrained  to accept  the first 
offer tendered.  A judge who did not get through  to an applicant 
at 12:00  noon was often too late.  "I got my first  choice,"  one judge 
complained,  "and, after that, having given the applicant a half 
hour,  I found my next 8 or 9 choices gone."  By 12:15  virtually  all 
of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit  was over. Between 12:00 and 
12:15,  judges were making  offers on one line as calls came in on a 
second from frantic  applicants  trying  to learn if they were to get 
an offer before they responded  to the offer of another  judge.'24 
Congestion problems of this sort are likely to be severe in markets 
with offer start  dates and earlier,  or no, start  dates for interviews. 
The second  possible  approach  is to have the offer start  date also be 
the interview start date. This was effectively the situation under the 
most recent attempted  reform  of the law clerk  market,  under  which  in- 
124  Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 159 (cited in note 2). 
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terviews  were not supposed  to occur (under a "nonbinding"  Judicial 
Conference guideline) prior to March 1.12 Under this guideline there 
was no official  regulation  of offer times,  but one presumes  that most 
judges would not hire applicants  for "the most intense and mutually 
dependent  [relationship]  I know  of outside  of marriage,  parenthood,  or 
a love affair""2  without  an interview,  although  a few judges  do take this 
127 
route.1 
The difficulty  with requiring  a common  start date for interviews 
and  offers  is that  neither  judges  nor students  will be able to conduct  or 
participate  in many interviews.  The experience  with the March  1 re- 
gime was that "both  interviews  and offers bunched  around  the March 
1 date, so students  had little latitude in scheduling  interviews"'28  and 
little opportunity  to interview  with a range  of judges (and conversely 
so for the judges). 
b) Cheating.  Alongside congestion,  the second and equally  fun- 
damental  problem  with a stage two solution is that it is virtually  im- 
possible to prevent defections  from the specified start date.  This has 
happened  before in the law clerk market,  and it is the overwhelming 
consensus  of judges that it would happen again.  Both our 1999 and 
our 2000 surveys  posed the following  question  to judges:  "If the Judi- 
cial Conference  established,  by rule,  a firm  start-date  for interviews  of 
September  1 of the third  year of law school,  do you believe that all or 
virtually  all court  of appeals  judges  would  adhere  to this date (in spirit 
as well as in letter)?"  72 percent  of responding  judges  in 1999,  and 74 
percent  in 2000,  stated that they did not believe all or virtually  all of 
their colleagues would adhere.  Our survey  showed that most judges 
say they are willing  to comply  if others  are (93 percent  in 1999,  and  92 
percent  in 2000),  but the problem  is that they do not believe that  most 
others  will comply. 
The problem is  the familiar one  of  trying to  sustain a self- 
enforcing  cartel-one  in which  there is no outside  sanction  for defec- 
tion. In general a cartel is much easier to sustain if strong outside 
sanctions  exist to punish  defectors.  In the case of ordinary  cartels,  anti- 
trust law denies enforcement of  any explicit agreements,  thereby 
eliminating  most of the effective outside means of sanctioning  those 
who defect. Likewise  in the context of a start date for the law clerk 
market,  the ability  of some central  authority  to mete out punishments 
to judges who defect is limited by the institutional  constraints  sur- 
rounding  the judiciary.  Particularly  because  cheating  may be far from 
explicit (as discussed  below), it is difficult  to imagine  draconian  pun- 
125  See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 207-08 (cited in note 8). 
126  Wald,  89 Mich L Rev at 153 (cited in note 2). 
127 See, for example, 1999 Judge Survey #52. 
128  Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi,  104 Yale L J at 219 (cited in note 8). 
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ishments being handed out to Article III judges.  The lack of explicit- 
ness, as well as other factors, likewise make it difficult to imagine 
handing  out strong punishments  to clerkship  applicants  who were in- 
terviewed  or hired  before the specified  date. 
So only a self-enforcing  arrangement  among  judges is realistically 
possible. But of course the difficulty of sustaining  such an arrange- 
ment is well known.  The problem  is particularly  acute in the clerkship 
context,  since parties  cannot  compensate  those who are disadvantaged 
by the arrangement  for their losses. In an ordinary  cartel,  conflicts of 
interest among members,  if they exist, can be smoothed over by com- 
pensation;  for instance,  a seller who would prefer a higher price than 
the other members  of the cartel can be given a larger  sales quota.  But 
there is no obvious way for a judge who is disserved  by a given start 
date to be compensated for the losses he or she would incur from 
compliance  with that date. 
It is clear that some judges lose from specified start dates. Obvi- 
ously,  those judges who wish to gain a strategic  advantage  over other 
judges by jumping the gun are disadvantaged.  This is related to our 
earlier observation that the unregulated market is unlikely to  be 
Pareto inefficient:  at least a few judges are likely to be made worse off 
if the bargaining  gain they enjoy from  jumping  the gun in an unregu- 
lated market  is eliminated.29 
But other judges would want to defect as well; this is a conse- 
quence of the congestion caused by a start-date  arrangement  (hence 
the defection problem is linked to the congestion problem discussed 
above). Our description  of the clinical  psychology  market  above pre- 
cisely illustrates  the problem."M  The congestion on the start date pro- 
duces pressure on parties to arrange deals in advance in order to 
avoid the problems  that come up on the official start date.  The prob- 
lem may be particularly  acute when, as in the 1989-1990 law clerk 
market, there ends up being no minimum time that offers must be 
kept open.3"'  Here the market is likely to be over very quickly,  and 
thus a judge has reason to think that any candidate  not reached very 
quickly  will probably  be committed to someone else. Then the judge 
has reason to be reluctant to make an offer to a candidate who is 
likely to want to hold it for a long time (and as the earlier quotation 
makes clear,  a long time can be measured  in minutes).  Thus,  in decid- 
ing to whom to make an offer, the judge has some reason to favor 
candidates  who have indicated a willingness  to accept offers quickly. 
So, in turn,  candidates  have an incentive to let judges know that they 
129  See Part I.B.1. 
130  See Part III.B.3. 
131  See text accompanying note 124. 
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will accept their offers,  since this makes it more likely that an offer 
will be received.  Indeed,  in the 1989-1990  law clerk market,  "[s]avvy 
clerk applicants ...  played their own hands. They (or sometimes their 
sponsoring  professors)  called chambers  in advance  to announce  that 
that  particular  judge  was the first  choice."132 
Yet another  reason that defection  is hard  to control  with a stage 
two approach  in the law clerk market  is that defection will often be 
difficult  to detect (and hence will be relatively  easy to get away  with). 
Often it is not public  knowledge  when a clerk  is hired.  Recall our ear- 
lier anecdote (in Table 15) about a judge asking an interviewee  to 
sneak in the service entrance on a Sunday.133  Without some way of 
verifying  when hires were made or contacts  occurred,  it is difficult  to 
police defections  from a start-date  arrangement  (even if enforcement 
were feasible  once defection  had been detected). 
The problem  with start  dates is not only that they will be under- 
cut by defectors-although this is a problem.  The problem is that 
these defectors make the judiciary  look bad, a concern that many 
judges have voiced and that was discussed  above.  A system,  such as 
this one, that depends on honorable  behavior  also tends to penalize 
the honorable  and put honor in bad repute.  As one judge said on our 
survey  with regard  to "cartel"  solutions:  "All  you do is create  an incen- 
tive to cheat-on  the part  of students  and  judges  alike."1' 
This sort of concern was precisely what motivated the Judicial 
Conference's  September 1998 abandonment  of the March 1 bench- 
mark  start  date for interviews.  Judges  who did not honor  the start  date 
were thought  by the Judicial  Conference  to be engaging  in a public  act 
of lawlessness (even though there was no official "law"  to be bro- 
ken).'3  For similar  reasons,  the NCAA and the Japanese  Ministry  of 
Labor gave up trying to regulate their respective  markets;  they felt 
that their decisionmaking  bodies were cast in a poor light by having 
made rules that many were not following.1M 
2.  Palliatives. 
Could  some degree  of compliance  be achieved  if each year,  at the 
close of the market,  all clerk  candidates  were surveyed,  and  a summary 
of the year's  events  were circulated,  indicating  when  first  contacts  were 
reported,  whether  and when there  were agreements  in violation  of any 
start  dates,  and  so forth?  The great  difficulty  here would  be that  the re- 
132  Wald,  89 Mich L Rev at 158 (cited in note 2). 
133  See Table 15 (1999 Student Survey #154). 
134  1999 Judge Survey #84d. 
135  Although there is no official record of this sentiment, one of us (Posner) attended the 
meeting in question and can testify to the content of the discussion. 
136  See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1012 & n 24,1016 & n 33 (cited in note 3). 
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port would of course  have to preserve  student  anonymity,  and probably 
also omit judge names (no student  is going to report  that Judge  X, for 
whom  the student  will be clerking,  made an informal  deal in advance  of 
the start date), and without student or judge names it seems doubtful 
that  the report  would  be very  useful. 
Another possible palliative would involve limiting the informa- 
tion available  to judges prior  to the start  date.  Making  it more difficult 
for judges to gather information will impede their ability to move 
early,  and so (for example) the strategy  of asking law schools to em- 
bargo letters of recommendation  until February  1, a strategy  adopted 
by the Judicial  Conference in 1993 in connection with its establish- 
ment of a March 1 start date,137  was a sensible way to try to reinforce 
the (failed) attempt  to establish  a later appointment  date.  The fact that 
just such a strategy  was partially  successful  in the American medical 
market  in the 1940s  gave grounds  for at least cautious  optimism,  espe- 
cially since in the medical  market  this strategy  was effective at moving 
the date of appointment  back very substantially.38 
But the law clerk market,  or at least the most competitive seg- 
ment of this market,  is substantially  smaller  than the medical  market.39 
In light of the size of the law clerk market,  the success or failure of 
any reform that depends in part on an embargo  on letters of recom- 
mendation  may succeed or fail based on how nearly  universal  compli- 
ance is achieved.  Even a relatively  small set of "leaks,"  if they system- 
atically  concern the most competitive  part of the market,  has the po- 
tential to defeat the intent of the embargo.  And it is very difficult  to 
prevent  all leaks.  It is particularly  difficult  to control  informal  contacts 
by telephone, and these appear to be common in the law clerk mar- 
ket.'40 Of  course  when  other  professors  are  offering  phone 
recommendations prior to  the  specified date, refusal by  a  given 
professor  may harm  his or her own students.  So the temptation  to talk 
to a judge who has already  started  gathering  information  about other 
candidates  may be considerable. 
In addition,  as already  noted, even if defections  are perfectly  con- 
trolled,  the start-date  approach  does not work well in giving  parties a 
chance to consider  a wide range of possible transactions;  the problem 
of congestion will remain.  And there are no palliatives  for that prob- 
137  See Becker,  Breyer,  and  Calabresi,  104  Yale  L J at 214  (cited  in note 8). 
138  See Part III.B.1. 
139 Judge  Wald  notes,  "Thus,  in any  year,  out of the 400 clerk  applications  a judge  may  receive, 
a few dozen will become the focus of the competition;  these few will be aggressively  courted  by 
judges  from  coast  to coast."  Wald,  89 Mich  L Rev at 154-55  (cited  in note  2). 
140 See Becker,  Breyer,  and  Calabresi,  104  Yale  L J at 219  n 36 (cited  in note 8) (quoting  a let- 
ter from  a law school  dean suggesting  that in 1994  professors  at other  law schools  communicated 
with  judges  by phone  before  the authorized  date). 
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lem. As noted above,  the start-date  approach  in the market  for medi- 
cal residency  positions  was abandoned  even though  there did not ap- 
pear  to be significant  problems  with defection;  the reason  was that  the 
problems  with  congestion  were thought  to be intolerable. 
C.  The "Monkey  See, Monkey  Do" Approach:  Adopt the Medical 
Matching  System  As Is 
Many of the markets  discussed  in Part III, as well as numerous 
others  listed on Table  20, have progressed  from  stage one to stage two 
to stage three,  with the final move coming  after the (inevitable  in all 
markets  with which  we are familiar)  failure  of a stage two solution.  A 
stage three solution  involves  a centralized  matching  system,  which  al- 
lows participants'  preferences  to be considered  in an orderly  way and 
permits  one to set the timing  of the market  at a desired  point (say,  the 
third  year of law school for the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks), 
as is currently  the case in the market  for medical  residencies. 
One possibility  would be to adopt the medical  system as is. Sev- 
eral commentators  have urged essentially  this approach  for the law 
clerk market.  '  Here is a recent succinct  description  of the medical 
match: 
Each year ...  graduating physicians and other applicants inter- 
view at residency programs  throughout  the country and then 
compose and submit Rank Order Lists (ROLs) to the NRMP 
[National  Resident  Matching  Program],  each indicating  an appli- 
cant's  preference  ordering  among  the positions  for which  she has 
interviewed.  Similarly,  the residency  programs  submit ROLs of 
the applicants  they have interviewed,  along with the number  of 
positions  they wish to fill.  The NRMP  processes  these ROLs and 
capacities  to produce  a matching  of applicants  to residency  pro- 
142 
grams. 
A few points bear emphasis  here.  First,  the matching  occurs  after 
personal  interviews  have been conducted.  Neither  residency  programs 
nor candidates  are expected  to make  choices  sight  unseen  for what  are 
relationships  in which  personality  certainly  may  matter.'43 
Second, under the matching  system participants  can never gain 
from submitting  rankings  that depart  from their true preferences.  In 
other words,  there is no possibility  of gaining  from ranking  parties  on 
141 See Norris, 81 Cal L Rev at 791-98 (cited in note 72); Oberdorfer and Levy, 101 Yale L J 
at 1098-1108 (cited in note 41);Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 160-63 (cited in note 2). 
142  Roth and Peranson,  89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9). 
143  Roth, 92 J Pol Econ at 995 & n 6 (cited in note 71). 
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the other side in a strategic manner based on impressions of how 
those parties  will be ranking  the initial  party.44 
Third,  the medical match reflects purely the preferences of the 
participants  for pairing with one another. It does not reflect some 
broader  aspect  of social planning  or engineering  by a central  authority. 
The match is simply a way of facilitating  the parties' expression and 
achievement  of their preferences,  an opportunity  that is lacking  in an 
unregulated  market  with timing  problems.145 
Fourth,  the process is completely confidential.  Neither side ever 
learns how the other side ranked  it.'46  This seems critical  in the clerk- 
ship context, as no student would want the judge for whom he or she 
will be clerking  to know that the student ranked  that judge far down 
on the list. 
Fifth,  the matching  system is set up to accommodate  the prefer- 
ences of married  couples who wish to be in the same geographic  re- 
gion.147  It is also set up to accommodate  other specialized  preferences 
of applicants  and residency  programs,  as discussed  more fully below.'48 
Might  the medical  match  approach  work in the law clerk  market? 
1.  Prognosis. 
Not promising.  The medical  match  does away  with one of the cen- 
tral problems  identified above for a stage two solution--the fact that 
congestion may occur on the start date. But the problem of implied 
agreements  between participants  as a way of getting around  the stric- 
tures of the imposed agreement  remains.  Since judges and candidates 
are permitted to meet for interviews  before the match date, "offers" 
and "acceptances"  can be communicated  well in advance of the cen- 
tralized  match.  Just  as in the situation  of the market  for Canadian  arti- 
cling positions,149  there is nothing  here to stop a judge from saying  to a 
candidate:  "I'll rank you first in the match if you rank me first."  Or 
consider  a judge who is more subtle,  saying  to a candidate: 
You are my first choice. If I knew that I was your first choice, I 
would  just decide now to rank  you first  in the match.  Of course,  if 
I am not your first choice, I need to consider other candidates, 
and we won't have any mutual commitment.  But if you tell me 
that I am your first choice,  then I will know that you will rank  me 
144  Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 770-72  (cited in note 9). 
145  Id at 748. 
146  Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 161 (cited in note 2). 
147  See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 758-59  (cited in note 9). 
148  See id at 758-59  & n 8; Part IV.D.3.c. 
149  See Part III.B.5. 
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first on your form,  and I'll relax now and not worry  about other 
candidates. 
The subtext  is: 
Of course,  I'm not asking  you to make a commitment  of the kind 
that we're  not supposed  to make.  That  would  be unethical  on my 
part.  I just want to understand  your preferences-that is part of 
what I try to accomplish  at an interview.  Of course,  only an un- 
ethical cad would mislead  me about his or her preferences,  so I 
know  that I can rely on what  you tell me. 
No system  will work  unless  it makes  this kind  of conversation  un- 
tenable. 
How is this sort of problem  avoided  in the medical  match?  Cer- 
tainly  it is not entirely  avoided;  estimates  suggest  that 10 percent  to 15 
percent  of students  are urged  to make informal  commitments  to resi- 
dency  programs  prior  to the match  date.' However,  there  has not been 
enough  "winking"  and  "nodding"  of this sort to bring  down the system 
or even weaken  it in any  significant  way.  The  critical  difference  from  the 
law clerk  market  seems  to be that  informal  promises  are  far  more  likely 
to be binding  when made to federal  judges than when made to resi- 
dency  programs.  Studies  of the medical  match  suggest  that  students  feel 
residency  programs  often lie to them,'51  and this may make students 
more willing  to violate a supposed  informal  understanding  (since they 
feel residency  programs  do this all the time).  A key feature  in the law 
clerk  market  may be the relatively  small  number  of judges  in the rele- 
vant  sector  of the market.  This  is an interesting  feature  of the law clerk 
context, since ordinarily  smaller markets make coordination  easier. 
Here the small  size of the market  seems to make informal  agreements 
easier to enforce,  and it is these informal  but binding  agreements  that 
present  potential  problems.  Thus,  just as the ability  to make informal 
agreements  caused  problems  with the stage two solutions  in the mar- 
kets for college bowls,  clinical  psychology  positions,  and Japanese  uni- 
versity  graduates,  this ability  makes  wholesale  adoption  of the medical 
150 See Clark, 83 Georgetown L J at 1783 (cited in note 72) (reporting 1990 survey results 
according to which 10.4 percent of students nationwide were pressured to make informal com- 
mitments prior to the centralized match); Richard D. Pearson and Allison  H. Innes, Ensuring 
Compliance with NRMP Policy, 74 Acad Med 747,747  (1999) (reporting that 15 percent of 1996 
and 1997 graduates of the University of Virginia School of Medicine were asked for signals con- 
cerning what rank order list they intended to submit to the centralized match). 
151  For instance, a recent study found that 33 percent of students surveyed felt that resi- 
dency programs had lied to them during the process, and 58 percent of students who were told by 
programs that they would be ranked highly were skeptical of the sincerity of those statements. 
See Kimberly D. Anderson, Donald M. Jacobs,  and Amy V. Blue, Is Match Ethics an Oxymoron? 
177 Am J Surgery 237,238-39  (1999). 
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model in the law clerk setting--as several prior commentators  have 
advocated- highly  problematic. 
2.  Palliatives. 
Adopt a modified  medical  match.  (See below.) 
D.  A Modified  Medical  Match 
1.  Solving  the problem  of informal  agreements. 
Since informal  agreements  intended to circumvent  a centralized 
match  seem so likely to be problematic  in the law clerk market,  a suc- 
cessful centralized  process would have to have a way of preventing 
them. One step the Canadian articling  market discussed above has 
taken in response to this problem is to require students to affirm  on 
the form on which they submit their ranking  lists that they "have  not 
accepted  an articling  position  nor made a commitment  to article  in the 
[upcoming]  articling  year."152  We propose a similar approach  for the 
law clerk market:  each judge and each student  who participates  in the 
centralized  match should be required  to certify,  as a condition  of par- 
ticipation,  that no prior  understanding  or agreement  with a student  or 
a judge has been reached. The idea is to make destabilizing  early 
agreements  nonbinding. 
One way in which  this certification  requirement  would make such 
agreements  nonbinding  is that parties on the receiving  end of imper- 
missible  overtures  seeking informal  understandings  would  presumably 
feel less bound to adhere  to such understandings,  given their explicitly 
forbidden status as reflected in the certification  requirement.  A sec- 
ond, and critical,  reason the certification  requirement  might work is 
that if participants  are explicitly required  to certify that no informal 
understanding  was reached prior to the match,  then a judge who at- 
tempted to engineer such an understanding  would not be in a strong 
position to retaliate against  any student (at least in an overt manner) 
who ended up not ranking  the judge highly.  That is, it is hard  to imag- 
ine a judge complaining  to colleagues,  law professors,  Supreme  Court 
Justices,  or anyone else who might be in a position to influence a par- 
ticular  applicant's  future  that the applicant  did not stick to an informal 
understanding  that the judge and candidate  were explicitly  required  to 
certify they did not make.  And since students have far less power to 
retaliate against  judges, there seems little reason to worry about the 
problem  from that end. 
152  See, for example,  1999 Ontario  Articling  Student  Matching  Program  Student  Rank Or- 
der List (on file with  authors). 
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Of course,  each of the reasons  just given also suggests  that a simi- 
lar sort of certification  might  be helpful  in the context of a stage two 
solution of the sort discussed  above. But, as noted above, defections 
are only one of the problems  with a stage two solution.  The other ma- 
jor problem,  which  in fact is exacerbated  when defections  do not oc- 
cur, is congestion on the start date.  This congestion  prevents  parties 
from considering  a range of options before making their decisions 
and, in the medical context, led to the adoption of a stage three 
mechanism  apparently  without  substantial  problems  with  defection. 
2.  The scope of the centralized  process. 
A critical  question  in the context  of a centralized  matching  process 
for the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks  would  be the scope of the 
match.  The medical  model is that all (or virtually  all) employers  are in- 
cluded.  But this  model  would  not make  sense  in the law  clerk  market,  at 
least as a starting  point.  The comprehensive  model  very  quickly  runs  up 
against  the fact that a not insubstantial  number  of judges  would  proba- 
bly be highly  resistant  to the idea of a centralized  match.  In a 1989  sur- 
vey  of judges, only one-third expressed support for a  centralized 
match'3-although  a very important  caveat here is that in the dozen 
years  since 1989  the market  has experienced  many  more debacles  and 
several additional  failures  of attempts  to impose stage two solutions, 
meaning  that  the openness  to a stage  three  approach  might  be greater. 
A match  of comprehensive  scope also overlooks  what  seems to us 
to be a very important  feature  of the law clerk market.  This feature, 
which emerges  strongly  from our judge surveys,  is that there are two 
groups  of judges:  those who are engendering  the problems  in the mar- 
ket, and the rest of the judges,  who perceive no problem  obtaining 
qualified  clerks  and are not eager to be part  of any "solution"  to what 
they  do not consider  to be their  problem.  The  judges  who are  the source 
of the problem  may  or may  not be eager  to be part  of a proposed  solu- 
tion,  but whether  they are eager  or not, they are in a different  category, 
we think,  from  judges  who are both resistant  to solutions  and not the 
source  of the problem. 
The two groups  of judges  differ  not only in whether  they are the 
source  of the problem,  but also (and  relatedly)  in whether  they think  it 
is difficult  to obtain  desired  clerks.  The first group  of judges seems to 
think  it is difficult  to obtain  the clerks  the judges  desire,  while the sec- 
ond does not view this as a problem.  Judges  Wald  and Kozinski  are in 
the former  camp,'5  and the judge-author  of the present  Article (Pos- 
153  See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 222 (cited in note 8). 
154  See  Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1708 (cited in note  1); Wald, 89 Mich L Rev  at 153-55 
(cited in note 2). 
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ner) agrees with that point of view. Our judge surveys  provide many 
examples  of judges in the other camp,  as reflected in the comments  in 
Table  22. 
TABLE 22 
JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS  OF A BIFURCATED  MARKET 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Survey  I have never  understood  the serious  competition  be- 
#101c  tween  judges  for clerks.  For  nearly  a quarter  of a cen- 
tury,  I had fine clerks,  turning  down  dozens  of appli- 
cants  who would  have been equally  fine.  Of course,  I 
was employing  clerks-not judges! 
1999  Survey  #9  There  are far  more  well qualified  applicants  than  there 
are positions  available  in the federal  system. 
1999  Survey  #83  There  are far  more good candidates  than  clerkships. 
The notion that  we judges  have to compete  with one 
another  is misplaced.  It's a buyer's  market. 
1999  Survey  #2  Although  I do not interview,  as a rule,  until  the winter 
or spring  of the year  in which  the law clerks  start 
work,  I have never  had any  problems  obtaining  satis- 
factory  law clerks. 
1999  Survey  #4  There  are plenty  of able people out there. 
1999  Survey  #8a  [T]here  are plenty  of good candidates. 
1999  Survey  #8b  I do not participate  in the unseemly  "rush"  of second- 
year law students  (they have only one full year of 
grades  when they apply)  for judicial  clerkships.  I inter- 
view in May and  June  of the year  preceding  the Court 
year  for which  they are hired  and  find many  qualified 
candidates. 
1999  Survey  #10  There  are always  excellent  candidates  available  even 
late in the year. 
1999  Survey  #27  Even though  hiring  after  only 3 semesters  of law 
school is quite early,  my expertise  of almost  10 years 
indicates  that regardless  of the national  strictures,  I 
have a plethora  of excellent  applicants  to choose from 
after  the super-stars  have been cherry-picked-I am 
just not bothered  by the "sooners,"  largely  because  I'm 
not that interested  in [unreadable]-hunting  for #1 grad 
and top 5 schools. 
1999  Survey  I do not find the system  flawed.  Hiring  competent 
#30a  clerks  has not been a problem. 
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TABLE 22 
JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS  OF A BIFURCATED  MARKET 
(CONTINUED) 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Survey  #34  There  are far  more  qualified  applicants  than  available 
positions. 
1999  Survey  #57  There  are  plenty  of good law  grads  to go around. 
1999  Survey  #68  There  are a lot of smart  people  out there. 
1999  Survey  #89  In the past  two years  I have  not hired  until  spring  of 
the year  they begin  clerking.  While  the field  is much 
smaller,  I am content  that  I have  harvested  clerks 
roughly  equivalent  to those  hired  from  the primary 
competitive  field.  I have  not had  to lower  my demand- 
ing standards. 
1999  Survey  #95  There  are  plenty  of well-qualified  law  school  candi- 
dates  out there.... This  "competition"  business  is non- 
sense.  The  judges  so obsessed  with  getting  the very 
best must  be awfully  insecure  about  their  own abilities 
and  intellect!! 
2000  Survey  #99  [C]ompetition  or not,  I have  always  been able  to se- 
cure  fine clerks. 
2000  Survey  #25  I have  found  many  qualified  candidates  after  the 
somewhat  hysterical  selection  process  undertaken  by 
many  appellate  judges  in the early  spring. 
2000  Survey  #47  There  are  many  more  well-qualified  candidates  than 
clerkships. 
2000  Survey  There  are  plenty  of outstanding  applicants.  I have  al- 
#102  ways  been "behind  the curve"  in hiring  but  have  al- 
ways  been able to secure  wonderful  people  to fill these 
positions! 
2000  Survey  #91  I am disgusted  by the "rat  race"  to hire  prestigious  law 
clerks.  I refuse  to take  part  in it, and  by doing  so I have 
discovered  many  highly  qualified  people-passed over 
by others-who have  been excellent  law  clerks. 
2000  Survey  #69  There  are lots of great  fish  in the sea.  Without  trying 
very  hard,  I have  gotten  consistently  excellent  clerks, 
from  many  different  law  schools. 
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TABLE 22 
JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS  OF A BIFURCATED  MARKET 
(CONTINUED) 
Survey  Comment 
2000  Survey  #63  It's a pain,  mainly  because  there are a small  number  of 
grotesquely  aggressive  judges  out there  who seem to 
think  that if they don't  get x or y to clerk  for them 
they'll  somehow  suffer  [irreparable]  injury!  They  need 
to chill out! 
2000  Survey  #72  This  is a "big,  fancy  law school"  problem.  If my col- 
leagues  weren't  such  snobs about  where  their  clerks 
come from,  we'd  be a lot better  off. 
1999  Survey  #82  The  judges  who advertised  themselves  to the law 
schools  as running  farm  clubs  for the Supreme  Court 
seem to be energizing  most of the competitive  prob- 
lems. 
2000  Survey  #83  This  is a big school,  fat-headed  judge  problem.  Go 
away  and  leave us alone.  I'm serious. 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. 
There are two possible  explanations  for the perceived  limits on 
the pool of top candidates in the view of the first group of judges. One 
possibility is that the number of judges who perceive the need to hire 
"top" candidates is large relative to the pool  of such candidates. But 
perhaps a more important explanation relates to the issue of Supreme 
Court clerkships. Many judges want to attract applicants who will go 
on to  clerk at the  Supreme  Court, not  only because  of  the intrinsic 
value of these clerks as a result of their high ability, but also because 
such  applicants have  instrumental  value  to  the  hiring judge  in that 
they make the judge more attractive to future candidates."5  The role of 
Supreme Court clerkships can explain why there is always a shortage 
of "best" clerks, since there is a fixed number of Supreme Court clerk- 
ships. It can also explain why many judges (those not competing to be 
Supreme Court feeders)  seem  to think that clerk quality is not a big 
issue at all. 
Picking  up  on  the  role  of  the  Supreme  Court,  our  proposed 
model  for  a centralized  match is  that participation  be  required for 
those judges  who  wish their clerks to be eligible for  Supreme Court 
clerkships, with enforcement  by the Supreme Court in a manner dis- 
cussed more  fully below.'56  Thus, a judge who chooses  not to partici- 
155 See Wald,  89 Mich  L Rev at 154 (cited in note 2). 
156 One judge suggested  what seems to be a similar  two-tier  system  but as a means of en- 
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pate in the centralized  match cannot feed any of his or her clerks  to 
the Supreme  Court.  The judge (whether  federal  or state,  and whether 
appellate  or district  court level) would decide whether  to participate, 
and thus whether  to be eligible to feed clerks  to the Court.  A student 
would regain  eligibility  for a Supreme  Court  clerkship  by clerking  for 
a judge  who hired  through  the centralized  match  following  a clerkship 
with a judge  who did not hire through  this procedure. 
Our proposed  approach  has several  advantages  relative  to a cen- 
tralized  match  of comprehensive  scope.  First,  it would  not require  par- 
ticipation  from, and cause inconvenience  to, the judges who are not 
the cause of any of the problems  in the current  market.  This is a sig- 
nificant  plus of the proposal.  One of the clearest  lessons from the ex- 
perience  in various  medical  markets  is that  the degree  of participation 
of employers  covered  by the centralized  process  is critical  to the suc- 
cess of the process.'57  A high degree of participation  seems much  more 
likely with the targeted  approach  than with a general approach  em- 
bracing,  for instance,  all federal appellate  judges.  (This  is not to deny 
that some judges,  like Judge  Kozinski,  will nonetheless  be highly  resis- 
tant to our proposal.)  On the other hand,  it must be recognized  that 
there may be some cost to requiring  judges  who want to hire outside 
the centralized  match to self-identify  as nonfeeders.  But our hunch 
(although  at this point it cannot  be more than that) is that,  at least in- 
sofar  as federal  appellate  judges  are concerned,  only a minority  would 
opt out of the centralized  matching  process  and  that  these  judges-the 
sources  of the comments  quoted in Table  22-do  not have significant 
interest  in being  regarded  as Supreme  Court  feeders  anyway. 
A second advantage  of our targeted approach  is that the great 
majority  of judges who currently  engender the "competitive  prob- 
lems" would almost certainly  not want to opt out of the Supreme 
Court  feeding pool (although  they might wish that they did not have 
to participate  in order  to feed their  clerks  to the Court).  Thus,  the pre- 
cise  judges  whose  participation  is most needed  would  be most  likely  to 
participate,  whether  happily  or not, in the match. 
Enforcement  of our proposed  approach  would  be in the hands  of 
the Supreme  Court.  Would  the Court  go along?  Our  survey  of the Jus- 
tices showed  essentially  unanimous  agreement  on two points:  first,  the 
forcing  a start  date for offers,  not a centralized  match.  The judge wrote,  "[I]f  all the Supreme 
Court  Justices,  or even a majority  of them,  announced  that none of the group  making  the an- 
nouncement  would  hire any law clerk  who had been hired  the year before  in contravention  of 
the rule  set by the Judicial  Conference,  this  would  go a long  way  towards  obtaining  enforcement 
of the rule."  1999  Judge  Survey  #8c.  As already  noted,  however,  even if the problem  of defection 
from  a start  date is solved,  the problem  of congestion  on the start  date  remains  and,  in the medi- 
cal context,  led to the adoption  of a stage  three  approach.  There  are also serious  problems  with 
detecting  departures  from  a start  date  in the law  clerk  market. 
157 See Clark,  83 Georgetown  L J at 1761-65  (cited  in note 72). 
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current  state of the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks  is a mess,  and 
something should be done about it; and second, there are far more 
well-qualified applicants for Supreme Court clerkships than slots 
available at the Court.  Thus, Supreme Court Justices are concerned 
about the status  quo, and they would be unlikely  to find it a significant 
burden to limit themselves to clerks hired through  the match for ini- 
tial clerkships,  particularly  given the judges who are likely to partici- 
pate in the match (as discussed  just above). Fundamentally,  given the 
number  of excellent applicants,  there is little risk that a Justice  would 
gain much from defecting and hiring  a stellar  person who did not par- 
ticipate in the match,  since it would be easy for the Justice to hire a 
very good person who did participate  in the match.  This is not to say 
that the Justices  would not perceive the regime to be a restriction  on 
their freedom;  they surely  would.  It is simply  to say that the restriction 
would be limited in comparison to the significant  potential benefit 
that  they  themselves-many  of  them  former  federal  appellate 
judges-seem  interested in achieving  for the lower federal court sys- 
tem. 
The most obvious difficulty  with our proposed  noncomprehensive 
model is that some judges  who do not participate  in the match  may try 
to hire fairly strong candidates before the match; these candidates 
might be led to accept such offers if they are uncertain  (as of course 
they often would  be) about  their  chances  of getting  a clerkship  with one 
of the "Supreme  Court  feeder"  judges participating  in the match.  This 
would in fact be much like the problem  that comes up in the present 
market;  students  accept offers from less preferred  judges because they 
do not know whether  offers from more preferred  judges  will material- 
ize (see Table 10 above). This is precisely the problem a centralized 
match  is designed  to solve. So if substantial  hiring  did occur  before the 
centralized  match,  a more comprehensive  approach  might  be desirable. 
But the tailored approach,  which recognizes  the two-tier market that 
many  judges  feel currently  exists,  seems to us a good place to start. 
3. Attributes  of a centralized  process. 
A number  of arguments  have been advanced  in the existing  legal 
literature  in support  of a centralized  matching  process for the market 
for federal  judicial  law clerks,  and a number  of objections  to these ar- 
guments  have been offered.18  Although  the existing  debate has focused 
on a comprehensive  match  rather  than on the sort of match  we propose 
158 The literature  here includes  id at 1759-97;  Kozinski,  100 Yale L J at 1721-24 (cited in 
note 1);  Norris,  81 Cal L Rev at 791-98 (cited in note 72);  Oberdorfer  and Levy,  101  Yale L,  J at 
1098-1108  (cited  in note 41);  and  Wald,  89 Mich  L Rev at 160-63 (cited  in note 2). 
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here,  many  of the arguments  and  objections  are  similar.  Since  they  have 
been well rehearsed,  we discuss  them  fairly  briefly. 
a) Ability to consider a range of options. Most fundamentally,  a 
centralized  clearinghouse  vastly expands the parties' ability to con- 
sider  a wide range  of options  before  making  their  decisions.  This  is the 
main  advantage  of a centralized  matching  system. 
Some have objected to the idea of a matching  system on the 
ground  that  judges  might  have to conduct  more interviews  under  such 
a system.59  This  might  well be true,  particularly  in the early  years  until 
judges  learned  how many  interviews  they needed to conduct  in order 
to be sure they would fill their slots.  At the same time,  in light of the 
number  of interview  cancellations  under the present system (see Ta- 
bles 11 and 12 above),  it might  well be that too few interviews  are be- 
ing conducted  at present.  Moreover,  with  improvements  in technology 
it may be that interviews  can be conducted  via videoconference.  Al- 
ready the Second Circuit  is hearing  a fair number  of cases from up- 
state New York and Vermont  by videoconference.  A further  point is 
that a judge's  opportunity  to hire will not be limited  to the match;  af- 
ter the match  is over, a judge would be free to hire on the open mar- 
ket, just as occurs now in the case of medical residents.'60 
In any event, the cost of having  to conduct  additional  interviews 
seems to be a cost that  many  judges  are willing  to bear  in exchange  for 
a more orderly  and sensible process.  Our judge survey  in both 1999 
and 2000 posed this question:  "In general,  would you favor a regime 
(assumed  to be fully enforceable)  under  which  hiring  occurred  much 
later,  say in the fall of the third  year,  and in an orderly  fashion;  under 
which  interviews  could be scheduled  at a judge's  convenience,  without 
the pressure  of 'beating'  other judges;  but under which more inter- 
views had to be conducted?"  74 percent  of judges said "yes"  in 1999; 
73 percent said "yes" in 2000. So, many-although not all-judges 
seem willing to bear the burden  of more interviews  in exchange  for 
the benefits that a match might bring.  It also seems likely that the 
judges most willing to bear the burden of more interviews  are the 
ones most dissatisfied  and frustrated  with the present system and, 
thus, most likely to opt for participation  in the targeted  centralized 
match  we propose. 
b) Reduced geographic bias.  A  matching process would also 
significantly  reduce the geographic  bias that may arise under a stage 
two solution to the unraveling  problem.'16  Because the process  would 
159 See Clark,  83 Georgetown L J at 1766-70 (cited in note 72); Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1721 
n 31 (cited in note 1). 
160  Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 161 (cited in note 2). 
161  See Carl Tobias, Stuck Inside the Heartland with Those Coastline Clerking Blues Again, 
1995 Wis L Rev 919,923-29  (discussing the bias under a stage two approach). 
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no longer be compressed into a very short time frame (as under a 
stage two approach  and, indeed, also in today's unregulated  market), 
judges not near major  cities,  where students  can visit many  judges in a 
short span of time, would not be as disadvantaged.  Also, since inter- 
views could occur at any time,  candidates  might be able to visit judges 
when they are in the area for other reasons. But the latter point 
should not be overstated:  judges might well want to interview all of 
their candidates  within a relatively  compressed  time frame,  so as to be 
able to make comparisons,  and candidates  might  not want to interview 
far earlier  than other applicants  for fear that they would be forgotten 
by the time the judge got around  to making  decisions on rankings  for 
the centralized  match.  Thus it might be an overestimate  to suggest,  as 
some advocates of matching  systems have, that students could inter- 
view at any time convenient to them, including  while flying out to in- 
terview  for jobs at law firms.'62  Still,  at a minimum,  interviews  could be 
scheduled  well in advance  in a calm and nonchaotic  manner. 
Note that the same factors  that suggest  a reduced  geographic  bias 
also suggest  reduced  travel costs,  since travel  could be arranged  in ad- 
vance. Thus, although more interviews might, all else equal, mean 
higher  travel  costs for students,163  all else is not equal;  instead  of buying 
non-advance-purchase  tickets in order to come on short notice, stu- 
dents could buy discounted  tickets,  which are often only a fraction  of 
the cost of full-fare tickets. If discounted tickets are generally one- 
third (say) of the cost of full-fare  tickets,  then students  could do three 
times as many  trips  without  increasing  their travel  costs. 
c) Balance and diversity of clerks.  The biggest objection that 
skeptics of a centralized  match have voiced is that it interferes with 
judges' ability  to ensure diversity  and balance across  clerks.64  The idea 
is that the attractiveness  of one clerk will depend on who his or her 
co-clerks  will be. 
This is an important  point, but there are three responses to it. 
First,  the argument  may overstate  the degree of control  judges have in 
the current  market.  When a candidate is snatched away by another 
judge who has made an exploding  offer,  as Part  II.C.l.a showed occurs 
frequently  at present,  the first judge is limited in his or her ability to 
achieve an optimally  diverse  and balanced  mix of clerks. 
Second, the fact that, as noted above, a number of judges make 
offers to a pool of candidates  and fill their positions with the first of- 
162 Norris,  81 Cal L Rev at 794 (cited  in note 72), offers  such  an argument. 
163  See Kozinski,  100  Yale L J at 1721  n 31 (cited  in note 1). 
164  See Becker,  Breyer,  and  Calabresi,  104  Yale L J at 221-22 (cited  in note 8);  Kozinski,  100 
Yale L J at 1722  (cited  in note 1). 
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ferees to accept suggests  that at least some judges do not regard  the 
composition  of their  clerk  team as critical.165 
Third,  and most important,  the algorithm  used in some matching 
systems  provides  ways  to deal with issues of diversity  and  balance.  For 
instance,  the clinical  psychology  match  allows conditions  such as that 
all candidates  should  not be from the same school.  Similar  conditions 
apply  in some of the British  medical  markets,  where,  for example,  Ed- 
inburgh  surgeons  are able to request  what  they regard  as an appropri- 
ate  gender  balance among  the  students with  whom  they  are 
matched.66  In general,  there is no theoretical  difficulty  in implement- 
ing restrictions  of this sort, in which some candidates  are viewed as 
substitutes  for other candidates (for instance, candidates  from the 
same school).  Thus,  it would be easy to allow  judges  to say (for exam- 
ple) "not all positions should be filled with candidates  of the same 
sex." 
d) Impersonal  nature  of the match. Another criticism  that has 
been offered of a centralized  match is that it would undermine  the 
"highly  personal  relationship  between  judge and clerk."'17  Judge  Koz- 
inski  writes: 
The selection process-for  all its expense and pain and disap- 
pointment  and hardship-is the crucible  wherein  the foundation 
of that  relationship  [between  judge and clerk]  is forged.  The time 
the judge spends talking  to professors  and reading  draft  law re- 
view notes; the student's  efforts devoted to reading  the judge's 
opinions;  the time  judge  and clerk  spend  in interviews;  the weigh- 
ing of competing  possibilities--all these help bring the parties 
psychologically  to the point where they are ready to make a 
commitment  to each other.68 
The difficulty  with this argument  is that all of these things  would  con- 
tinue to happen  under  a matching  system  (interviews,  talking  with re- 
commenders,  clerk  preparation  for the interview,  etc.).  The only thing 
that would be absent is what Judge Kozinski  describes  later as the 
"electrifying"  moment when a student says,  "Yes,  judge, I accept"  in 
person (or on the phone).169  Judge  Kozinski  asks,  "How will the bond 
between  judge and  clerk  be affected  when offer and acceptance  are so 
impersonal?  How will the emotional content of the relationship  be 
165 See note 43 and accompanying text (describing this strategy). 
166  See Alvin  E. Roth, A  Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor 
Markets: Regional  Markets for  New  Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom, 81 Am 
Econ Rev 415,428-29  n 26 (1991). 
167  Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1723 (cited in note 1). 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
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diminished  by the inherently  protracted  delay between interview  and 
computer communication?"10  Whatever the answers to these ques- 
tions (and we doubt that the mode of offer and acceptance  has much 
significance  in the overall nature of the judge-clerk  relationship),  we 
would be surprised  if, for most participants  in the law clerk market, 
this issue outweighed  all of the other serious problems  and inefficien- 
cies of a stage one or stage two market.  The survey  evidence described 
in Part II.C above certainly  suggests that neither  judges nor students 
generally  regard  the current  process as an auspicious  beginning  to the 
judge-clerk  relationship. 
e) Changes  of mind. Another issue raised by critics  of a central- 
ized match is that some candidates  or judges might find their match 
unacceptable  in reality  "even though  it might  have seemed acceptable 
as a remote contingency  far down a list of happier  possibilities."'17  This 
is a concern,  for saying  yes to a specific offer out there (or making  an 
offer to a specific candidate)  seems different  from listing a particular 
judge or candidate  on a form that will be processed sometime down 
the road. But this risk must be weighed against the fact that candi- 
dates change their mind in the current  market as well, as a result,  we 
think,  of the early time at which decisions  must be made.  For example, 
a few years ago a Harvard  Law School student accepted  an offer with 
a highly prominent  D.C. Circuit  judge two years ahead of the time at 
which the clerkship  was to begin and then, a year or so later,  informed 
the judge that he would not be doing the clerkship  after all.  With the 
market occurring at  a  later date and in  a more orderly fashion, 
changes of mind on grounds of changed circumstances  or changed 
preferences  would be far less likely. 
f) Bargaining  power.  One of the design questions that must be 
settled in constructing  a match is which side of the market  "makes  of- 
fers"  and which  side "accepts  or rejects"  offers.  (Of course these terms 
do not have their ordinary  meanings  in a centralized  matching  process, 
but the concept is similar  to the notion of who makes and receives of- 
fers in a decentralized  market.)  In most matches  we know of, this issue 
has been settled by appeal  to the practice  in the decentralized  market; 
thus,  in a match for the law clerk market,  judges would retain the ini- 
tiative.  Interestingly,  the recent redesign  of the medical  match  reverses 
this;  the match  is now conducted  so that medical  students  have the ini- 
tiative, and (within the internal operation of the match algorithm) 
residency  programs  are treated  as if they accept  or reject  the offers (or 
applications) of  the  students.72  But it turns out that the two ap- 
170  Id at 1723-24. 
71  Id at 1724. 
172  See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 755-59  (cited in note 9). 
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proaches yield largely similar results as a practical  matter in any 
173  event."3 
4.  Transition  and administrative  issues. 
The medical  match occurs  in March  of the last year of medical 
school.  Ultimately  a similar  sort  of time frame  may  be desirable  for the 
market  for federal  judicial  law clerks.  But initially  it might  be best to 
have the law clerk  market  occur  earlier  than  the winter  or spring  of the 
third year.  The reason is that it might ease the transition.  "Both the 
models  and  the experience  of the many  markets  that  have  attempted  to 
halt unraveling  suggest  that a cautious  plan of attack"  would  be to in- 
troduce  a central  match  "initially  at an early time,  when a substantial 
percentage  of transactions  are already  taking  place,  and then to move 
the time at which the mechanism  operates  later only after it has at- 
tracted  a high  rate  of participation.'"74 
Having the process go early would mean that initially  only the 
benefits  from a more orderly  process,  and not the benefits  from later 
hiring,  would  be achieved.  But even the former  benefits  seem likely  to 
be significant,  particularly  from  the perspective  of what  seems  to be the 
judges'  primary  concern,  the way in which  the process  casts  the judici- 
ary  in a negative  light. 
The modified  match  we have  proposed  here  could  be administered 
by an outside  firm  skilled  in running  matches  such as the medical  resi- 
dency  matching  program  and  the clinical  psychology  matching  program. 
Alternatively,  the match  could be administered  by the Administrative 
Office of the United States  Courts  or some other  judicially-related  en- 
tity,  presumably  with  some technical  help  from  an outside  organization. 
5.  Trouble  signs  in a modified  match. 
a) Movement from a stage three to a stage four market. A  lesson 
from  the markets  discussed  in Part  III above is that even a stage three 
mechanism  that is working  well can on occasion  be threatened  by un- 
raveling  problems.  One source of such problems  is summer-associate- 
type positions  that effectively  amount  to "prematching"  in advance  of 
the centralized  match.  This is stage four in the typology  described  in 
Part  III.A. 
The possibility  of such "prematching"  seems unlikely,  however,  to 
bring  down a centralized  match,  assuming  it gets up and running  suc- 
cessfully.  If "prematching"  were to become very significant-as in the 
case discussed  in Part  III.B.5  above in which  80 percent  of participants 
173  See id at 759-60. 
174  Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1038 (cited in note 3). 
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in a match submitted  only one alternative,  making  it clear that every- 
thing had been settled in advance-then the centralized  clearinghouse 
might  have to be abandoned,  but this has not occurred  in other  markets 
with centralized  matches  that  produce  stable  outcomes.  The situation  of 
80 percent prematching  occurred  in a match that used a nonstable 
matching  algorithm.17 
b) Informal agreements.  A  separate trouble sign in a modified 
match  in the market  for federal  judicial  law clerks  would  be the reliance 
of parties  on informal  prematch  understandings  (unrelated  to summer- 
associate-type  positions)  notwithstanding  the certification  requirement 
described  above.76  A possible response,  if such a problem  were to de- 
velop,  would  be the use of a small  degree  of randomization  in the match 
to destabilize  the informal  understandings.  The somewhat  speculative 
randomization  proposal  we offer here is meant to suggest  one way of 
dealing  with the problem  of informal  understandings  in contravention 
of the centralized  match.  We realize that most judges are not accus- 
tomed to thinking  in explicitly  statistical  terms,  so this proposal may 
cause a certain  culture  shock. 
Suppose  that an anonymous  hotline were set up to monitor  com- 
pliance with the prohibition  on informal  understandings  reflected in 
the certification  requirement.  If this hotline showed that some thresh- 
old of noncompliance  had been reached (say 1 percent of candidates, 
or 1 percent of the total number of positions), then it could be an- 
nounced that 5 percent (for example) of applicants  would have their 
first and second choices randomized  in the centralized  match.  That is, 
for 5 percent  of applicants,  there would be a 50 percent  chance  of hav- 
ing their second choice judge ranked as their first choice and vice 
versa. (If no second choice judge was listed, the student  would have a 
50 percent chance of not being matched  at all.) This would give these 
applicants  a smaller  than 50 percent chance (with the precise number 
depending on the preferences of both their first and second choice 
judges) of consequently  being matched to their second choice judge 
even if their first choice judge wanted them. This would provide all 
students (not just the 5 percent) with the ability to avoid any under- 
standing  that they would put Judge  A first when they preferred  Judge 
B, since no one would know which students' choices had been ran- 
domized;  a candidate could simply say to Judge A (who thought an 
understanding  with the candidate  had been reached)  that "randomiza- 
tion must have kicked in." It would be  important not to  set the 
threshold number of reports required for randomization  too high, 
since receiving the sort of informal  overture described  above from a 
175  See id at 1000. 
176  See Part IV.D.1. 
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judge might  well produce  sufficient  excitement  on the part  of a clerk- 
ship candidate  eager to put the process behind him or her that the 
candidate  would  not call even an anonymous  hotline. 
Hopefully the threat of randomization-and the statement  that 
this would  make about  judges'  behavior-would be enough  to deter a 
sufficiently  large number of judges from reaching  informal under- 
standings  that the randomization  would not ever have to kick in. But 
the knowledge  that  in any given  year randomization  could  always  kick 
in would  help to deter such informal  understandings  in the first  place, 
since there would  be some question  as to how reliable  they would  be. 
Even in years in which  randomization  would actually  occur,  it would, 
we think, probably  produce fewer negative effects than the current 
system (although  it should  be acknowledged  that the negative  effects 
would be of a different  character).  Obviously  the prospect  of inten- 
tionally  failing  to put together  pairs  who want  to be with one another 
is troubling  and could  certainly  produce  perceptions  of unfairness;  but 
so too is, and does,  the current  free-for-all. 
CONCLUSION 
The hiring  process  for federal  judicial  law clerks  has engendered 
intense dissatisfaction  among  both judges and students.  Hiring  occurs 
earlier and earlier-now  often early in the student's  second year of 
law school-and  in a rushed,  chaotic  process  that  resembles  a game of 
musical  chairs,  in which frequently  neither  judges nor students  make 
their most desired  matches.  Efforts to reform  the process have been 
attempted  over the years,  with a complete  lack of success. 
Our study  has differed  from the earlier  literature  on this baffling 
and frustrating  issue in three major  respects.  First,  we have placed  the 
issue within  the context of economic  theory that identifies  the incen- 
tives and  constraints,  and  the private  and  social  costs and  benefits,  that 
lead to the "unraveling"  of certain  markets.  Second,  we have situated 
the law clerk market  within  the range  of markets  that have exhibited 
similar problems and experienced  a wide variety of attempted  and 
achieved solutions.  And third,  we have conducted  a far deeper and 
wider-ranging  empirical  survey of judge and applicant  attitudes  and 
behaviors  than  any  previous  students  of this subject. 
It would be nice to be able to report  that on the basis of this re- 
search  effort we have come up with a clear solution to the problem. 
But we have not.  The problem  is stubborn,  intractable;  this is plain  as a 
matter  of theory  and as a matter  of experience  in this and other mar- 
kets.  The solutions  that have been tried and sometimes  succeeded  in 
the other markets  are unlikely  to work  as well in the law clerk  market 
because  of subtle  differences  we have discussed. 
884  [68:793 The  Market  for Federal  Judicial  Law Clerks 
A mature appreciation  of the recalcitrance  of the world to re- 
formers' efforts requires  recognition that many social and economic 
problems cannot be solved and can only be lived with. Nevertheless, 
not being given to  fatalism, we have suggested a partial solution, 
which would require judges who wish their clerks to be eligible for 
United States Supreme Court clerkships to enroll in a centralized 
matching  system that would, for those judges and the students apply- 
ing to them for clerkships,  very largely eliminate the congestion, in- 
formation,  and resulting  mismatching  problems  of the present system. 
More generally,  we believe strongly that the Supreme Court could 
play an important  and productive  role in helping to organize  and im- 
prove the market for federal judicial law clerks.  We commend our 
suggested solution to the attention of the relevant decisionmakers. 
But we hope that apart  from its merits and any criticisms  that may be 
lodged against it, our study will be seen to have permanent  value in 
framing  and illuminating  a most interesting,  if difficult,  market prob- 
lem. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
TABLE  Al 
RESPONSE  RATES  BY SENIORITY STATUS AND CIRCUIT- 
1999 AND 2000 JUDGE  SURVEYS 
Group  of  Number  of  Number  of  % of surveyed 
federal  judges  judges  judges 
appellate  surveyed  responding  responding 
judges  1999  2000  1999  2000  1999  2000 
All judges  238  238  155  129  65%  54% 
Active  judges  161  159  103  84  64%  53% 
Senior  judges  77  79  51  45  66%  57% 
Senior  status  N/A  N/A  1  0  N/A  N/A 
not listed 
1st  Circuit  11  10  8  7  73%  70% 
2nd Circuit  20  21  9  10  45%  48% 
3rd  Circuit  18  19  13  13  72%  68% 
4th Circuit  16  13  10  6  63%  46% 
5th Circuit  20  19  9  10  45%  53% 
6th Circuit  23  22  16  11  70%  50% 
7th Circuit  13  15  10  9  77%  60% 
8th Circuit  17  18  11  15  65%  83% 
9th Circuit  40  43  27  17  68%  40% 
10th  Circuit  16  15  11  8  69%  53% 
11th  Circuit  18  17  11  8  61%  47% 
D.C.  Circuit  11  11  7  6  64%  55% 
Federal  Circuit  15  15  11  9  73%  60% 
No circuit  listed  N/A  N/A  2  0  N/A  N/A 
Sources:  2 Almanac of the Federal  Judiciary (Prentice Hall 1999) (1999 data on active and senior 
judges);  Judicial Yellow  Book (Spring  2000) (2000 data on active and senior judges); 1999 and 2000 
Judge Surveys (survey response rates). 
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TABLE A2 
THE IMPORTANCE  OF MEMBERSHIP  IN THE SCHOOL'S  MAIN 
LAW REVIEW  TO JUDGES' HIRING DECISIONS 
Ranking of the importance of  Number of  Cumulative 
membership in the school's  judges  % 
main law review' 
1  6  5% 
2  23  25% 
3  11  34% 
4  14  47% 
5  8  53% 
6  8  60% 
7  7  66% 
8 or belowb  7  72% 
a factor,  but  7  78% 
not ranked 
not a factor  25  100% 
Total  number  of judges  responding:  116 
Source:  2000  Judge  Survey. 
aTies  in rankings  were resolved  by assuming  that law review membership  received  the higher 
ranking,  so if anything  the data  reported  here  overstate  the importance  of law  review  membership. 
Some judges  wrote in additional  selection  criteria,  so it was possible  for one of our eight listed 
criteria  to receive  a ranking  below  8. 
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TABLE A3 
REPRESENTATION  OF STUDENTS  FROM  TOP LAW SCHOOLS 
IN FEDERAL APPELLATE  CLERKSHIPS 
Institution  U.S. News &  Number of  Size of Class 
World Report  Law Clerks 
Ranking 
Top  four: 
Yale 
Stanford 
Harvard 
Chicago 
Total 
Next six: 
NYU 
Columbia 
Michigan 
Berkeley 
Virginia 
Cornell 
Total 
Next ten: 
Dukea 
Northwestern 
Penn 
Georgetown 
Texas 
UCLA 
USC 
Vanderbilt 
Minnesota 
Washington & Lee 
Total 
1 
2 
3 
6 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
10a 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
45 
16 
56 
26 
143 
21 
22 
13 
13 
17 
7 
93 
10 
10 
4 
20 
4 
10 
1 
4 
2 
3 
68 
192 
182 
552 
188 
1114 
443 
389 
356 
282 
363 
182 
2015 
214 
217 
252 
587 
470 
319 
203 
187 
235 
122 
2796 
Sources:  <http://www.usnews.com/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawtl.htm>  (visited  Aug 17,2000) 
(US. News rankings  and number  of J.D.  students  (divided  by three to get class size));  Judicial 
Yellow  Book (Spring  2000)  (law  clerk  data). 
aTied  with  Cornell. 
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TABLE A4 
RESPONSE RATES OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL  AND BY 
APPLICANT STATUS  (1999  STUDENT SURVEY) 
Group  Number of  Number of respondents who 
students  applied for federal clerkships 
responding  in 1998-1999 
All seven  schools  337  143 
Top  four schools: 
Yale  51  33 
Stanford  72  24 
Harvard  114  40 
Chicago  30  13 
Total  267  110 
Other  schools surveyed: 
Columbia  26  13 
Michigan  13  5 
Vanderbilt  31  15 
Total  70  33 
Source:  1999  Student  Survey. 
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TABLE A5 
HIRING OF THIRD-YEAR AND POST-GRADUATE  CANDIDATES 
(1999-2000) 
Percent  of judges  whose hiring  of third-year  students  for 
2001-2002  clerkships  was: 
Higher  than  10% 
Lower  than  13% 
About the same as  78% 
their level of hiring of third-year  students in previous 
years  (94 responses  total)a 
Percent of judges whose hiring of post-graduates  for 
2001-2002  clerkships  was: 
Higher  than  10% 
Lower  than  13% 
About the same as  77% 
their level of hiring  of post-graduates  in previous  years 
(93 responses  total) 
Number of  third-year students hired for  2001-2002 
clerkships as  of  the  date of  the judge survey (106  35 
responses  total) 
As a percent  of total hires completed  at the time of the  12% 
judge  surveyb 
Number  of post-graduates  hired  for 2001-2002  clerkships 
as of the date of the judge  survey  (105 responses  total)  38 
As a percent  of total hiring  completed  at the time of the 
judge surveyb  13% 
Sorc:200ugeSuvy. 
Source:  2000  Judge  Survey. 
aPercentages given  sum  to 101  percent  as a consequence  of rounding. 
b300 total  completed  hires  were  reported  by  judges  responding  to the survey. 
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TABLE A6 
JUDGES' REASONS FOR MAKING OFFERS BEFORE 
COMPLETING  SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS 
Survey  Judge's  reason  for making  offers  before 
completing  scheduled  interviews 
1999  Survey  #105  Avoid loss to other  judge(s). 
1999  Survey  #73  Because  candidates  were already  accepting  offers  else- 
where. 
1999  Survey  #18  Because  I had to compete  with other  offering  judges. 
1999  Survey  #91  Because  I really  liked  her and everything  moved  so fast 
this year-plus, so many  were dropping  out before they 
interviewed  with me.  In any event,  she took a position 
with the judge  she interviewed  with after  me-see  be- 
low. 
1999  Survey  #106a Because  I told each interviewee  that I would  be pre- 
pared  to consider  making  an offer should  they be 
pressed  by another  judge and  required  to accept  within 
a specified  period  of time. 
1999  Survey  #36  Because  I was pretty  certain  the candidate  would  re- 
ceive an offer instanter! 
1999  Survey  #112b Because  if I see a candidate  I like I give them an offer. 
1999  Survey  #90  Because  of the issue in the previous  question  [referring 
to cancellations  of interviews  by applicants]. 
1999  Survey  #8  Because  other  judges  were hiring  candidates  away. 
1999  Survey  #38  Because  other  judges  were making  offers  to students 
that I was interviewing. 
1999  Survey  #42  Competition. 
1999  Survey  #33  Did not want  to lose outstanding  applicants. 
1999  Survey  #22  Excellent  candidate  I didn't  want  to lose. 
1999  Survey  #45  Excellent  candidate  who had other  options. 
1999  Survey  #31  Hired  one exceptionally  qualified  candidate  on the spot 
(figured  she'd  be gone if I waited). 
1999  Survey  #112  I found  a good candidate  and didn't  want  to lose 
him/her. 
1999  Survey  #53b  I had to act fast as this candidate  was sure  to receive 
other  offers  in the days  ahead. 
1999  Survey  #17  I learned  from  experience  that if I waited  to complete 
all interviews  before making  offers  quite a few appli- 
cants  would  withdraw. 
1999  Survey  #25  I thought  I would  lose good prospects  if I didn't. 
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TABLE A6 
JUDGES' REASONS FOR MAKING OFFERS BEFORE 
COMPLETING  SCHEDULED  INTERVIEWS 
(CONTINUED) 
Survey  Judge's  reason  for making  offers  before 
completing  scheduled  interviews 
1999  Survey  #8d  If I liked  a candidate,  I made  an offer  at the interview. 
The  reason  I did not want  to wait  until  all interviews 
were  over  was  to minimize  the risk  of losing  candidates 
who would  want  to clerk  for me. 
1999  Survey  #67  Impression  that  many  offers  with  short  deadlines  were 
being  made. 
1999  Survey  #30  My staff  consists  of 4 clerks  and  1 secretary.  I had  to re- 
cruit  a whole  staff  (including  a new secretary)  in early 
1999.  One of my most  promising  applicants  notified  me 
she had  been hired  by one of my colleagues  in Novem- 
ber or December  1998.  Under  these circumstances,  I felt 
that  I had  to accelerate  my recruitment  as much  as pos- 
sible. 
1999  Survey  #104  Otherwise  they  would  be gone,  based  on prior  years. 
1999  Survey  #3d  Outstanding  applicants  who would  be taken  by another 
judge  if I did  not act. 
1999  Survey  #82  Perceived  competition  from  other  judges. 
1999  Survey  #24  Pressured  by a student  to match  an offer. 
1999  Survey  #187  Satisfaction  with  candidate,  desire  not to lose candidate 
to another  offer. 
1999  Survey  #18c  So as to be able to compete. 
1999  Survey  #21  So other  judges  would  not hire  someone  I really  thought 
highly  of. 
1999  Survey  #53  The best candidates  disappear  fast. 
1999  Survey  #97  To keep from  losing  a good clerk  to some  other  judge. 
1999  Survey  #99  To prevent  that  applicant  from  being  hired  by someone 
else before  I completed  interviews. 
2000 Survey #69  A bird in the hand .... 
2000  Survey  #41  Afraid  they would  be hired  by someone  else. 
2000  Survey  #75  Applicant  already  had  an offer. 
2000  Survey  #73  As I learned  recruiting  for a law  firm,  it is an effective 
and  necessary  procedure. 
2000  Survey  #45  Because  applicants  had  other  offers  already. 
2000  Survey  #119  Because  if I see a good applicant,  I want  to make  an of- 
fer before  the person  has  been hired. 
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TABLE A6 
JUDGES' REASONS FOR MAKING OFFERS 
BEFORE COMPLETING  SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS 
(CONTINUED) 
Survey  Judge's  reason  for making  offers  before 
completing  scheduled  interviews 
2000 Survey  #46  Because  the candidate  was so good,  I knew  from  experi- 
ence that she would  receive  and  probably  accept  an- 
other offer if I waited  any longer. 
2000  Survey  #33a  Competition  and  pressure  to finish. 
2000 Survey  #28  Good candidate-would have accepted  another  offer. 
2000  Survey  #80  I did this for the first  time ever,  because  almost  none of 
the interviewees  wanted  to take my 2-year  position,  and 
this excellent  candidate  did;  plus the candidate  said that 
the school  had instructed  the students  that they "had"  to 
take the first  offer given,  and  the candidate  was headed 
immediately  for additional  interviews. 
2000  Survey  #76  I started  late (later  than  other  judges)  and  good candi- 
dates  were being  hired  by other  judges. 
2000  Survey  #37  If I think  a candidate  would  be an excellent  choice I like 
to wrap  up my efforts  and leave it to the candidate.  Also, 
the longer  the ptocess drags  on, the more likely  that 
someone else will make  him/her  an offer resulting  in 
nothing  to show  for our efforts. 
2000  Survey  #114  Obtain  clerk  who was offered  another  clerkship. 
2000  Survey  #5  Outstanding  applicant  who would  be hired  by another 
judge  if I did not act. 
2000 Survey  #43  Rolling  admission  to keep from  losing  clearly  acceptable 
clerk  applicant. 
2000  Survey  #74a  To avoid  losing  the really  good applicants. 
2000  Survey  #100  To hire a good candidate  before someone else did. 
2000 Survey  #18  To meet competition.  However,  at all times I had at least 
two offers  open. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
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TABLE A7 
STUDENT  COMMENTS  ABOUT  THE  DECISION  NOT  TO 
APPLY-CONCERNS  ABOUT THE NATURE OF  THE 
PROCESS  AND EARLY  HIRING (1998-1999) 
Survey  Comment 
Survey  #199  [The  market]  certainly  seems  like a hellish  experience 
and  that  definitely  contributed  to my decision  not to 
apply. 
Survey  #210  [My  decision  not to apply]  was  at least  in part  because 
of disgust  with  the process. 
Survey  #202  I think  the current  system  is absurd  and  I have  yet to 
hear  a sufficient  rationale  for it. Frankly,  I chose  not to 
apply  not because  I am uninterested,  but  because  of the 
process. 
Survey #211  The reason I chose not to [apply] was ...  I was 
exhausted  from  fall interviews  and  was  not ready  to 
begin  the process  again.  [Also,]  I had  spoken  with  many 
people  about  it and  their  tremendous  frustration  with 
the process  discouraged  me. 
Survey  #196  Terrible  market.  The  reason  I did  not apply  was [that]  I 
was  burnt  out from  2L law  firm  interviewing  and 
because  it forced  me to decide  to[o] early  where  I 
wanted  to be two years  from  now.  And the process  is a 
hodgepodge  lottery. 
Survey  #16  The  biggest  concern  that  I had  was  that  I had  to be 
getting  my application  packets  together  so that  they 
could  go out in Dec.-Jan.  That  meant  that  the more 
judges  I would  apply  to, the less time I would  have  to 
study  for finals  etc. 
Survey  #201  [The  process]  was  especially  not attractive  so soon after 
the 2L summer  job search. 
Survey  #14  [The]  scheduling  [of the market]  (time  of year  when 
students  must  apply)  is tremendously  inconvenient. 
[This  is part  of the reason  that]  I, while  theoretically 
very  interested,  chose  not to apply.  I hope too many 
others  weren't  similarly  dissuaded. 
Source: 1999 Student Survey. 
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TABLE A8 
TIMING  OF  THE  MARKET  BY CIRCUIT 
Number  of judges  Number  of judges as 
from  circuit  a % of total 
responses  from  circuit 
1998-  1999-  1998-  1999- 
1999  2000  1999  2000 
Started interviewing  and 
making  offers  by Jan.  31: 
1st Circuit  2  4  40%  80% 
2nd Circuit  1  5  14%  63% 
3rd Circuit  0  6  0%  55% 
4th Circuit  5  2  71%  100% 
5th Circuit  4  6  57%  75% 
6th Circuit  4  6  29%  75% 
7th Circuit  1  6  14%  86% 
8th Circuit  3  9  33%  64% 
9th Circuit  8  13  40%  93% 
10th  Circuit  2  7  18%  88% 
11th Circuit  0  3  0%  50% 
D.C. Circuit  3  6  43%  100% 
Federal  Circuit  2  2  20%  25% 
Total  35  75  28%  71% 
Done with  interviews  and 
offers  by  Jan  31: 
1st Circuit  2  4  40%  80% 
2nd Circuit  1  5  14%  63% 
3rd Circuit  0  5  0%  45% 
4th Circuit  2  2  29%  100% 
5th Circuit  2  5  29%  63% 
6th Circuit  1  5  7%  63% 
7th Circuit  0  5  0%  71% 
8th Circuit  1  8  13%  57% 
9th Circuit  5  11  25%  79% 
10th  Circuit  1  7  9%  88% 
11th  Circuit  0  3  0%  50% 
D.C.  Circuit  3  6  43%  100% 
Federal  Circuit  2  1  20%  13% 
Total  20  67  16%  64% 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. The University  of Chicago Law Review 
TABLE A9-1 
STUDENT  PERCEPTIONS  REGARDING  THE TIMING 
OF THE MARKET  FOR FEDERAL  JUDICIAL  LAW 
CLERKS  (1999-2000) 
Survey  Comment 
Survey  #25  I ended up having  to miss  the entire  last week of 
classes  to fly out to five or six interviews  on the west 
coast,  arriving  back  the day before  my first  exam  for 
which  I was entirely  unable  to study.... Although 
I'm happy  (and  lucky)  to have ended up with  what 
looks like an exciting  job opportunity,  I'm sure  I'd 
perform  better  at it had I been able to catch  the 
Establishment  clause  in Con law. 
Survey  #34  To have a shot at appellate  court  clerkships  you 
have to apply  in the middle  of [the student's  law 
school's]  interviewing  season.  It's ridiculous  that 
the process  is so front-loaded  with  lots of clerkships 
awarded  in October  and  November.  2Ls in the fall 
have little by the way of writing  samples  and  only 
one year's  grades. 
Survey  #165  Judges  need to be sensitive  to the fact that 
travelling  in December  imposes  enormous  costs. 
My fall grades  reflect  the fact that  I did not have 
adequate  time to pull together  the course  material. 
Survey  #263  [T]he  timing  meant  that  some of us were 
interviewing  during  finals  ...,  obviously  a 
particularly  bad time to be travelling  and  preparing 
well for an interview. 
Survey  #28  Trying  to apply  for clerkships,  do call back 
interviews  [with  law firms],  2nd  year [moot  court 
competition]  and  normal  classwork  was absolute 
hell. 
Survey  #32  I couldn't  postpone  my interviews  to study  [for 
exams].  I believe that  I experienced  adverse  effects 
on my performance  as a result. 
Source:  2000 Student Survey. 
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TABLE A9-2 
STUDENT PERCEPTIONS  REGARDING THE TIMING 
OF THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW 
CLERKS  -  STATEMENTS  ABOUT DIFFICULT  THINGS 
IN THE HIRING PROCESS (1999-2000) 
Survey  "One of the most difficult  things  in the 
[clerkship hiring] process was"... 
Survey  #17  Trying  to schedule all of my interviews  right  before 
finals. 
Survey  #19  Having  to deal with the clerkship  application 
process  so soon after  the fall summer  job 
interviewing  season. 
Survey  #55  Scheduling  during  exam period. 
Survey  #58  Sending  out clerkship  applications,  deciding  on 
summer  work and studying  for finals at the same 
time. 
Survey  #60  Juggling  clerkship  applications,  summer  job 
interviews  and finals. 
Survey  #165  Scheduling  and attending  interviews  during  exam 
week. 
Survey  #166  Scheduling  interviews  on week before finals. 
Survey  #169  Trying  to balance applications,  interviews  for 
summer  associateships,... and studying. 
Survey  #196  Dealing with clerkship  and summer  law firm 
process  simultaneously. 
Survey #199  Ramping up ...  for application in the beginning of 
the 2nd year (while interviewing  with firms). 
Survey  #206  Having  to interview  during  finals  reading  period. 
Source:  2000 Student  Survey. 
2001]  897 The University  of Chicago Law Review 
TABLE A10 
THE  ROLE  OF  REFERENCES  FROM  CLASSMATES 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Survey  In an e-mail  headed  'The  Dish,'  one Washington, 
#154a  D.C.  clerk  leaked  me the names  of my classmates 
who had made  the judge's  shortlist.  In exchange 
for the gossip,  he asked  me to rank  my peers.  It 
didn't  matter  that  I hadn't  worked  directly  with 
them and  knew  nothing  of their  writing  skills.  It 
didn't  matter  that after  a year and a half of law 
school,  I had limited  experience  to know  what 
makes  a good clerk. 
1999  Survey  #119  On the D.C.  Circuit,  peer references  were being 
used to extend  interviews  and  offers.  I think  [it's] 
offensive  that  someone could  get a desired 
clerkship  because  she had a good friend  who 
made calls  on her behalf. 
1999  Survey  #164  [A third-year  student  who would  be clerking  for 
a particular  D.C.  Circuit  judge  the following 
year]  may  have put the good word  in.  Judges 
called  3L's  in law review. 
1999  Survey  #122  Third  year  law students  play an enormous  role. 
The clerks  sort through  the resumes  and  then 
call their  buddies  in the class  below and ask  who 
to interview.  This  was especially  important  when 
no one had any grades  in to speak  of because  the 
process  began  so soon. 
1999  Survey  #43  A 3L friend  from  undergrad.  at Harvard  who will 
be clerking for [a particular  judge] ...  established 
contact  with  clerks  in particular  chambers. 
2000 Survey #3  [A] 3L (future clerk)...  recommended me to his 
future  judge. 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Student  Surveys. 
a This  response  took the form of a newspaper  editorial  that the student  had written  about  the 
market  for  federal  judicial  law  clerks. 
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TABLE All 
THE IMPORTANCE  OF RECOMMENDATIONS  FROM  FAMILIAR 
PROFESSORS  TO JUDGES' HIRING DECISIONS 
Ranking  of the importance  of  Number  of  Cumulative 
recommendation  from  a familiar  judges  % 
professor' 
1 or 2  49  42% 
3 or 4  31  69% 
5 or below,  21  87% 
or a factor 
but not 
ranked 
not a factor  15  100% 
Total  number  of judges  responding:  116 
Source:  2000  Judge  Survey. 
aTies  in rankings  were resolved  by assuming  that recommendations  from a familiar  professor 
received the higher  ranking,  so the data reported  here may overstate  the importance  of such 
recommendations  by a small  margin. 
bSome judges  wrote  in additional  selection  criteria,  so it was  possible  for one of our  eight  listed  cri- 
teria  to receive  a ranking  below  eight. 
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TABLE A12 
THE  ROLE  OF  FACULTY  CLERKSHIP  BROKERS 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Student  One of my professors  gave me a glowing  review 
Survey  #134  when the judge  called  him,  and 15 minutes  later  I 
got the offer. 
1999  Student  [Professor  X] definitely  got me several  interviews 
Survey  #116  by calling  on my behalf.  [Professor  Y]  got me at 
least the [interview  with a particular  prominent 
Eastern  seaboard  judge]  ([that  judge]  told me), 
and  probably  [another  judge]. 
1999  Student  [Dean X] got me the ... interview  [with  a 
Survey  #1  prominent  Ninth Circuit  judge]. 
1999  Student  One professor  basically  got me an interview  with 
Survey  #119  [a prominent  D.C.  Circuit  judge]. 
1999  Student  One recommender  took a very active  role in the 
Survey  #9  process.  I can tell because  he clerked  for a 
particular  judge  who offered  an interview,  lobbied 
the judge on my behalf,  and  served  as a messenger 
to let me know  where  the judge's  hiring  was going. 
He also called  to discuss  how I felt about  different 
judges/circuits. 
1999  Student  One of my professors  really  wanted  me to clerk 
Survey  #114  for a particular  judge.  But that  judge never  called 
me.  When  I accepted  a state clerkship,  this 
professor  was upset and  called  the judge  who she 
wanted  me to clerk  for,  only to find  that  the reason 
this  judge  hadn't  called  me was that  she hadn't 
started  interviewing  yet....  This  judge now thinks 
that  I will reapply  next year,  and  my guess is that 
she will at least interview  me. 
2000  Student  My recommender  got me many  interviews  I 
Survey  #37  wouldn't  have gotten on my own because  he was 
friends  with  many  judges. 
2000  Student  My professor  nominated  the judge I interviewed 
Survey  #167  with. 
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TABLE A12 
THE ROLE  OF  FACULTY  CLERKSHIP  BROKERS  (CONTINUED) 
Survey  Comment 
2000 Student 
Survey  #235 
I told a professor  whom I'm close to that I 
would very much  like to interview  with my 1st 
choice judge.  At that point,  the judge had not 
called me back after I told the chambers  that 
I'd be in his city the following  week. My 
professor  made a call on my behalf. 
Immediately  after the call,  the judge called to 
tell me he'd be incredibly  excited to see me. 
After the judge's  call,  my professor  called me 
to make sure the judge called.  I received  my 
offer at the interview.  Months  later,  when my 
judge sent a letter to all his 2001-2002  clerks 
describing  the other clerks,  he pretty  much 
wrote in my description  that he trusted  "his 
friend"  (my professor). 
2000 Student  One of my professors  called the judge I will be 
Survey  #266  clerking  for and played an integral  role in my 
getting the interview  and clerkship. 
2000 Student  [The]  dean of [the student's]  law school,  good 
Survey  #252  friends  with [a particular]  judge,  called him on 
my behalf. 
2000 Student  [V]arious  [faculty  from the student's  school] 
Survey  #209  played enormous  roles getting  me interviews 
with the three  judges I applied  to. 
2000 Student  [O]ne of my recommenders  carried 
Survey  #165  considerable  weight with several  judges.  I was 
told several  times that her name and 
recommendation  secured  my interview. 
2000 Student  A professor  called to get me an interview 
Survey  #8  despite the fact that all interviews  had been 
filled. 
1999  Judge  Survey  [I] delegate[ ] [hiring]  to [the] Clerkship 
#52  Committee  at a Law School. 
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TABLE A12 
THE  ROLE  OF  FACULTY  CLERKSHIP  BROKERS  (CONTINUED) 
Survey  Comment 
1999  Judge  Survey  I always  take (or almost  always)  one law clerk 
#61  from  Harvard,  recommended  by my classmate, 
[Professor  Z]. 
1999  Judge  Survey  [I have an] arrangement  w[ith]  [a] law school:  I 
#52  hire people we mutually  agree  on:  The 
interview  is a formality  ([and]  sometimes  I hire 
w[ithout]  interviews). 
2000  Judge  Survey  [A]t least one of my clerks  is,  in effect,  picked 
#70  by a certain  law professor. 
Source:  1999  and  2000  Student  Surveys;  1999  and  2000  Judge  Surveys. 